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Basic Exchange Service:  Service within a local calling area provided to customers by the 
incumbent telephone company which allows them to make calls for a monthly charge. 
BOC:  A Bell Operating Company was owned by the parent company, AT&T, which 
provided local and long distance services within a specific region of the country.  Calls 
between regions and internationally where provided by another wholly owned company, 
AT&T Long Lines. 
Certification:  Inspection of proposed non-Bell terminal equipment by an expert agency 
which determines if it can be connected to the network without creating harms. 
Channel:  An electronic path over which communications signals in the form of voice or 
data are transmitted. 
Common Carrier Principle:  The position that regulation should limit the number of 
businesses which provide certain essential public services (such as utilities and 
transportation) in each geographic area.  The contention is this will achieve low-cost, high-
quality service through regulatory oversight using standards of accountability for prices, 
profits, and service.  It argues this approach is preferable to multiple competing firms and 
will result in greater utilization of capacity and therefore lower unit costs.    
                                                          
1 Some definitions are paraphrased from sources in the 1970 to 1985 years with the intent of reflecting 
commonly used terminology of that period.  They are modified by the author to present a clearer and more 
balanced perspective.    
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Connecting Arrangements:  Interface equipment provided by the regulated telephone 
company to be installed between customer-provided terminal equipment and telephone 
network facilities.  The goal was to insure against damaging signals and voltage emanating 
from terminals which could interfere with the service to other customers or possibly create 
hazards for customers or company technicians.   
Cost Averaging:  The policy of the BOCs before competitors entered the market.  It 
provided for all products and services in all geographic areas to be equally priced as the 
means used to establish universal service.   The goal was to permit all users to have access 
to all services at prices they could afford even when the cost to provide a specific service 
to a specific customer was greater than the price.  It also meant that some products and 
service were priced above the cost and this became the target area for new competitors.   
CPE:  This acronym has been used in two ways.  Initially, it meant Customer Premises 
Equipment, but later it also was used to mean Customer Provided Equipment.   
End-to-End responsibility:  The traditionally held belief within telephone companies that 
the only way to ensure quality service is for them to provide and maintain all aspects, which 
included CPE.  
Hard-wired:  Direct connection of CPE to telephone company network rather than through 
inductive or acoustic coupling. 
Independents:  Local telephone operating companies that were not part of the AT&T Bell 
System.   
x 
 
ICT:  Information and Communications Technologies is an umbrella term that includes 
any communication device or application, encompassing: radio, television, cellular phones, 
computer and network hardware and software, satellite systems and so on, as well as the 
various services and applications. 
Interconnection:  A generic term for linking equipment or systems with the principle 
telephone network.  In this dissertation, the term will primarily refer to the connection of 
premises equipment to the access lines of the local telephone network. 
Local loops: Communications facilities that connect a customer’s premises to a carrier’s 
switching center or hub site. 
LRMC:  The minimum increase in total cost associated with an increase of one unit of 
output when all inputs are variable.  The long-run marginal cost curve is shaped by returns 
to scale, a long-run concept, rather than the law of diminishing marginal returns, which is 
a short-run concept.  The telephone companies historically used this accounting method.  
Depreciation rates for capital investment, such as cables and switches, were typically thirty 
years. 
MTS:  Message telecommunications service refers to services made available to customers 
over the nationwide switched network rather than private line services which are furnished 
to a single customer for their exclusive use. 
NARUC:   The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissions represents Public 
Service Commissioners who regulate essential utility service in each state with the charge 
to assure reliable utility service at fair, just and reasonable rates. 
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OTP:  The White House Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP) was established in 
1970.  In 1978, it was merged, along with the Department of Commerce's Office of 
Telecommunications (OT), into the newly created National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration (NTIA).  Before this reorganization, OTP was the principal 
federal agency involved in issues relating to the impact of increased telecommunications 
and computerization on personal privacy.  OT's primary function was to provide OTP with 
scientific and engineering support for managing radio frequencies used by federal 
agencies.   
PBX:  A Private Branch Exchange is a switching system that provides internal 
communications between a customer’s phones and from those phones to the nationwide 
network.  Most PBXs were located on a customer’s premises although local telephone 
companies also began to provide Centrex services which were similar in functionality but 
were located on the telephone company’s premises.   
RBOC:  One of the seven Regional Bell Operating Companies created with the 
implementation of divestiture on January 1, 1984.  All seven were holding companies for 
a combination of the pre-divestiture BOCs. 
USITA/USTA:  The United States Independent Telephone Association was a trade 
organization representing monopoly telephone companies which were not part of the Bell 
System.  After the breakup of AT&T, the name was changed to the United States Telecom 
Association and became open to all providers of telecom services and equipment.   
xii 
 
Vertical services:  Equipment, accessories, or services provided by the telephone company 
to the customer, other than basic local service.  This included extension phones, color sets, 







This dissertation is focused on impacts of technology innovation and governmental 
policies on the telecommunications industry from the 1950s until the passage of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.  Special attention is given to the local Bell Operating 
Companies (BOCs) and to the changes initially driven by competition in Customer 
Premises Equipment (CPE).  Ultimately, it was the federal court’s decision in January 
1982, resulting in AT&T’s divestiture of the BOCs, which permanently changed the entire 
landscape.  However, this study begins well before 1982 to consider the magnitude of the 
BOCs’ tradition of control over all aspects of telephone service and the significance of 
losing that control.   
The terminal, subscriber loop, central office switches, and interoffice trunks had for 
many years been the exclusive province of the regulated telephone operating company.  
Communications lines and terminals were indivisible and installation of any subscriber-
owned equipment violated the federal and state tariffs and carried with it the penalty of 
service disconnection.  The demise of that tradition occurred because of technology 
evolution, initiatives of competitors, changes in customer requirements, BOC responses, 
and ultimately the actions of governmental bodies.  To fully appreciate impacts of the 
court-ordered divestiture and the ramifications of various adjustments necessary by the 
BOCs, mandated that this study extends into the years of the mid-nineties.   
 
 
CHAPTER 1.       INTRODUCTION  
  
Certain dates in modern United States history stand out in the minds of Americans.  
December 7, 1941, November 22, 1963, and September 11, 2001, are clearly notable for 
how they changed the country.  January 8, 1982, is certainly below those dates in its level 
of impact, but still very significant to the telecommunications industry at that time.  Many 
managers had been brought to the AT&T headquarters in New Jersey from the Bell 
Operating Companies (BOCs) to help in preparation of the defense against the Department 
of Justice (DOJ) antitrust case.  These managers and their AT&T counterparts took it very 
seriously and yet were certain of a favorable outcome.  How could it be otherwise?  The 
AT&T companies had a million employees and three million shareholders.  They 
dominated all aspects of the telecommunications industry.   
In general, customers of the BOCs considered their level of service to be good.  
AT&T’s extensive media campaign in 1980 aimed to further reinforce this positive image.  
The goal was to convince the public that it was essential to keep in place the Bell System 
which brought together “23 Partners.”  This referred to the BOCs, Western Electric as a 
supplier, Bell Labs for research and development, and Long Lines for long-distance 
service.  The tagline used was “The System is the Solution.”   
On the Friday morning of January 8, 1982, the managers at AT&T General 
Headquarters in New Jersey and in New York City were called together over closed circuit 
television to watch an announcement by Chairman Charlie Brown about the DOJ antitrust 
case.  A direct communication by the Chairman to employees was a new experience.  Those 
huddled in front of the screens in every hallway of the headquarters building knew it was 
2 
 
big and probably about a settlement.  Perhaps the good news would be that the long trial 
was over and life in the Bell System could proceed, albeit possibly with some minor 
changes.  Instead, the managers received the incredible shock that AT&T would divest the 
BOCs.  The managers brought to AT&T General Headquarters were promptly returned to 
their home companies and played key roles in orchestrating the break-up.  The traditional 
Bell System faced a challenging and uncertain future.   
1.1 Key Points                                                                                                      
This study makes six key assertions regarding Bell System restructuring: 
1. Momentum toward divestiture began in the 1950s, which is well before most 
histories indicate.   
2. Competition in Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) was the leading 
component. 
3. The BOCs were key to the process, even though most historical attention rests 
with AT&T Headquarters. 
4. Industry standards were critical, but difficult to achieve. 
5. The Bell System attitude of invincibility, due to their size and importance to 
society, was a significant factor in their loss of a monopoly position. 
6. In the end, a break-up would be done and competition would be good. 
1.2 Overview of the Story 
Forces emanating from customers and competitors and from technological 
advancements all played roles in pushing the movement toward divestiture.   The political 
and deregulatory tide initially gained traction in large measure because of what was 
happening with the equipment on the premises of the customers. This equipment was 
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installed, owned, and maintained by the serving BOCs and connected to the local network 
of the BOC.  Developments at that level were key to propelling forward deregulation and 
influencing politics in opposition to the BOCs and their parent company, AT&T.   
The reality in business is that the ultimate motivator is profit.  This study considers 
that emerging competitors sought profit while the embedded operators, the BOCs, aimed 
to protect profit.  Within this context, technology was an enabler and governmental 
agencies responded to their clientele (who were voters as well as users).  In addition, 
standards bodies served as enablers and were driven by multiple clients which included the 
embedded telecommunications providers, new entrants, equipment manufacturers, 
governmental bodies, and telecommunications users.  
This opening of the telecommunications system required extensive interconnection 
standards negotiations and agreements.  Significant examples where many players debated 
open standards involved new suppliers of equipment to be installed on the customer 
premises in addition to alternatives to the BOCs for transport and switching services.  As 
data communications grew, large business customers sought options for providers to 
reduce expenses.  In the cases of both voice and data communications, all parties had to 
agree upon interface standards to enable interconnection between the BOCs, the CPE, and 
the emerging transport and switching competitors.   
Both technology and politics were certainly critical components.  Technological 
advances at times facilitated or even helped to create momentum for restructuring.  Policy 
initiatives were necessary to open the doors.  But it was technology that enabled effective 
competition.  This dissertation recognizes both components but explores more deeply than 
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other historical works into the technological aspects.  One example where the power of 
new technology was acknowledged is when a reporter for The Wall Street Journal wrote 
in February of 1981, “The 1934 act2 gave AT&T a monopoly, but technological advances 
have greatly changed the competitive environment.”3   
The Bell System companies manufactured, installed and maintained switching, 
transmission, and terminal components.  The first two categories were equipment in a BOC 
central office and in transmission links that made up the distribution network.  Terminal 
equipment operated on the customer premises.  The focus herein is on the production, 
installation, and maintenance of terminal equipment on the customer premises (CPE).  
Examples were the basic single-line telephone set, teletypewriter equipment, data sets, and 
switching equipment servicing only one customer.  The type of switching equipment 
serving as CPE was a private branch exchange (PBX), which connected individual stations 
on a customer premises with one another and with the public telephone system.  Also, 
important in the time frame of this study, are key telephone systems (KTS) which used 
lighted multi-button telephones that allowed the user to be connected to one of several 
outgoing telephone lines or PBX lines.  And finally, the advent of data terminals was very 
important especially because of the large and powerful competitors it introduced (i.e. IBM). 
The subject of the breakup and its aftermath remains of great interest today.  The 
goal of this dissertation is to contribute to a better understanding of the long story by 
focusing on particularly relevant aspects.  Movement toward a breakup began with the 
                                                          
2 This is a reference to the Telecommunications Act of 1934 which Congress established to specify how the 
industry would operate.  It stayed in effect until the Antitrust Case brought by the Department of Justice 
against AT&T was settled in 1982 and a new Telecommunications Act was passed by Congress in 1996.  
3 Robert Taylor, The Wall Street Journal, 2/11/1981. 
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appearance of competitors desiring to sell telecommunications equipment to be located on 
the premises of customers (CPE) and the endorsement of state and federal regulating 
agencies for this prospect because of their concern that incumbent operators, which leased 
rather than sold CPE, were using inordinately high profits from the leases to improperly 
subsidize pricing of network services.  The Bell System contended these subsidies were 
necessary to fund the costly operation of services in remote areas and hence to continue to 
provide Universal Service4.  Regulators perceived Bell’s position to be an attitude of 
invincibility exhibited through invoking apprehension over the loss of Universal Service 
which would unfairly impact the more remote and low-income areas of population.  This 
attitude had the opposite effect than what was desired as the size of power of the Bell 
System concerned governmental policy-makers.  In this regard, it is important to also 
understand the role of the parent company, AT&T, as compared to that of its subsidiaries, 
the BOCs.  Finally, it is critical to appreciate the impacts of new technologies on the overall 
story.  The timing of these events was made possible by advancements in 
telecommunications technologies, many of which came from the Bell System through Bell 
Labs.   
1.3 Literature Review 
Many good books approach the subject through the lens of policy.  While they may 
acknowledge technological forces, they typically emphasize institutional factors.  One 
offshoot of that approach is a failure to consider in detail what happened closer to the 
ground where decisions were made and impacts were directly felt by the BOCs.  Historical 
                                                          
4 Universal Service in the context of this dissertation means basic voice service widely available to the 
public at affordable rates. 
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events can be viewed from different perspectives.  World War II can be viewed from the 
position of the government officials who took positions which led to the conflict, from the 
generals who executed it or from the soldiers in the trenches.  Similarly, changes in the 
telecommunications industry can be viewed from the perspective of state and federal 
government regulators, top management in AT&T and its competitors, or from those in the 
trenches; meaning employees at all levels in the BOCs.  Much has been written from the 
viewpoints of the first two, but comparatively little from the view of those in the BOCs.  
With the goal of adding to the historical record, attention in this work is given more to the 
operating companies, rather than to AT&T headquarters.   
Jeremy Tunstall discussed the shift that occurred post-World War II, “From static 
regulated technology to dynamic unregulated technology?”5  He described how telecom 
deregulation efforts in Washington involved five areas of politics: The White House, 
Congress, the courts, federal agencies, and lobbyists.  These are important, but Tunstall 
understated the significance of state politics.  Robert Horwitz in The Irony of Regulatory 
Reform: The Deregulation of American Telecommunications noted that deregulation of 
telecommunications was considered by some to be a consequence of changing 
technologies.  However, he deferred to the political process as being of greater 
consequence.6  A comprehensive book on movement from regulation to deregulation is by 
Thomas McCraw entitled Prophets of Regulation.7  Another is by Richard H. K. Vietor 
                                                          
5 Tunstall, Jeremy. Communications Deregulation: The Unleashing of America's Communications Industry 
(New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986).  
6 Horwitz, Robert Britt. The Irony of Regulatory Reform: The Deregulation of American 
Telecommunications (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).  
7 McCraw, Thomas K. Prophets of Regulation: Charles Francis Adams; Louis D.  Brandeis; James M. 
Landis; Alfred E. Kahn (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984). 
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entitled Contrived Competition.8  It would be wrong to argue these forces are unimportant.  
This dissertation merely suggests that forces of technology are typically understated 
regarding their power to drive political actions in comparison to the attention given to 
economic and sociological forces.   
Alfred Kahn argued in, The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions, 
that although telephone service costs increased when measured solely in terms of the 
number of customers, it was important to recognize that the addition of each new subscriber 
did improve the quality and value of service for all by increasing the number of stations 
that could be reached.  However, a monopoly was only inherently natural if one company 
could serve any given number of customers (for example, all in a community) at a lower 
cost than multiple companies would be able to do.9  Kahn challenged the applicability of 
this theory of “network effects” when pursuing airline deregulation during his tenure as 
Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board in the late 1970s.  He believed different industries 
required different governmental oversight.  This was particularly relevant to airlines, but 
also to telecommunications.  Like the airlines, Kahn contended for public utilities, 
including telephone service, the desirability of a regulated monopoly was dissolving.   
In his book, The Myth of the Machine, Lewis Mumford investigated the 
relationships between man and machine and advanced the theory of technological 
determinism.10  This theory was expanded by Thomas P. Hughes, who argued that while it 
was true technology shaped society it was also true that societies shaped technology.  In 
                                                          
8 Vietor, Richard. Contrived Competition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994). 
9 Alfred Edward Kahn, The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions (New York: John Wiley 
& Sons, 1970)  
10 Lewis Mumford, The Myth of the Machine: Technics and Human Development (New  
York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1970) 
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1983, Hughes established his position of eminence with the publication of Networks of 
Power: Electrification in Western Society 1880-1930.11  This analysis is particularly 
relevant to consider when investigating telecommunications evolution because of parallels 
between systems of electrification and systems of telecommunication.  In 1987, Hughes 
was a major contributor to a collection of essays which addressed varied technologies from 
13th-century galleys to 20th-century missile systems.12  The theme was to give equal weight 
to technical, social, economic, and political questions.   His many works through the years 
had unparalleled impacts on shaping studies of the complex sociotechnical networks that 
comprise our modern world.   
The Economics of Innovation in the Telecommunications Industry by John 
McNamara stated that the breakup of AT&T provided a historical opportunity to evaluate 
the impact and value derived from policy actions as they relate to technology evolution in 
an industry before and after restructuring.13  Milton Mueller developed his insights from a 
historical analysis of the concept of Universal Service.  His book begins in the early 1900’s 
and progresses through to the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  Mueller contended the 
goal of Universal Service was to achieve and maintain affordable nationwide 
telecommunications by means of rate averaging and cross-subsidies.  He argued telephone 
companies and state regulators believed a regulated monopoly structure was necessary and 
                                                          
11 Thomas Parke Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930 (Baltimore, 
Md.: John Hopkins Univ. Press, 1983) 
12 Hughes, Thomas P. “The Evolution of Large Technological Systems,” in Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. 
Hughes, and Trevor Pinch, eds., The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the 
Sociology and History of Technology (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987).   
13 McNamara, John R. The Economics of Innovation in the Telecommunications Industry (New York: 
Quorum Books, 1991).  
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competitive market forces had to be subdued to achieve the Universal Service goals.14  Also 
of value, regarding the years leading up to the Telecommunications Act of 1996, is a work 
by Patricia Aufderheide which examined how and why the 1996 Act was developed.  
Aufderheide analyzed the 1996 Act thematically and charted its intended and unintended 
effects on business and policy immediately after enactment.15 
Telecommunication Policy for the Information Age: From Monopoly to 
Competition by Gerald Brock examined the evolution of telecommunication policy in 
relationship to changing technology, industry structure, and industry responses to previous 
policy decisions.  Brock described his book as an “attempt to integrate his knowledge from 
the FCC with academic literature.”16  His writing was woven from a wealth of direct 
experience as previously he was Common Carrier Bureau Chief at the FCC.  While that 
knowledge is valuable, it does tend to provide a perspective skewed toward AT&T rather 
than the BOCs.  An extensive study on AT&T divestiture is The Fall of the Bell System by 
Peter Temin and Louis Galambos.  The work traced and analyzed the events which resulted 
in the breakup of AT&T.  It was commissioned by AT&T Chairman, Charles Brown, who 
granted access to AT&T officers and documents.  As valuable as this is, the fact remains 
that it was written from an AT&T point of view and did not fully address the perspectives 
of the BOCs.17  
                                                          
14 Milton L. Mueller, Jr., Universal Service: Competition, Interconnection, and Monopoly in the Making of 
the American Telephone System (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997).  
15 Patricia Aufderheide, Communications Policy and the Public Interest: The Telecommunications Act of 
1996 (New York: Guilford Press, 1999). 
16 Brock, Gerald W. Telecommunication Policy for the Information Age: From Monopoly to Competition 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 1994.  




Competition in Telecommunications by Jean-Jacques Lafont and Jean Tirole is a 
book aimed at a wide audience of business executives, government officials, and 
academics.  It focused on the policy and economic implications of governmental 
predisposition toward development of increased competition in previously monopoly-
based network industries. The authors contended the movement toward incentive 
regulation and competition in telecommunications was at the forefront and thus could be 
viewed as an indicator of what other network industries would face.18  However, 
telecommunications was only one of multiple increasingly complex network systems.  
Railroads are a prominent early example which in multiple ways presaged what would 
occur in the telecommunications industry.  Steven W. Usselman in his book, Regulating 
Railroad Innovation, explores many of the elements of the railroad system.19  One major 
issue was that it became impractical for a nationwide rail system to function as a network 
of different service providers unless there were agreed upon standards.  In this regard, 
Usselman examined the issues involved with standardizing the technology of steel rails.  
As increasingly complex systems became more integral to business operations, the 
importance of standards continued to grow.  These topics are addressed by James R. 
Beniger in his book on the Information Society.20  In another recent work, Philip Scranton 
and Patrick Fridenson cite standards and standardization as one of the areas that business 
historians might profitably study.21  An extremely valuable work which delves into how 
                                                          
18 Lafont, Jean-Jacques, and Jean Tirole. Competition in Telecommunications (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2000). 
19 Steven W. Usselman, "Chapter 6," in Regulating Railroad Innovation: Business, Technology, and   
Politics in America, 1840-1920 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 215-241. 
20 Beniger, James R., The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information 
Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986).   
21 Scranton, Phillip and Patrick Fridenson, Reimagining Business History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2013). 
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standards-setting became a central element of our political economy, with attention to 
information networks, is Open Standards in the Digital Age by Andrew Russell.22   
1.4  Other Sources 
Recently opened archival files of the former BOCs were extremely valuable in 
understanding the roles of and impacts upon these companies.  Roles of the BOCs and 
impacts upon them are most often relegated to a subservient position.  The attention of the 
media, potential competitors, large business customers, and rulings of governmental 
agencies generally tended to focus on the AT&T parent company.  However, for this study, 
much of the relevant detail on roles of various actors was found in the BOC archives.   
Rather than study all the BOCs, the primary sources were selected from files of the 
Southwestern, Illinois, and Pacific companies.  These companies were at the forefront of 
BOC activities and access was available to extensive archival records and other sources of 
information.  Each of the archives contained sources that the others did not.  For example, 
Southwestern had more general management policy communications, Illinois Bell had 
more technology documents, and Pacific Bell had more customer and media relations 
documents.  To go beyond these three was not likely to add much value because it would 
have become mostly duplicative.   
The archives of today’s AT&T contain records of 11 of the 22 BOCs.  In the years 
after divestiture, the former Southwestern Bell bought the former Pacific Bell, Nevada Bell, 
Southern New England Telephone, Illinois Bell, Indiana Bell, Michigan Bell, Ohio Bell, 
Wisconsin Bell, Southern Bell and South Central Bell.  In 2005, Southwestern Bell 
                                                          
22 Russell, Open Standards and the Digital Age. 
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Corporation bought the legacy AT&T and with it got rights to the AT&T name.  All 
archives of the above-named BOCs were consolidated in their facility located in San 
Antonio, Texas.  Records of the original AT&T Headquarters, AT&T Long Lines, Western 
Electric and Bell Telephone Labs are housed in Warren, New Jersey and are managed by 
the same Director of Archives who oversees the San Antonio center. 
An advantage of undertaking this work now is that AT&T has a 30-year prohibition 
on outside access to many of the internal documents in its archives.  Access for this study 
was permitted to archived documents to the beginning of 1987.  This goes to three years 
after the company was split apart.  The Director of Archives stated that the New Jersey 
location, which focuses on the legacy AT&T headquarters, their long-distance company, 
the R&D labs and the manufacturing company attract a significant number of researchers.  
However, the operating company archives in San Antonio hosts only about 3 or 4 
researchers each year.  The two components of fortunate timing and a focus on the BOCs 
yielded the opportunity to contribute to the base of knowledge beyond what had been 
previously studied from a scholarly historical perspective.   
In San Antonio, files which were examined contained internal communications 
among BOC management and with AT&T headquarters, information reports provided to 
all employees, communications with customers, publicity releases, media coverage, 
legal/regulatory documentation, and interactions with standards bodies.  These extensive 
records address technology advances, strategic plans, deployment plans, implementation 
initiatives and related concerns.  They provide the BOC’s view of competitor actions and 
their perception of motivations for governmental proceedings.  Also, in these files are 
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various documents presented by current or potential future competitors and other 
opponents to the positions of the BOCs.   
Federal and State archives were also worthy of investigation.  These included 
publications and records of the DOJ, FCC, Executive Agencies, Congress, and state Public 
Utility Commissions.  Research conducted at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library also 
provided useful information on federal actions and positions during the 1977 to 1981 period 
(a timeframe of interest because it led to the AT&T antitrust settlement in January 1982).  
Records on the positions and activities of non-governmental organizations, such as the 
United States Telephone Association, consumer activist groups, unions, and standard 
bodies, provided insights of value as they were actors in the process.  Media accounts from 
multiple publications were also reviewed and provided insights on public opinions.  
Identifying and understanding the perspectives of the BOCs was also achieved 
through discussions with individuals who were in key positions across multiple 
departments at multiple levels beginning in the late 1960s.  Some of these individuals may 
have worked at AT&T headquarters for a part of the time frame of interest, but the BOCs 
were their home.  It was not at all surprising to find the emergence of a consensus that the 
story of divestiture, in their opinions, has continuously understated the role of the BOCs.   
1.5 Background 
 
As telephone service in the United States developed in the 19th century, there was 
a duplication of facilities in the telephone industry and technology was not far enough 
advanced to avoid impairment of service and increased costs to the users.  The question 
arose as to how best to ensure that monopolies did not take advantage of their position to 
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charge beyond what was a reasonable price while also encouraging them to spend money 
to innovate and improve their services without the impetus of competition.  Paul Starr 
delves many of these issues in his analysis of the role of government in media and 
communications.  He contends control can reside in private hands until critical moments 
when it becomes in the public interest for politics to take over.  Business should be about 
more than just the marketplace and profits.23  It was in this vein the U.S. Supreme Court 
affirmed in 1877 that state commissions could regulate prices charged by “businesses 
affected with a public interest.”24   
1.6 Chapter Overview 
Chapter 2 describes the early issues and debates surrounding the process of 
deregulating the telephone business.  The focus is on the period from the beginning of 
telephony until the 1950s.  In Chapter 3 technology and associated processes leading to 
competition in Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) are identified and their impacts 
evaluated.  It describes the changes required within the BOCs to effectively operate in a 
competitive environment.  The significant impacts on telecommunications which emerged 
during the early period of President Jimmy Carter’s time in office are examined in Chapter 
4.  In this period technology emerged as a major driver of change and politics sought to 
establish a proper role for government in adapting the regulatory climate to those changes.   
The position of the Carter administration regarding deregulation toward the end of 
his time in office is addressed in Chapter 5.  Impacts of policy decisions on the 
telecommunications industry are examined.  Chapter 6 reviews the final steps in the process 
                                                          
23 Paul Starr, The Creation of the Media: Political Origins of Modern Communications (New York: Basic 
Books, 2004). 
24 U.S. Supreme Court, Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125-26 (1877). 
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leading to the break-up of the Bell System. Also, the subsequent actions required to 
implement the government ruling are described.  AT&T was ordered to divest the Bell 
Operating Companies (BOCs) effective on January 8, 1984.  Chapter 7 reviews impacts of 
the divestiture decree and subsequent governmental actions.  It covers the adjustments to 
telecommunications policies made by Congress in the 1996 Communications Act, which 
replaced a 1934 Act, and ends with the presentation of overall conclusions. 
 
  




CHAPTER 2.      THE REGULATORY BACKGROUND 
 
This chapter provides with a brief overview of the initial advantages available to 
the Bell System in their early years and how their position changed with time.  It addresses 
conditions which encouraged competitors to seek entry into previously monopoly services 
provided by the telephone companies.  The period of interest runs from the earliest years 
of telephones until the middle of the 20th century.   
During this early time frame, potential new entrants began to see opportunities to 
undercut prices charged customers through using an approach known as “cherry-picking.”  
This terminology referred to the entry by competitors into services which were artificially 
priced high by the incumbent telephone company to enable keeping the price of basic 
services low.  The goal of low pricing was encouraging the expansion of users for the 
benefit of the nation.  Of course, it was beneficial to the telephone company as well. 
2.1 The Early Years 
A great advantage enjoyed by Bell Telephone at the beginning of the 
telecommunications industry came from patent laws.  As Christopher Beauchamp 
described in his book, Invented by Law, there were considerable questions concerning the 
identity of the true inventor of the telephone.25  Today we accept it was Alexander Graham 
Bell, but the reality is that lawyers and judges debated at great length concerning what it 
meant to be the first person to create the technology and to describe it in a fashion that was 
the most effective for registration of a patent.  Hence, the proposition by Beauchamp that 
the telephone, and other inventions as well, were assigned to owners by patent laws and by 
                                                          
25 Christopher Beauchamp, Invented by Law: Alexander Graham Bell and the Patent That Changed 
America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015). 
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the lawyers whose arguments were the most persuasive.  For American Bell, later known 
as AT&T, the first patent was only the beginning of a long history of domination of the 
communications industry which was based largely on legal ownership of key inventions.   
There was an effort by Western Union Telegraph Company to enter the telephone 
business using the inventions of Thomas Edison and Elisha Gray.  Bell sued for patent 
infringement and won the case in 1880.  The settlement ensured control of the telephone 
business by Bell until 1894 when the last patent protecting Bell’s original invention 
expired.26  Despite this expiration, Bell still fought continuing legal battles to protect its 
monopoly.  However, across the country rival companies jumped into the market for phone 
service and battled for the right to serve the same territory.  The result was that some 
customers had to purchase service from multiple companies to be sure they could reach all 
the people they might want to talk with over the phone.  This was unpractical and provided 
the motivation for federal laws establishing phone service as a ‘natural monopoly” to be 
provided under a system of regulations under the purview of the individual states.  This 
was codified in the Communications Act of 1934.    
In his book, Network Nation, Richard K. John provides an excellent and detailed 
history of the early years of the telephone business in the United States.  Of special interest 
are the insights concerning arguments surrounding Universal Service, which for many 
years provided cover against those who sought to compete with the monopoly of the Bell 
                                                          
26 The importance of making and defending patent claims is noted by George Smith: “Typical of the 
organization of all the major firms in the electrical industries, telegraph and telephone company 
organization ‘crystallized around patent rights,’ . . .  Survival (in that as well as in most emerging high-
technology businesses of the era) required almost obsessive attention to patent claims wherever they arose.”  




Companies.  John quotes the AT&T president, Theodore N. Vail, who in the annual 
shareholder's report of 1910 foresaw the day when there would be a “universal wire 
system” that was as extensive as the road system leading from everyone’s door to every 
other person’s door.  When that dream was achieved, the goal of continuing it was key in 
holding off efforts from would-be competitors.  John provides descriptions of how the 
attacks and counter-actions continued over most of the 20th century until AT&T eventually 
was overcome.27  Even though the Universal Service “shield” was penetrated, the 
explanations and insights from John are most valuable in understanding why it lasted so 
long as it did.   
 2.2 Perspectives on Regulation 
 Theodore N. Vail, AT&T’s first president, recognized the need to act.  In 1907, he 
called for regulation of the telecommunications industry on the premise that it qualified as 
a natural monopoly being operated in the public interest.28  In agreement with that position, 
state legislatures added telecommunications to their list of natural monopolies for which 
they were in the process of creating agencies to regulate at the state level.  The first such 
agencies created were in the states of New York and Wisconsin.   
In 1910, the Interstate Commerce Commission began regulation of interstate 
telephone communications.  Later, The Communications Act of 1934 created a federal 
agency, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), “For the purpose of regulating 
interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make 
                                                          
27 Richard R. John, Network Nation: Inventing American Telecommunications (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2010). 
28 Louis Galambos, "Theodore N. Vail and the Role of Innovation in the Modern Bell System," Business 
History Review 66, no. 1 (Spring 1992): 101-103. 
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available, so far as possible, to all people of the United States a rapid, efficient, nation-
wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at 
reasonable charges . . .”29  This Act specifically exempted the FCC from jurisdiction over 
intrastate charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities or regulations.  Telephone 
companies argued that these forms of regulation worked and universal service at low prices 
had been achieved.  They further argued that the network is a constantly changing system 
which requires extreme care to ensure that modification of one part does not adversely 
affect the whole.  They contended this was achieved because the regulatory agencies were 
effective in holding the telephone companies responsible for providing quality service at a 
reasonable cost.  To accomplish this required the system to be based upon the “end-to-end” 
service concept and included equipment on the premises, local cables, switching machines 
and inter-machine transmission.  Consequently, the system worked best when designed, 
built and maintained by the regulated monopoly of the telephone companies.30  
In his book, Shaping American Telecommunications, Christopher Sterling also 
recognized the importance of telecommunications public policy because, unlike most other 
countries, in the United States the government role was never one of ownership, but of 
regulation.  Sterling goes on to contend, “More than other sectors of a nation’s economy, 
telecommunications operates through a unique melding of technology, economics, and 
policy.”31   
                                                          
29 United States 73rd Congress, Communications Act of 1934, Public Law No. 416, TITLE I Section1, June 
19, 1934. 
30 AT&T, A Competition Issue publication, March 4, 1974.  
31 Christopher H. Sterling, Shaping American Telecommunications: A History of Technology, Policy, and 
Politics (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2006), 1. 
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The pricing of local service by the BOCs was required by regulators to be kept low 
but regulators did permit increasing the price of long distance service to subsidize local 
service.  The result was that entry into long distance service was attractive to competitors 
who were not required to provide the less profitable local service and who also did not have 
the legacy plant which was less cost effective to operate than newer technologies.  The 
BOCs also were required to provide “universal service” which meant serving some very 
unprofitable locations, such as rural areas.  As emphasized by Mueller, this accounts for 
much of the cross-subsidy necessary to achieve the objective of wide availability and 
affordability of telephone service which was at the heart of universal service.  However, 
Rate of Return (ROR) regulation did enable the BOCs to increase their overall revenue by 
investing more.  Depreciation rates for major investments such as new switches or cables 
were negotiated with regulators.  Also at issue was what expenditures would be capitalized 
or expensed.  If capitalized and depreciated over a long period (typically 30 years for a 
switching system) then the pricing of services allowed by regulators could be based on a 
higher investment.  Thus, investment expenditures in a monopoly environment are more 
favorable the longer the depreciation period extends.  In a competitive industry, however, 
depreciation rates must be tightly managed by service providers in order to achieve 
competitive pricing while maintaining a return on investment which meets the expectations 
of investors.   
Another consideration for the BOCs was that they were required by AT&T 
headquarters to pay a “license contract” charge to AT&T for the right to operate in licensed 
areas and to support the AT&T headquarters staff.  There were multiple forms of oversight 
for the BOCs to deal with on these and other issues.  At the federal level, there was the 
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FCC, DOJ, and Congress.  There were also state utility commissions, which set rates and 
rules.  City councils controlled right-of-way for cables and, in some locations, also set rates. 
2.3 Views of Competition 
Beyond the merits of competition for the customer, the case could be made there 
were advantages to the BOCs also.  The telephone service providers operated in a capital-
intensive industry.  The Pacific Telephone Company testified in a 1975 rate increase case 
that they had to significantly reduce their capital program and delay $50 million per year 
of improvements to avoid a decline in bond ratings and increased cost of debt.  Over the 
same period, the capital impacts of installing company-owned residential telephones 
averaged $150 million per year.  This investment would be avoided if customers could 
purchase the instruments.  It is especially enlightening to consider that in the same rate case 
the telephone company argued that they lost money on each telephone extension.  In this 
situation, why would a BOC not agree to allow customer-owned equipment?32  The answer 
was because, under rate-of-return regulation, a greater capital investment meant greater 
revenue.  Therefore, even at a loss, it could be desirable to increase investment to drive up 
the rate base.  Beyond the financial impacts, another part of the answer was due to the long-
held tradition of a focus on service quality and reliability.  There were fears that losing end-
to-end control would cause negative impacts not only the customer base but also the many 
employees who took great pride in being part of the Bell System. 
 Still, some independent voices of concern over the changes made their way into the 
media and public consciousness.  The financial editor of a major newspaper argued that the 




regulated local phone companies were charged to provide ‘universal telephone service’ to 
the widest number of customers at the lowest possible cost.  Basic CPE and local phone 
service could be provided at a price less than the cost, with the difference made up by the 
telephone company charging higher rates for other kinds of equipment and services.  This 
would no longer be possible when the government enabled competitors to enter only the 
most profitable parts of telecommunications.33  It was an argument that was in the minority.   
Andrew Davis makes the case that during the 1970s, the service requirements of 
large, multi-location businesses for data transmission between computer sites in the 
emerging digital technology environment could no longer be adequately met by monopoly, 
regulated telephone operating companies mandated to provide universal service, were 
controlled by a central headquarters, and dependent upon an in-house supplier.  Corporate 
users and electronics manufacturers joined the campaign to break apart the Bell System 
and enable new providers to meet their needs.  In order to achieve the innovation and 
flexibility they needed required an open architecture with full and free competition.  This 
is demonstrated by the fact that many large corporations began building their own private 
systems.  General Motors and Walmart are notable examples.  An extreme example was 
Bank of America.  By 1985, it owned and operated seventy-six separate data networks.  
The bank’s control center was unable to effectively monitor all the different networks, and 
many of the networks were unable to support new applications such as networked ATM 
Machines and money transfer systems.  Network planning and control were in the hands 
of the bank’s systems engineering headquarters, but network maintenance responsibility 
                                                          
33 Donald Bauder, San Diego Union, April 30, 1976, C-8. 
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was mandated to reside with the operating telephone companies who owned the facilities 
but had diverse priorities.34   
The preferred solution for large businesses was the latitude to turn to one 
specialized data operator.  Consequently, a split emerged between the societal requirements 
for universal basic telephone service and the private demands for specialized digital 
services and technologies.  Large corporations which required a nationwide or even 
worldwide telecommunications network capable of transmitting and receiving data 
between computers, at low cost, wanted greater control over terminal equipment attached 
to their private networks.  Two schools of thought emerged.  One view held that during a 
period of dynamic technological change, a private corporation provided the greatest and 
most effective spur to expansion and modernization while government control is 
unnecessarily bureaucratic and unresponsive to change.  Under competition, private 
companies could seek out new markets and serve otherwise unsatisfied demand.   
The contrasting view was from the more traditional interests, including regulators 
and unions.  These groups argued for government controls over monopolies on the grounds 
of efficiency and social equity.  They believed economies of scale and scope were so large 
in the telecommunications sector that multiple competitors would never match the 
efficiency attained by a single company.  This contrasting view held that the growing 
number of private providers of transmission and terminal equipment reduced the volume 
of sales for any one provider which then increased the costs for the residential and small 
business users of a public system.  One consideration, not given adequate credence, was 
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the size of the telephone industry.  Such a huge volume of products should be expected to 
be able to support many suppliers.  In addition, another impact was thought to be a 
weakening of governmental ability to promote social equity and national economic 
development.  Unions anticipated more difficult labor negotiations due to more providers 
being involved.35   
Despite the presence of opposition, movement toward competition clearly 
continued to gain momentum from the digital revolution.  Eventually, this revolution 
entailed the actual merging of computers and communications.  Open interfaces for 
interconnection of equipment and services from diverse providers were essential to the 
success of the movement toward open competition.  Detailed specifications for standards 
were required as they were in other systems, such as the railroad, gas or power industries.  
Indeed, equal access to customers could not be achieved without standard network 
terminating equipment and an agreed upon open network architecture.  This is well covered 
in Open Standards in the Digital Age by Andrew Russell.36  The process of negotiating 
standards to achieve openness across various network providers was complex because of 
the many diverse players with varied motivations.  To illustrate this point, there were about 
150 different kinds of special service circuits, each having a different configuration and 
using different equipment at the ends.  Special service circuits were used for capabilities 
such as automated teller machines, host-to-host data communications, and voice circuits.  
Service on a given special service circuit could be provided by several network providers.  
As with any telecommunications circuit, special service circuits failed from time to time.  
                                                          
35 Ibid. 
36 Andrew L. Russell, Open Standards and the Digital Age (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
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When a customer reported trouble with a circuit, a test was made to determine the cause.  
This test was accomplished by an intelligent network terminating device which was 
remotely activated.  After activation, the device measured the frequency and level of 
signals sent from a testing location utilizing a computer-based, one-person, remote-access-
and-test-system.  The system was designed to provide access and testing functions over a 
central interface, normally located at a service center.  Intelligent devices made by different 
manufacturers had features that were functionally identical but activated differently.  To 
further complicate matters, various local providers attempted to standardize intelligent 
features and operations to their own internal use without regard to the practices and 
procedures used by other local telephone companies or other long distance providers.37  
Even though there were significant challenges, it was possible to accomplish the objectives.  
By the early 1990s, The United States, and most other modern countries had liberalized 
terminal equipment and information services.  The United States was among the most 
aggressive as evidenced by the successful implementation of the 1984 break-up of the Bell 
System and its replacement by a multiple-player system while retaining and growing an 
advanced and reliable telecommunications capability. 
 2.4 Roles of AT&T and the BOCs 
Overarching decisions were made at AT&T headquarters.  However, the BOCs 
provided input to AT&T headquarters and were the primary interface with state and local 
governmental entities.  The BOCs also managed relations with customers, labor unions, 
                                                          
37 Ackroff, John. Patent Publication US5105438 A, AT&T Bell Labs, 1990. 
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suppliers, competitors, and media outlets.  Finally, the BOCs also held ultimate 
responsibility for implementation.   
From the vantage point of today, some things are indeed clearer.  But, questions 
which can be more deeply investigated do remain.  In what ways does the evolution of the 
telecommunications industry compare to other large deregulated systems-based industries?  
How and when did significant competition develop with CPE as the early driver? What 
were the interrelationships among the main drivers of divestiture?  What were the roles of 
the BOCs before and after divestiture?  And finally, how did standards figure into the 
picture?   
Beyond the fact that our world has been profoundly altered by new communications 
capabilities and an evolving telecommunications industry structure, there are also 
numerous parallels to other business areas.  Other industries have similarly been moved 
from regulated to deregulated, and from monopolistic to competitive.  Industries that 
provide services to the general public (railroads, airlines, gas, and power) have dealt with 
many of the same issues as telephone companies.  Government oversight and assignment 
of limited resources (airline terminals, right-of-ways, rate setting, and the number of 
allowable providers) have evolved over time.  These parallels make this dissertation 
relevant to those who study other industries that have had comparable regulatory pressures, 





2.5 On the Road to Full Competition 
The movement toward CPE provided by the customer was only a very first step on 
the road toward ending the telecom monopoly.  Recognizing the necessity of maintaining 
Universal Service while enabling competition and advancing innovation was a major 
political and regulatory challenge.  Every initiative aimed at creating the optimum 
competitive environment was violently opposed by the Bell System.  The FCC put the first 
chink in the BOC’s armor of being the sole end-to-end provider by granting authorization 
to a CPE competitor in 1956.  That company was Hush-A-Phone.  It enabled privacy by a 
user in a manner somewhat like simply cupping your hand over the transmitter.   
The next CPE competitor, Carterphone, moved a bit farther by acoustically 
connecting landline service to radio communications.  Carterphone was granted approval 
by the FCC in June 1968.  It was required to use an interface device provided by the BOC.  
By 1973, a variety of “hard-wired” CPE were permitted.  Then, in 1977, CPE was no longer 
required to use a BOC supplied interface so long as their equipment had been tested and 
approved by an independent engineering board.   
There was another separate landmark filing for telecommunications competition 
before the FCC in the same period as the Carterphone debates.  The other request was 
pressed by a newly formed company named Microwave Communications Incorporated 
(MCI).  It involved competition in the telephone network itself, rather than the premises 
equipment.  MCI requested the authority to build and sell special services through their 
privately owned and operated communications channels between Chicago and St. Louis.  
The FCC’s Common Carrier Bureau strongly recommended that the FCC approve the 
service.  It would mean construction of parallel and competitive facilities to the incumbent 
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regulated monopoly of AT&T.  The FCC request was given final approval by the FCC in 
August 1969.   
The advent of transport providers, such as Microwave Communications Inc. (MCI), 
who gained the right to sell private line voice and data circuits and later to be granted Equal 
Access (EA) to local Telco networks by their previously private line customers, continued 
the pressures.  To enable connections to various providers of CPE and of transport required 
standards for equipment to terminate network channels of both the BOCs and the transport 
competitors.  Motivations, actions, and degrees of success by the various actors are 
explored and assessed in this dissertation.   
Clearly, the motivations for, and the approach by government toward, regulation 
has changed over time.  Forces created by wars, economic cycles, and technological 
advances had their impacts.  As an example, a few railroad companies once had control of 
the market and passengers or transporters were confined to go where and when the railroad 
operators decided.38  With the technology of the Interstate Highway system, users had a 
much greater choice of where and when.  Similarly, radio and television used to confine 
customers to hearing and seeing when and what others decided.  Now, with the internet 
and information age, users hear or see what they want and when they want – plus they can 
add their own content.  The book, Prophets of Regulation by Thomas K. McGraw addresses 
time periods and forces at work regarding regulation grouped by the leaders who 
                                                          
38 Although typically not a monopoly, except in some local areas, they were a national oligopoly. The term 
refers to a market structure in which a small number of firms has the large majority of market share. 
An oligopoly is similar to a monopoly, except that rather than one firm, two or more firms dominate the 
market and have control over the services or goods supplied as well as the prices charged. 
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exemplified their era.39   According to this book, regulation as a whole assumed enhanced 
importance during four specific periods of United States history.  McCraw identifies these 
as the 1870s, early years of industrialization; 1900-1916, the Progressive Era; the 1930s, 
Roosevelt’s New Deal; and the 1970s.  McCraw points out in this book that the 1970s were 
unique because during that period both regulation and deregulation somehow grew 
simultaneously.  McCraw praised Alfred E. Kahn and the movement toward deregulation 
which President Jimmy Carter made a priority.40  This deregulation movement during the 
Carter administration was a significant factor in the eventual break-up of the Bell System.  
Prophets of Regulation was published in 1984, the year when the Bell System break-up 
was implemented.41  Richard H. K. Vietor similarly points to the two periods of the 1930s 
and the 1970s, which he calls The Great Depression and The Great Stagflation, as framing 
an era of regulation.42   
Louis Galambos explores the institutional and cultural orientation of AT&T which 
Vail created and his successor, Walter S. Gifford, continued.  It was a commitment to 
technological progress while maintaining the highest possible quality and affordability of 
service.  Galambos notes the Vail philosophy was so ingrained in the Bell System 
companies that it was firmly held until the 1970s.43 Initially, this meant pricing long 
                                                          
39 McGraw. 
40 Ibid. 
41 An article by McCraw published in 2009 seems to take the position that deregulation was a failure 
because it brought on the severe economic recession of 2008.  McCraw wrote that without the rigorous 
oversight of regulation, “. . . movement of vast sums from the regulated sunshine to the unregulated 
shadows became inevitable.”  Although he supported strong Security and Exchange Commission controls 
over the financial industry, he did not address increased regulation in other areas.  It appears reasonable that 
he believed regulation would be justified in some areas, such as financial transactions, but not in others, 
such as telecommunications.  See, Thomas K. McCraw, “Regulate, Baby, Regulate.” The New Republic 
240, no. 4 (March 18, 2009). 
42 Vietor. 
43 Galambos, Louis. "Theodore N. Vail and the Role of Innovation in the Modern Bell System." The 
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distance, which was capital intensive and expensive to maintain, below its cost to provide.  
The rationale was to encourage customers to purchase local service for the purpose of 
calling long distance.  As technology advanced, the cost factors changed and long distance 
became more profitable than local service.  The disparity between costs and prices of long 
distance and local service was an accepted condition under the regulated monopoly model.  
Long distance, as well as business services, subsidizing local residential service in order to 
keep those rates low was considered to be in the public interest.   
2.6 Judicial Actions 
In 1956, the DOJ settled with a consent decree a suit that alleged AT&T’s 
equipment subsidiary (Western Electric) controlled the telephone equipment market in 
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.  The suit argued that AT&T had granted exclusive 
licenses to Western Electric and required its operating companies to make purchases only 
from them.   The DOJ’s proposed remedy was a complete divestiture of Western Electric 
and a requirement for the BOCs to make their purchases in a competitive market.  Instead 
of the entire divestiture of Western Electric, there was an agreement by AT&T to divest 
selected non-telecommunications related business units and to make its portfolio of patents 
available on a royalty-free basis.  In an effort to avoid legal actions, AT&T had already 
offered before the suit was filed to make patents available at a reasonably low charge and 
had made the transistor available on that basis.  AT&T emerged the winner in this case 
since they retained Western Electric and could still require the BOCs to purchase 
equipment solely from them.  There was a congressional investigation, but it was concluded 
that the suit would not be won by the DOJ because it could be argued that the FCC had 
jurisdiction and would adequately regulate the business.  Further, there was concern that 
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divestiture of Western Electric may, in fact, lead to higher cost of equipment and therefore 
higher telephone rates.44  However, it did signal the beginning of a 40-year long process in 
the policy making arena which eventually revolutionized the industry. Technological 
advancement reinforced the viability of change.  
2.7 CPE Interconnection 
The movement toward competition in the telephone business continued to proceed 
forward in the United States.  In the 1960s, the FCC proposed that it would be in the public 
interest to encourage competition in the provision of CPE.  Telephone company policies 
had proceeded to foreclose the potential for competition by requiring customers to obtain 
CPE exclusively from them.45  Since early in the 20th Century, the telephone industry was 
regulated on both the state and federal levels.46  In 1968, the Federal Communications 
Commission took the lead by issuing a ruling that customer owned equipment could be 
interconnected to the nationwide telephone network if the equipment was not harmful to 
the network.  The long-standing dual authority was challenged when a state commission 
filed a federal lawsuit to block the FCC from its efforts to institute competition by requiring 
telephone companies to interconnect with CPE provided by others.  In what became known 
at the Telerent decision, the Fourth Circuit Court upheld the FCC’s pro-competitive policy 
against attempts by state regulatory agencies to block interconnection.  The court ruled that 
                                                          
44 Manley R. Irwin, The Telecommunication Industry: Integration Vs. Competition (New York: Praeger, 
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45 Harry M. Trebing, Common Carrier Regulation-The Silent Crisis, 34 Law and Contemporary Problems, 
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46 Federal regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) began in 1910, while state regulation 
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the FCC, not the states, had jurisdiction over the telephone companies' interconnection 
policy.47  
The Telerent ruling did not end the controversy over competition in the telephone 
equipment industry. The local telephone operating companies could still thwart 
competition by manipulating intrastate local and long distance telephone rates, which were 
beyond the reach of the FCC, in order to subsidize equipment prices and thus gain an 
advantage over their competitors.  To ensure effective competition in the equipment 
industry, the FCC, and the state commissions were required to monitor subsidization.48  
Still, this ruling was a significant step in creating the interconnect industry and introducing 
competition within the telephone terminal equipment business.  The regulated telephone 
companies had been requiring expensive interface devices for the privately provided 
equipment.  With this ruling, the court affirmed FCC policy authority for enabling direct 
connection of equipment provided by non-telephone company entities to the telephone 
network.  However, the FCC continued to require this equipment to meet safety and 
performance standards and be registered with the FCC.   
Companies which manufactured terminal equipment persuasively argued they 
could reduce costs for customers.  For example, a typical Bell Operating Company (BOC) 
monthly charge for an extension phone was $12 per year.  Retail chain stores sold 
extensions for a one-time charge of $22.  In a similar manner regarding transport, Pacific 
                                                          
47 537 F.2d 787 (4th Circuit Federal Court), Dec. 14, 1976. 
48 In this context, subsidization refers to the failure of a regulated firm to recover its long-run marginal 
costs on a particular service.  This becomes a concern when profits from a regulated or non-competitive 
offering (i.e., local phone service) is used to reduce the pricing of an offering which is unregulated and 
competitive (i.e., CPE).  If this subsidization is permitted the result is an unfair competitive advantage for 
the BOC.     
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Telephone charged 61 cents/minute for a regulated intrastate call from San Francisco to 
Palm Springs while an interstate call, open to competition, from San Francisco to Las 
Vegas of the same distance cost only 48 cents/minute.49  This is analogous to the situation 
of intrastate versus interstate airplane flights before deregulation and open competition.    
Concurrently with their legal battles and claims of adverse impacts on universal 
service, AT&T continued to expand the reach of their telephone system across the country.  
Funding requirements of expansion led to the need for unpopular rate increases while still 
leaving large pockets of market potential unsatisfied.  Bell was often held up by potential 
competitors and by members of the populist movement as an example of a distant, 
impersonal corporation growing rich by maintaining a stranglehold on a popular and useful 
product and its related services.  In contrast, Bell’s management “had come to believe, and 
believe honestly, that anyone who attempted to enter the telephone field, no matter through 
what gate, was an interloper and a lawbreaker.”50 
With their near monopoly power, Bell was able to make huge profits.  For example, 
they required that telephones connected to their network be made only by Western Electric 
which was a wholly owned subsidiary.  Further, they also required the sets be leased rather 
than bought.  Manufacturing a set cost only four dollars and the annual lease amount was 
twelve dollars.  A substantial profit was assured.  However, this profit did not prove 
sufficient to fund the need to continue to grow the networks reach.  Few of the local 
exchanges were able to fund expansion without local service rate increases.  This created 
                                                          
49 Edgar Buttner, President of California Interconnect Association, San Francisco Examiner, April 15, 
1976, 33-34. 
50 Paul A. Latzke, A Fight with an Octopus, (Telephone Press,1906). 
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continuing conflicts with the subscribers and citizen groups took these complaints to 
government officials.51    
Throughout the deregulation debates, government regulators had struggled with the 
issues of competition versus regulation.  The Deputy Chairman of the New York State 
Public Service Commission had this to say at a conference: 
“. . . as a general matter, the economy will prosper and the welfare of 
consumers will be advanced if business firms are afforded maximum 
latitude in competing with one another in seeking to satisfy the needs and 
desires of particular customers.  The regulation of public utilities is seen as 
an exception to this general approach, an exception made necessary by the 
inevitably monopolistic character of major aspects of public utility 
operations.”52  
This comment goes right to the heart of the issue.  The point of contention revolved 
around the nature of any exceptions to open competition.  Most regulators agreed 
exceptions should be no broader than the conditions which made it necessary.  The problem 
with telecommunications was deciding on the necessity; especially considering the 
changing nature of technology in that industry.  Also, to the extent that some portions of a 
public utility operation may be conducted under competitive conditions, it was logical to 
remove those segments from the regulatory sphere in order to facilitate customer choice 
among competing firms.  This viewpoint explains why it was considered appropriate to 
                                                          
51 Mueller, 33-37.  
52 William K. Jones. Deputy Chairman, New York State Public Service Commission (Presentation at a 
Seminar of the International Communications Association, Phoenix, Ariz., January 25, 1973). 
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favor the liberalization of interconnection standards and seek to transition 
telecommunications terminal equipment from the regulated sector to the competitive 
sphere.   
Telephone operating companies countered that the telephone network as it was then 
operated and regulated functioned satisfactorily, in most if not all aspects and any 
disruption of the present system was more likely to be harmful than beneficial.  Further, 
the effectiveness of certification could not be proven because its use had not been 
permitted.  Therefore, experimentation in limited areas, with respect to specific types of 
apparatus, was begun by the Federal Communications Commission, working in 
conjunction with state regulatory officials.  The concentration was on standards for specific 
types of apparatus (such as PBX equipment).  Specifically, the New York State Public 
Service Commission was one of the lead agencies which were instrumental in studying the 
feasibility of a liberalized form of interconnection in a limited geographical area.  
Regulatory bodies believed that such piecemeal moves were appropriate responses because 
both caution and experimentation were necessary.53  
2.8 Essential Technical Standards 
Regulatory concerns varied somewhat among the different governmental agencies, 
but an area of agreement was the need for care to be taken in the development of technical 
interface standards to preclude their use, intended or unintended, for anticompetitive 
                                                          
53 AT&T had repeatedly argued there could be damage to network transmission and switching systems if 
equipment manufactured by suppliers not affiliated with the incumbent telephone companies was permitted 
to be introduced. Among the possible dangers could be erratic voltage generation on telephone lines, 
improper network control signaling, and poor service due to distortion of signals.  Most State Commissions 
were concerned that the potential for damage was greater than the possible benefits.  i.e. North Carolina 
Utilities Commission v. FCC, No. 76-1002 (4th Circuit, filed Jan. 2, 1976). 
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purposes.  For example, AT&T sought standards which would ban the mixture of company-
owned and customer-owned terminal equipment on the same telephone access line.  The 
justification for this was to provide technical ease in testing for equipment defects.  State 
regulators considered the justification to be insufficient to offset their concern that the 
telephone company may use the restriction to discriminate against customer owned 
equipment in order to favor their own equipment offerings.  Eventually, a general 
agreement emerged among regulators that the telephone network should be protected from 
degradation resulting from the interconnection of poorly designed, manufactured, installed 
or maintained customer owned equipment.  There was also agreement that, by using a 
standardized interface device, an acceptable level of protection could be achieved against 
most kinds of technical harm to the network and, in some circumstances at least, something 
other than an interface device could suffice.54  
 Even in light of developing regulatory consensus, AT&T had continued to argue its 
charge was to provide the best possible telephone service to the United States and to 
accomplish this required it to be the sole provider under government scrutiny.  In a speech 
to the 1973 National Association of Regulatory Utilities Commission (NARUC) 
convention, the AT&T Chairman said, “The story of our unusual obligation of 
responsibility and service is being told forcefully and with conviction.  But the acid test 
will be whether the public hears and accepts our arguments that it is their 
telecommunications service the Bell System is trying to protect.”55   
                                                          
54 William K. Jones. Deputy Chairman and Commissioner, New York State Public Service Commission, 
(Presentation at a Seminar of the International Communications Association, Phoenix, Ariz., January 25, 
1973). 
55 John deButts, AT&T Chairman, (Presentation at NARUC convention, 1973).  
37 
 
 The fundamental argument for a regulated telephone monopoly was well 
understood by deButts and his management team.  It was based on the long-held concept 
of standardized and universally available telephone service along with the need for that 
service to be of high quality.  This meant a reliable telephone network that covered all the 
United States, was technologically integrated and connected as many citizens as possible.  
The objective was to unify the country and span the realms of economic and social policy.  
In its most common terms, the concept also meant maintaining affordable local rates by 
means of rate averaging and cross-subsides.  There was a natural fit between a telephone 
monopoly and universal service objectives.  A monopoly simplified standardization and 
provided the basis for nationwide connectivity.  It also made it easier to conform rates to 
social policy goals.  Use of long-distance revenues to subsidize local service made access 
to basic telephony affordable to large numbers of citizens.  That goal was mostly realized 
when AT&T divestiture occurred in 1984 because 92 percent of homes in the United States 
had telephones.  However, by that time, extending universal service to the emerging 




CHAPTER 3.    LOSING END-TO-END CONTROL  
 
In this chapter, the technology and associated processes leading to competition in 
Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) are identified and their impacts evaluated.  Prior to 
the appearance of these new potential providers of equipment to be located on the customer 
premises, the incumbent operators had complete control over all aspects of end-to-end 
telephone service.  The first appearance of a non-telephone company component was a 
very simple inactive device.  This movement constituted the first assault on the armor of 
what had been considered a comprehensive natural monopoly.  While it was successfully 
rejected, other pieces of equipment with increasing degrees of complexity and, the 
telephone companies believed, increasing potential for interference appeared.   
Subsequently, active CPE was allowed, but only if there was a protective interface 
supplied by the telephone company to protect the network.  Later, even more complex 
business services CPE appeared and the interface device was also replaced by the 
competitor achieving quality approval by an independent source to certify the equipment 
was safe.  A major challenge for the BOCs was to change their mindset to being customer-
focused and skilled at marketing.  This was a whole new world for the old entrenched 
monopoly.   
3.1 Dialite Rejected 
The earliest attempt at competition in CPE had occurred in 1952 in the form of a 
simple device attached to the dial mechanism of the telephone.  The claim by the provider, 
Dialite, was that this plastic disc would illuminate the dial.  But the real purpose was to 
carry an advertiser’s name.  In this simple case, it would seem there could be no viable 
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claims about harms to the quality of telephone service.  To avoided setting a precedent 
Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, the involved Bell Operating Company (BOC), 
filed a lawsuit contending the device interfered with the operation of the dial and attempts 
by the customer to remove it could damage the telephone set.  Dialite argued the telephone 
company violated the Sherman Antitrust Act.  The Federal Court ruled there was no 
antitrust violation because there was a legal contractual arrangement between the BOCs 
and their customers and therefore they had the right to take necessary steps to accommodate 
the terms of the contract.  Further, the court ruled there was potential for damage from the 
Dialite device and that firm must stop selling it to telephone customers.56  This was a clear 
victory by the BOCs.  But, it did not foreshadow future events, which they typically would 
lose. 
 3.2 Acoustic Coupling Accepted (Hush-A-Phone and Scrambler) 
The beginning of more serious competition in CPE occurred in 1956 with the 
introduction of another non-telco device to be used on the customer premises.  The Hush-
A-Phone clipped onto the mouthpiece of a phone to enable private conversations.  It was a 
minor attachment somewhat like a small megaphone.  The intent was to shut out 
environmental noise, allowing the user to speak quietly yet still be heard by the party on 
the other end.   
                                                          
56 Southwestern Bell v. Dialite Dial Co., US District Court, Oklahoma 102F. Supp. 872 (1951), 
http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/102/872/1382564/ , accessed 6/20/2015.  
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                         Figure 1 -  Advertisement for the Hush-A-Phone57 
 
AT&T petitioned the FCC claiming the Hush-a-Phone mouthpiece could cause 
major failures in the phone system.  While this was a seemingly ridiculous claim, the FCC 
did rule against Hush-A-Phone on the grounds that as a telecommunications product it 
violated the phone company’s monopoly rights as a regulated utility and was damaging to 
its obligation to provide quality service.  The FCC prohibited the use of the device.  The 
Hush-A-Phone company went to the Court of Appeals and argued that its device would 
have no effect on the telephone system.  Since there was no electrical connection, the court 
ruled, there were no standards issues to be resolved.  The court’s opinion stated, “To say 
that a telephone subscriber may produce the result in question by cupping his hand and 
                                                          
57 http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2008/06/carterfone-40-years/,  accessed 12/1/2016. 
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speaking into it, but may not do so by using a device which leaves his hand free to write or 
do whatever else he wishes, is neither just nor reasonable.”58   
 On May 2, 1957, AT&T sent a policy letter to all BOCs instructing them to comply 
with the revised FCC order which was issued in response to the court ruling permitting the 
Hush-A-Phone and similar devices.  By that time a new model had been developed.  The 
BOCs were required to file the appropriate tariffs in each of their state jurisdictions.  The 
AT&T letter stated, “. . . the new Hush-A-Phone model, designed to be used with a type 
500 set, has been examined and will be permitted by the Voice Silencer provisions as well 
as the Hush-A-Phone models described in the record of the Federal Communication 
Commission and United States Court of Appeals proceedings.”59  It was a complete victory 
enabling the first set of devices to be legally attached to the terminal equipment owned and 
provided by the BOCs.  
  This case served to encourage other potential competitors.  An interesting example 
is the “scrambler” which was made by Delcon Corporation of Palo Alto, California.  It was 
a portable unit which was initially designed to preserve secrecy in telephone calls for 
businesses and law enforcement.  Like the Hush-a-Phone there were no wired connections.  
It was only held against the telephone handset.  It worked by transposing and distorting 
high, low, and middle frequencies to convert the speech into garbled noise.  A matching 
unit on the other end of the conversation reversed the signals back into normal speech.  
Thus, it would prevent eavesdroppers from listening to private conversations.  Residential 
                                                          
58 Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. U.S., 99 U.S. App. D.C. 190, 193, 238 F. 2d 266, 269 (D.C. Cir., 1956). 
59 John J. Hanselman, (AT&T VP) to All General Commercial Managers of BOCs, May 2, 1957, 
Collection 2, Record Group 5, Box 15, Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, AT&T Archives and 
History Center, San Antonio, Texas.  
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customers also sought these devices to guard against potential eavesdroppers who might 
be on a shared party-line.  Some residential customers were also concerned about their 
conversations being heard by wire tappers, or even telephone operators.  A pair of 
scramblers sold for $219 when introduced in 1960.60   
 3.3 BOCs File Tariffs to Permit Only Acoustic Connections 
 Following a model provided by AT&T in 1961, the BOCs drafted and filed tariffs 
with their state regulatory commissions which used the following recommended AT&T 
wording: “No equipment, apparatus, circuit, or device not furnished by the telephone 
company shall be attached or connected with the facilities furnished by the telephone 
company, whether physically, by induction, or otherwise.”61  AT&T and the BOCs had 
previously agreed to accept acoustical coupling devices which merely focused sounds.  
These accepted devices did not have any direct connection either by physically tapping into 
wires or through induction generated by the wires.  With these state filings, the BOCs 
sought to prevent any incursion in the form of physical connections to the telephone 
network transmission facilities.  The hope was that state commissions would be more 
stringent in protecting their monopoly rights and thus influence the FCC to follow suit.   
Although the voice recorder was only an acoustic connection, it did present an 
additional dilemma beyond interference with network signaling and transmission.  At issue 
was whether the BOC’s should be responsible for prohibiting the recording of 
conversations without the knowledge of all parties involved.62  Voice recording devices for 
use on telephones had been available since World War I.  Only after World War II, 
                                                          
60 Business Week, September 24, 1960.  Page 34. 
61 AT&T tariff no. 132 with the FCC paragraph 7, 1961. 
62 Ronald Hrusoff, Staff of FCC, Public Utilities Fortnightly, 5/12/1966. 
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however, did they become a serious matter. Technological advancements in recording 
equipment combined with increased growth of communications greatly increased their 
usage.  Rather than address the issues, the BOCs opted to prohibit the use of such devices.  
The FCC acted by issuing a ruling, Use of Recording Devices, 11 FCC 1033.  The FCC 
considered it an obligation to protect the public from unscrupulous recordings of telephone 
conversations.  The first option explored was a device to notify the user that the 
conversation was being recorded.  But, no technological solution could be found that would 
accomplish this.  Instead, the FCC ordered the BOCs to amend their tariffs so that recording 
devices would only be permitted to be attached to the telephone if a warning device was 
also in use.  For any customer to use a recorder, the telephone company was required to 
install a recorder connector which contained a recorder tone device that automatically 
produced a distinctive tone repeated at intervals of 15 seconds.   
 However, the tariff requiring a tone did not solve the problem.  Customers were 
irritated by the sound.  Due to the irritation factor, lack of awareness of the requirement, or 
because they were deceitful, many users recorded without the tone.  Enforcement was very 
difficult.  Multiple studies showed that many more recording devices were bought than the 
number of recording connectors with tone generators which were installed by the BOCs.  
Typically, the investigation was only undertaken because of a complaint.  Most often little 
in the way of serious action resulted.  Still, the volume of complaints received by the FCC 
continued to increase in the mid-60s.63    




Beyond the general usage of recorders, the Justice Department argued it was 
essential for police officers to be allowed to record telephone calls without the use of the 
tone.64  While these debates were underway, it was unclear whether the BOCs were 
required to demand a written authorization before installing recording devices without 
warning tones.  And, even if a BOC did obtain an authorization, it might be later determined 
that officials issuing the authorization were outside their degree of authority.  The BOC 
doing the installation might then be exposed to a civil lawsuit.  Even though the FCC had 
no rules regarding recording of telephone conversations, federal and many state laws did 
apply to the practice.  Typically, conversations could not be recorded unless the use of a 
recording device was preceded by verbal or written consent of all parties to the telephone 
conversation, accompanied by an automatic tone warning device, which produced the 
distinct signal that was repeated at regular intervals during the telephone conversation, or 
a court order had been issued authorizing the recording.  Also, no recording device could 
be used unless it was possible to physically connect to and disconnected from the telephone 
line or switched on and off.65    
3.4 Carterfone Changes the Telephone Industry 
Another initiative centered on the desire of Carter Electronics of Dallas to 
interconnect private mobile radio systems with the nationwide telephone network.  The 
Carterfone was designed to be used with a two-way radio at the base station of a mobile 
radio system.  When callers on the radio and on the telephone were both in contact with 
the base station operator, the handset of the operator's telephone was placed on a cradle in 
                                                          
64 Nicholas Katzenbach, Deputy Attorney General, speech to third judicial circuit, 1963. 
65 https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/recording-telephone-conversations, accessed12/5/2016. 
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the Carterfone device.  A voice control circuit in the Carterfone automatically switched on 
the radio transmitter when the telephone caller was speaking; when he stopped speaking, 
the radio returned to a receiving condition.  A separate speaker was attached to the 
Carterfone to allow the base station operator to monitor the conversation, adjust the voice 
volume, and hang up his telephone when the conversation had ended.  The Carterfone 
device was invented by Thomas F. Carter of Dallas, Texas.  It was produced and marketed 
by the Carter Electronics company beginning in 1959.  A picture of this device is shown in 
Figure 2. 
    
    Figure 2 – The Original Carterfone.66 
By 1966, approximately 3,500 Carterfones had been sold.67  Concerned by the 
growth in the use of Carterfones, the BOCs notified their subscribers that the Carterfone, 
                                                          
66 http://www.computerhistory.org/revolution/networking/19/371/2148, accessed 12/24/2016. 
67 FCC Docket 16942, Release Number: 68-661, June 26, 1968. 
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when used in conjunction with the subscriber's telephone, was a prohibited interconnecting 
device.  The BOC’s position was that unlike the Hush-A-Phone, which was now permitted, 
the Carterfone was an active device and did impact the network by switching on and off.   
Also, the Carterfone established, and continued throughout a conversation, an ongoing 
audio transmission over the telephone network while the Hush-A-Phone had only dealt 
with sounds before they entered the network or after they exited the network.  Hence, there 
was no potential network impairment due to the Hush-A-Phone but impairment could be 
possible with a Carterfone if it did not operate within the necessary boundaries of volume 
and frequency set by the telephone company.   
In rejecting the Carterfone, BOCs reasoned that since they had the responsibility to 
establish, operate and improve the telephone system, they must have absolute control over 
the quality, installation, and maintenance of all aspects of the system to effectively carry 
out that responsibility.  The BOCs argued that if the installation of unauthorized equipment 
occurred, it would have at least two negative results.  First, it would divide the 
responsibility for assuring that each part of the system could function effectively and, 
second, it would retard the development of the system since the independent equipment 
supplier would tend to resist changes which would render his equipment obsolete.68 To 
challenge this position, Carter Electronics filed a private antitrust case in the Dallas District 
Court.  The court ruled, in view of the complex technical nature of the subject, the matter 
should be referred to the FCC as they were better able to deal with the issues.    
                                                          
68 This is an interesting argument for the BOCs to make because it was typical for the reverse argument to 
be made. Their challengers contended it was the BOCs who impeded new developments because they had 
the imbedded investment in equipment and facilities, which had long depreciation times, and thus were not 
inclined to pursue installation of new technologies.  
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The FCC found that there was a need for a device to connect the telephone landline 
system with mobile radio systems which could be met in part by the Carterfone.  It also 
found the Carterfone had no material adverse effect upon the telephone system.  Further, a 
tariff to prohibit the attachment of the Carterfone was unjust and unreasonable.  It also 
found it would be unduly discriminatory since the telephone companies permit the use of 
their own interconnecting devices.  The ruling referred to the decision in the DC Circuit 
Court in 1956, which had determined the Hush-A-Phone device did not adversely affect 
the telephone system.  The FCC decided there was no material distinction between 
attachment of the Hush-A-Phone and the audio interconnection of the Carterfone.  Further, 
the court had held in the Hush-A-Phone case that tariff prohibition of customer-supplied 
foreign attachments interfered with the telephone subscriber's right to reasonably use his 
telephone in ways that were privately beneficial without being publicly detrimental.  The 
FCC conclusion was that a customer desiring to use an interconnecting device to improve 
the utility to him of both the telephone system and a private radio system should be able to 
do so, so long as the interconnection did not adversely affect the telephone company's 
operations or the telephone system's utility for others.69 
3.5 CPE Interconnect with BOC-provided Interface Device 
The Carterfone decision led to the creation of the CPE interconnect industry.  This 
result occurred because the FCC determined that lifting the restriction for Carterfone alone 
would be unfair to others who wished to enter the business.  Therefore, any company was 
permitted to provide terminal equipment so long as it was proven to not be hazardous or 
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 FCC Docket 16942, Release Number: 68-661, June 26, 1968. 
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detrimental to public telephone services.  The BOCs were charged with establishing 
reasonable standards for these attachments.  The FCC ruling also provided the basis for 
allowing future devices, such as computer terminals, to be connected to the telephone 
network.70  The BOCs still managed a minor victory by convincing the FCC that "interface 
devices" designed and provided by the BOCs had to be installed between any non-
telephone company equipment and the public telephone system.  Following this ruling and 
to seek to establish a limit on future competition, the BOCs began to file state tariffs which 
did allow interconnection but also established that the connecting device provided by the 
company and used on the customer premises would limit the number of phone lines to ten 
phones.   
The providers of alternative CPE contended that devices provided by the telephone 
companies were not necessary and that their own equipment could be “certified”71 for 
direct connection to the network.  In response, the FCC asked for comments on the viability 
of such a system of certification.  A Joint Federal-State Board was created and charged to 
study the issue.  AT&T enjoined its own study of terminal equipment provided by 
customers as compared to equipment provided by the telephone company.72  AT&T 
reported that there were 30% more trouble reports on lines connected to telephone switches 
and 60% more trouble reports on private lines, which were direct connections from one 
premises of a customer to other premises without being switched in the telephone company 
office.    
                                                          
70
 Business Week, August 19, 1967, 91. (The introduction of data CPE is explored in Chapter 5.) 
71 The suppliers of CPE contended all that should be required was inspection and approval by a licensed 
professional electrical engineer.   
72 AT&T, A Competition Issue publication, 3/4/1974. 
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At issue was whether interface devices tested and approved by the BOCs and 
AT&T could correct these faults, and if so, who would fund the testing process.  Should it 
be the end-user customers, the equipment suppliers, or the telephone companies?  As a 
regulated utility, the local telephone companies set intrastate rates so that the price of 
optional services, such as extension sets or more elaborate equipment, were set at 
sufficiently high levels to help keep the rates for basic service low.  These basic rates were 
averaged across a state and not linked to the cost of providing a particular individual line.  
The goal was to make basic service affordable for more users and thereby increase the 
value of the overall service.   
3.6 Competition Grows in Business CPE 
In the 1970s, progress was being made by competitors in the sales and maintenance 
of PBX switches and phones to businesses.  The BOCs concerns arose from the same fears 
as in the consumer market that the network would be harmed without solid testing and 
equipment approval processes, and that the lost revenue would mean higher network 
service rates to the business customers since PBX equipment subsidized their network 
services.   For the year 1973, the BOC operating in California claimed to have lost 950 
PBXs to competitors resulting in $10 million of annual revenue.73 
In 1974, there were four PBX certification proposals before the FCC:   
                                                          
73 Pacific Telephone Public Relations Department documentation of an AT&T public briefing regarding 
certification, Record Group 5, Box 7, Pacific Telesis Group, AT&T Archives and History Center, San 
Antonio, Texas. June 4, 1974. 
50 
 
1.  From the PBX advisory committee:  Customer provided PBX equipment could 
have a direct electrical connection to the network, but the equipment itself must 
be tested and approved at a laboratory authorized by the FCC. 
2. Also from the same committee as above, but only on an interim basis:  The 
customer could provide the connecting arrangement so long as it was approved 
by a newly created 20-member subcommittee composed of representatives 
from the FCC, the local PUC, independent manufacturers and the Bell System.  
(Note: this is an incredible example of a bureaucratic nightmare unlikely to ever 
be workable.)    
3. From the FCC, Chief Engineer’s office:  Direct connection of CPE would be 
permitted if the manufacturer had petitioned the FCC and successfully passed 
tests proving that it met the necessary standards.  After approval, it would be 
left to the state PUCs to enforce standards of maintenance.  The incumbent local 
telephone service providers were very concerned about the length of time 
required to successfully prove harm was occurring and have the terminal 
equipment corrected or removed. 
4. Commissioners from the National Association of Regulatory Utilities also 
proposed a direct connection with approval by the FCC.  A newly created joint 
federal/state body would be responsible for implementation and ongoing 
administration.  The local phone company would be required to conduct 
ongoing inspections of competitor installations.  It would seem untenable to 
charge a company with inspecting and requiring corrections be made to the 
equipment of its competitors.   
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None of these options were considered acceptable by AT&T.  Its argument was that 
manufacturers would only be interested in profit margins and would find ways to 
circumvent the intent of the standards.  The company continued to take the position that 
any of the above options would lead to chaos on the network, poorer service and increased 
overall costs to the end user customer.  The unstated implication was that by contrast, 
AT&T had always and would continue to focus on the best cost/service balance for the 
customer.  Of course, they could do so since they were rate-of-return regulated and not 
price regulated.  Rate-of-return regulation often did examine conditions and authorize price 
increases.  But, rather than reducing or at least stabilizing prices, AT&T contended that 
multiple suppliers inevitably would lead to price increases regardless of whether it came 
from them or from their competitors.74  Involvement by independent telephone companies 
ranged from substantial activity in opposition to competitors by the larger independents, 
such as General Telephone and Continental, to non-involvement by small operators who 
had few business clienteles in their regions.  Supporters were mostly groups created by the 
competitors to AT&T.  Examples are the North American Telephone Association and the 
Business Equipment Manufacturers Association.  In addition, there were groups of 
communications representatives from larger firms which entered the discussion.   Notable 
examples are IBM and 3M.  These firms and many like them were convinced that 
facilitating competition would yield improvement in cost and performance for their 
operations.   
 
                                                          
74 The National Academy of Sciences did come out with the statement that it was technically possible to 
achieve protection through certification, but they did not deal with the economics of the approach.   
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3.7 Service Quality and Ineffective Regulation Debated 
No doubt it would be possible for other manufacturers to create CPE which was 
equal in quality to what AT&T provided.  However, the argument by AT&T went beyond 
just the equipment itself to issues of end-to-end service responsibility and the requirements 
for proper installation, maintenance, and repair.  AT&T claimed that a study they 
conducted for 18 months in 1972 and 1973 of about 400 telecommunications lines with a 
mix of customer owned terminals and AT&T owned terminals demonstrated that almost 
four times as many of the customer owned terminals had a higher percentage of trouble 
conditions.  The problems consisted of noise, wrong numbers, billing errors and even 
physical damage to AT&T equipment from hazardous voltage levels.  The chairman of 
AT&T personally took on delivering the message through statements such as, “No system 
of certification we can envision and no interface requirement can provide a fully adequate 
alternative to the unequivocal and undivided responsibility for service that the common 
carrier principle assures.”75    
 At the other end of the competitive spectrum was Rolm Corporation.  They began 
efforts to compete with the operating companies in 1973 by developing intelligent systems 
for large businesses designed to replace the switchboard and desk phones usually leased 
from the operating company.  At that time, Rolm was a small manufacturer of military 
computing devices with operating revenue of about $3 million.  By contrast, AT&T had 
operating revenues of $24 billion.76  Rolm’s target customers were businesses such as 
corporate offices, hospitals, and hotels which had up to 4,000 telephone sets linked to an 
                                                          
75 John deButts, speech at National Association of Regulatory Commissions annual meeting, September, 
1973. 
76 AT&T Annual Report, 1973. 
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in-office switchboard.  Since the Rolm equipment was electronic rather than mechanical, 
as telephone companies still used, it was less expensive, could provide more features (such 
as caller ID and least cost routing of outgoing calls) and required less personnel to operate. 
 The different levels of sophistication in terminal equipment made it difficult and 
costly for regulators to have the staff, test equipment and processes necessary to handle the 
complexities involved in certification.  This issue also highlights a major challenge 
confronted in the emerging environment of competition: the multi-level aspect of 
regulatory authority.   Among federal, state and local agencies there were sometimes over-
lapping and other times unaddressed responsibilities as well as disagreements about the 
appropriateness of actions.  For example, some state commissioners had their doubts about 
the wisdom of certification.  A member of the New York Public Service Commission 
stated, “It is not clear to me how the people of this nation will benefit by substituting a new 
bureaucratic regime, at both the national and state levels, for an effective interface device.” 
77  He lamented that the costs would be millions of tax dollars to save a minor expense for 
a few individuals and suppliers who wanted to compete with the telephone companies.  The 
costs to government would largely be in the form of policing inspections and compliance.   
 Similarly, Ben Wiggins, President of the National Association of Regulatory Utility 
Commissions (NARUC), charged that regulators and others at the federal level were 
seeking to turn back the clock to the 1890s and early 1900s when the expiration of the 
original Bell patents led to widespread and chaotic competition among local telephone 
companies.  He contended that a pricing policy founded on looking out for the little guy 
                                                          
77 Edward P. Larkin, comments at proceedings of New York State Commission, 1974.  
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was the intrinsic social justification for monopoly operations.  Regulated monopolies could 
accomplish greater efficiency thereby leading to lower unit costs.78  This view is a bit 
strange considering the reality was a widespread celebration among “little guys” when 
telephone patents held by Bell expired because the resulting “chaos” of competition led to 
more affordable options. 
 Cyrus J. Colter, former commissioner of the Illinois Commerce Commission stated 
the following in his testimony before a Senate Committee:  
At present, the state regulator is able to design rates in a way that the charge 
for the basic services — i.e. for the use of his telephone by the average 
householder — is held low, while other charges, such as for terminal 
facilities, extensions, PBX's, etc. are kept higher.  Also, residential rates are 
invariably kept lower than business rates.  These rate policies are not new, 
but historical and have served the nation well.  But now these new, and I can 
only call them selfish, interests have appeared with the clear intention of 
underpricing in those special areas in which regulators have heretofore kept 
the prices higher: kept them higher in order to provide lower, though 
reasonable, charges for the great body of household telephone users across 
the country.  Such competition may be good for these special interest entities 
which are not at all averse to competing with a regulated system.  But it is not 
good, in my opinion, for the American public, especially the part of it which 
is economically disadvantaged — the unfortunate.  It ties the regulator's 
hands as he attempts to set rates which will meet over-all public interest 
standards — and especially the needs of the poor, the elderly, and the ill.79 
                                                          
78 Ben T. Wiggins, President NARUC, testimony at Senate Hearings, 1974.  
79 Statement of Cyrus J. Colter, Former Commissioner – Illinois Commerce Commission, “Hearing on The 
Industrial Reorganization Act, Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Committee on the 
Judiciary United States Senate 93rd Congress,” July 9, 1974, 
https://archive.org/stream/industrialreorga05unit/industrialreorga05unit_djvu.txt, accessed 6/15/2015. 
55 
 
 Some federal officials also voiced concerns about going too far in opening the 
system.  One FCC Commissioner expressed the belief that while competition was 
important, there still needed to be a balance between the forces of competition and the 
guiding hand of regulation.  He used the Carterfone decision as an example and mentioned 
how CPE in the growing field of data processing may require careful scrutiny to guard 
against unfair competition while also ensuring the continued viability of the national 
communications infrastructure.  He concluded that the FCC should turn to regulation only 
as a necessary supplement if the free competition was either not present or did not produce 
satisfactory results.80   Similarly, The Chief of the FCC’s Common Carrier Bureau noted 
that the FCC in the Carterfone decision had rejected the use of customer supplied 
equipment to perform signaling on the telephone network.  A panel of experts from the 
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) was assembled to examine the issue in detail.  After 
this event, the panel’s conclusions were sent to the Chief of the FCC Common Carrier 
Bureau, Benard Strassburg.  The panel’s foremost conclusion was, “Uncontrolled 
interconnection can cause harm to personnel, network performance, and property.”81  
Strassburg then took the position that the telephone industry should carefully assess 
recommendations of the NAS panel and act to ensure that the public interest was 
protected.82  Considering statements such as this, it is clear regulators believed careful 
consideration and deliberation was warranted. 
                                                          
80 Kenneth Cox, “Address to the Antirust Section of the American Bar Association,” April 1970. (At the 
time FCC Docket 16979 was ongoing.  The subject was the interdependence of computer and 
communications services.)  
81 Lewis S. Billig, Chairman NAS Special Panel on Common Carrier/Interconnections, in letter to Antony 
G. Oettinger, Chairman NAS Computer Science and Engineering Board, Harvard University, April 1970.  
82 Benard Strassburg, Chief of FCC Common Carrier Bureau, “Interconnection in 70s,” Address to the 
North Carolina Telephone Association, April 1970.   
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Even though the FCC studied the issues and released opinions on CPE competition 
matters, their position as a federal agency precluded authority over intrastate phone rates.  
Thus, they were not empowered to unilaterally take actions to prevent unfair competition 
in the terminal equipment market.  Instead, the FCC sought to establish joint federal-state 
boards to evaluate relationships between costs and pricing of services and CPE.  The 
preferred method recommended by economists was to calculate the proper cost of an 
offering by taking a long-term view of how much it varied as volumes increased.  The 
BOCs were enabled to participate in the competitive CPE business without the burden of 
recouping overhead costs from its established monopoly business.  More importantly, by 
segregating the costs of the competitive arena it meant that the regulated monopoly 
telephone entity would not be able to assume any costs to the advantage of the competitive 
part of their operations.  It seemed to be the fairest approach.  However, the collection of 
data and enforcement was an extremely complex process and typically proved to be beyond 
the ability of regulators to administer.     
 3.8 Competition Means Focus on Sales  
The BOCs conducted training of their sales managers to make sure they were 
familiar with the details of what equipment competitors were offering.  In June 1970, 
Southern New England Telephone reported there were 30 different devices available to 
customers to enable them to connect their own equipment to the telephone network.  They 
desired that their sales force understand how their equipment compared to what 
competitors offered.  There was direct competition in more than 300 cases.  It came from 
companies with a long history in communications, such as International Telephone and 
Telegraph (IT&T) and Radio Corporation of America (RCA), as well as newer entrants in 
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the United States communications market, such as Hitachi and Royce Instruments.  
Southern New England’s success record was good.  In the PBX field, they had lost only 5 
out of 75 sales.  One big loss was the switchboard for Armstrong Rubber Company 
headquarters in New Haven.   Royce Instruments proposed Ericson equipment, which was 
very similar to the telephone company equipment.  Armstrong Rubber decided to go with 
Ericson.  They preferred the flexibility of being able to lease and have the option to buy.83 
Some key executives in the BOCs realized competition in CPE was inevitable and 
attempted to recognize and adjust to it.  In 1970, William Ellinghaus, President of New 
York Telephone said: 
Since the mid-sixties, there has been increasing discussion of the role of 
competition in providing communication services.  A number of regulatory 
decisions have been addressed to this point, including the Carterfone 
decision.  That case led to a liberalization of our tariffs that permit more 
interconnection of customer-provided communications devices and the 
sharing of our facilities among customers.  We think these changes are good 
because they stimulate the use of the nationwide telecommunications 
network while at the same time provide more options to our customers and 
more business for the manufacturers of communications terminal equipment.  
It should be recognized, however, that these tariff modifications came about 
after careful examination and consideration of the merits of the changes by 
all interested parties.84 
 An FCC Commissioner and powerful critic of the Bell Companies viewed the 
statement by Ellinghaus as an exception.  He charged that most Bell officials were afraid 
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 William Ellinghaus, President New York Telephone, Public Utilities Fortnightly (October 1970), 23-24. 
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of anything, not their own, being installed into the telephone system.  He compared it to an 
electric company trying to discourage installation of air conditioners and washer-dryer 
combinations.  He went on to contend that if the telephone company would encourage the 
use of its system by innovative equipment manufacturers, it would suddenly find 200 
million Americans working for Bell on their own time, rather than working against it.  
Communications traffic would increase enormously because 200 million people can think 
of a lot more things to do with a communications network than one company could.85  In 
essence, he agreed on the merits of competing terminals but disagreed on the degree of 
receptiveness of the Bell companies. 
 In order to add weight to their arguments and clarify positions on the issues 
surrounding competition in telecommunications, the Bell System employed three highly 
regarded economists to write a paper on the subject.  It would be shared with the FCC and 
the public.  One of the authors was Alfred Kahn, an extremely influential person who later 
would become the chief inflation fighter and champion of deregulation for Jimmy Carter.86  
The other two were highly regarded economics professors and authors, William Baumol 
and Otto Eckstein.  Eckstein was formerly a member of Lyndon Johnson’s Council of 
Economic Advisers.  In this paper, the authors noted that changes in regulatory policies 
were driven by trends in technology and in the demography87 of the United States that 
                                                          
85
 Nicolas Johnson, FCC Commissioner, Time Magazine, November 2, 1970, p 80. 
86 It is ironic that AT&T chose Alfred Kahn since his later role under Jimmy Carter was significant in 
leading to settlement of the antitrust case which broke apart the Bell System.   
87 In particular, the change from a rural to an urban society. 
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made it appropriate to evolve from the traditional regulated monopoly structure in the 
telecommunications industry.88  Among these trends were: 
1. Diffusion of technological expertize to more business organizations, partially due 
to government support for research and development. 
2. Increased sophistication of users with changing needs for their connectivity.  
 3.   Increased use of communications networks internal to a business. 
4.  Concentration of population growth and economic activity in large urban areas 
and reduction of population in remote areas. 
 The authors referenced experiences with other regulated industries to guide the 
evolving public policy in communications.  In these other industries, competition had 
created more centers of power and avoided the risk of excessive concentration.  When a 
larger number of firms competed in a market, a greater services variety was likely to be 
offered.  Customers had also benefited because pressures for rapid innovation yielded 
maximum product quality at minimum cost.  A valid counter-argument, which the study 
emphasized, was that in telecommunications an additional benefit of a regulated monopoly 
structure had historically been the ability to invest heavily in basic research through Bell 
Labs.  If the benefits of research are defused among several firms, the funding is likely to 
                                                          
88 This is one example where the conclusions of a study supported a central thesis of this dissertation.  It 
recognized that technology trends were leading the telecommunications industry toward an evolution away 
from the traditional monopoly of the BOCs.  It is a surprising result considering it was funded by AT&T.  
One can only surmise that it was not what AT&T expected.   
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be reduced because sponsorship without certainty of payoff is not something multiple 
smaller firms would be inclined to undertake. 
Another potential downside of deregulation could be a loss of economies of scale 
due to the greater variety of products, thus potentially leading to higher prices.  Also, 
inexperienced buyers might be unable to identify the quality of competing offers, and 
sellers might be tempted to offer false bargains (inferior products at lower prices) leading 
to eventual quality deterioration.  A major concern in telecommunications resulted from 
the interdependence of competing services where, for example, terminal equipment of one 
supplier must interact with the network and may cause interference, which might lead to 
an accumulation of detrimental effects on their service as well as the service of others.  
When loss of economies of scale and potential deterioration in overall service to the market 
combine to exceed the benefits of competition, it is preferable that the industry is 
considered a natural monopoly and subject to governmental regulation. 
Clearly, there were many aspects, often conflicting, which had to be considered.  
Since AT&T initiated and paid for this study, it was not surprising the authors’ conclusion 
supported AT&T’s position that opening the way for competition must only be in limited 
areas and it must be structured to enable the monopoly provider to compete.  Even so, the 
authors did go farther than AT&T expected by emphasizing the importance of no cross-
subsidies between regulated and non-regulated offerings.  This was a reversal from the 
long-held tradition of using earnings derived from more profitable areas of the telephone 
business to maintain low pricing of other services.  The classic example was using profits 
from CPE to achieve wide availability of local service, including service in costly remote 
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rural areas.89  Some leaders in the BOCs began to see there was no option but to accept that 
using CPE to subsidize local service would be stopped.90 
An example of the new world forced upon the BOCs came from the Dallas area of 
Southwestern Bell.  Prior to competition, telephone personnel were “order takers” and there 
were no “sales people” in any department.  Faced with declining revenue from CPE due to 
competition, the General Manager over the Dallas region issued a challenge.  He 
proclaimed that for every telephone extension the personnel charged with installation and 
ongoing maintenance of equipment and services (Operations Department) would sell, the 
newly formed marketing and sales organization (Commercial Department) should sell two.  
The Dallas Commercial Department used an “Eat Crow” theme and put up posters showing 
crow feet.  Each foot represented a day and the daily sales numbers for individuals were 
recorded on every foot that went up.  The Operations Department did a less involved type 
of record keeping.  Then, the General Manager granted awards to the individuals who met 
their assigned goals.  For Commercial Department people, it was a dinner for two and for 
Operations Department personnel it was a Thanksgiving Day turkey.  The whole plan 
worked extremely well and total selling goals were exceeded by a large margin.  Somewhat 
surprising was that Operations did better than Commercial.  This unusual activity for a 
telephone company was repeated often in Southwestern Bell Telephone and copied by the 
other BOCs.  It signified a major change of culture.91 
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3.9 The Bright Future for Communications 
In the 1970s, customers had a growing enthusiasm for the future of 
communications.  Perhaps the new world of the Information Age would include worldwide 
computer networks, a cashless-checkless economy, video phones, and commuting-free 
workers.  IBM, Xerox, GE, RCA and many other suppliers of technology began to explore 
the opportunities as players in communications terminal equipment.  Interconnection to the 
telephone network of non-Bell devices such as telephone sets, switchboards, PBXs and 
data terminals progressed significantly.  Most of this activity was for businesses and, even 
there, the BOCs continued to own 80% of the equipment.  While the remaining 20% may 
not seem a major problem, the BOCs were still concerned about losing 20% of the base for 
establishing its allowable “Rate of Return” under the regulatory processes, which used 
embedded investment as the basis for how much each BOC could earn and hence what 
prices they could charge.  AT&T’s head of market planning, Samuel Bonsack, stated the 
company fully intended to compete.  As an example, they had rushed to completion a new 
line of PBX equipment.  BOCs were also experimenting with new pricing alternatives such 
as offering a lower installation charge with higher month rental if that better suited a 
business customer’s needs.  Stepping up to face competition had not been part of the 
telephone business since the early 1900s when there were multiple competing local phone 
companies.  
 In addition to large suppliers in the business market, a growing number of small 
start-up firms also began to appear.  These firms attempted to convince customers that their 
value proposition was not only to provide better equipment than the BOCs or other large 
suppliers, but also to offer faster service response.  One such company was founded by an 
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ex-Bell salesman.  Even though it was only local to Greenwich, Connecticut and had just 
12 employees, it took the optimistic name of National Communication Industries 
Company.  The owner, Louis Ferraro, claimed his company would achieve one million 
dollars of revenue in 1971.  They bought equipment from manufacturers which they then 
installed and serviced.  On the other end of the size spectrum were large companies such 
as International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT), United Business Communications, and 
North American Phillips Corporation.  These companies manufactured their own 
equipment, which they installed and serviced.  The director of marketing for ITT 
Communications Equipment commented that most businesses were surprised at what his 
company had to offer.  Initially, a business customer simply wanted telephones like the 
ones the BOCs offered and his company was required to compete only on the price.  By 
the early 70s, PBX customers were advancing in their sophistication and began to be 
interested in capabilities the BOCs did not offer.  Some were very simple such as music on 
hold or a light beep tone instead of the somewhat irritating busy signal.  Another was the 
automatic transfer of an incoming call to a station where the customer representative was 
not busy.  This helped businesses to avoid losing a potential customer.  Other attractive 
features were the ability to set up conference calls with a simple push of a button, 
abbreviated dialing for frequently called numbers, and priority overrides so that an 
executive or an incoming urgent call could break into busy lines.92    
 By the end of 1971, the largest success was by Arcata.  This firm grew out of the 
cable TV business and bought up small CPE providers with the ambition to become 
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nationwide.  Arcata sought to be first with new innovations such as a microphone and 
speaker in the base of a set that could be used for normal calls or for dictation to an assistant.  
In 18 months they had achieved a presence in 27 cities and had completed 1000 
installations.   
Competition in the consumer market grew slower than in the business market.  
However, the stakes were larger in the consumer market because there were so many 
phones in residences.  Although the FCC pushed for competition in the business market 
the commission was slow to do likewise for home phones and ancillary equipment.  Also, 
the BOCs charged rather high fees to allow a phone of another provider to be connected 
and even added additional charges for a dial to be installed in what was called a “decorator” 
phone which a customer had purchased.  Basically, only a few things had changed since 
the advent of the first dialed service in 1919 and then the beginning of “touchtone” service 
in 1963.  Color options were added but the ring still sounded the same.    
 Decorator phones aimed at the residential market are shown in Figure 3.  There 
were simple devices to replace telephone sets provided by the BOCs with a set that some 
individuals found more attractive.  They could be purchased through stores and used as 
decorative pieces.  The following ad claimed the devices were “registered” and therefore 
compatible with the network.93  
                                                          
93 The FCC reported in 1976 that the telephone operating companies had not proven that there had been any 
economic harm nor any technical/physical harm to the network from customer provided equipment.  FCC 
Press Release, May 3, 1976.    
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                        Figure 3 – Advertisement for non-Bell decorator phones.94 
When faced with growing penetration of voice terminals provided by competitors 
in the residential market, the BOCs began to provide their own variety of “decorator” 
phones.  It was a recognition that consumers wanted more variety than only a few options 
in their type of phone.  They wanted something different than what their neighbor had.  It 
was true that telephones had been rather like the Model T Ford.  The telephone companies, 
like Henry Ford, considered simple mass products to be more cost effective and reliable.  
You could have any color you wanted as long as it was black.  Recognizing the need to 
offer more, the BOCs begin to sell different colors and styles, even including a “Mickey 
Mouse Phone” under license from Disney.   
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 The AT&T Vice President over service planning, Samuel Bonsack, in a speech at 
a meeting of 250 representatives of communications users, consultants, and suppliers, 
stated that the BOCs would have to change their method of setting installation and monthly 
line use charges.  Given the competition in CPE, it no longer worked to spread these service 
charges over all users.  Some customers with CPE not provided by their BOC would now 
have to pay more for their network services.  This was because prior to competition in CPE, 
the equipment at the premises was factored into the overall services price at a rate higher 
than the cost to the BOC which provided it.  This was the traditional means to keep the 
overall network service charges lower for areas which cost more to serve.  While 
acknowledging that competition may bring benefits to some business users regarding 
flexibility and overall cost, it also meant new challenges for them.  The following quote 
from Bonsack captures well the essence of the Bell Companies’ view: “The designers of 
your communications systems, for example, are going to have to take many more things 
into consideration.  What is the best piece of equipment or system to use in each situation?  
Is it compatible with other systems?  Do certain cost savings outweigh, let us say, flexibility 
or performance?  How well can a supplier provide the maintenance service you require?  
Are you investing dollars in the ownership of a system that will be obsolete in a few 
years?”95  His goal was to sow doubts and fears in the minds of decision-makers who were 
responsible for selecting suppliers.  He emphasized these types of issues had been and 
could continue to be dealt with most efficiently by the BOCs.  Ironically, this “fear-
mongering” tone sounded like the argument used by one the BOCs new competitors, which 
                                                          




for years had dominated the computer industry.  As the saying went, “No one ever got fired 
for buying IBM.” 
3.10 Slowing the Impacts of Competition 
 By 1974, the attention of both the federal policymakers in Washington and the 
public, in general, was focused on the chaos created by Watergate and the long lines at the 
gas pumps due to the energy crises.  In comparison, telecommunications issues seemed to 
be of a minor importance partly because the topic was not one of fixing something broken, 
but rather how to make it even better.  Further, no agency was in worse organizational 
shape than the FCC.  In addition to being short of staff, the FCC’S integrity was questioned 
because of the release of White House memos indicating a strategy to use them to pressure 
news broadcasters to be more favorable toward the Nixon administration.  Also, there were 
supposed to be seven commissioners, but due to term expirations and resignations, there 
would be only three remaining.  In addition to being focused elsewhere, Congress was also 
suspicious of any candidates that were put forward by Nixon’s staff.  Under these 
conditions, the FCC was unable to effectively deal with the critical decisions facing the 
telecommunications industry, specifically the questions surrounding regulation and 
competition.   
The Bell System saw in this quagmire an opportunity to attack.  AT&T had always 
considered attempts to duplicate its capabilities with competitive alternatives as anathema. 
FCC decisions since 1968 to allow interconnecting customer-owned equipment to the 
sacred network were considered horrible mistakes not only for their company but for the 
country as well.  The Chairman of AT&T claimed publicly that competition endangered 
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the nation’s phone system and the company would attack the policy-makers who permitted 
competition.96  Competitors continued to chip away, albeit slowly, at the CPE equipment 
rental revenues of the BOCs. 
 While attacking policy-makers, AT&T also sought some means to attack 
competitors.  It made a remarkable move in 1973 by hiring a top executive from outside of 
the Bell family.  AT&T was a company that held to the practice of promoting from within, 
especially when it came to top officers.  The man hired was Archie McGill, formerly a 
Vice President of IBM with responsibility for sales.  McGill joined IBM in 1956 and at the 
age of 33, he was named a vice president, the youngest ever appointed at that corporation.  
In 1969, he had left IBM to start his own telecommunications consulting firm.  McGill 
brought a very different style to AT&T.  His charge was to establish a more aggressive 
sales mindset throughout the BOCs and to enhance the product line available to them from 
their AT&T-owned supplier, Western Electric.  His tenure at AT&T lasted ten years.  Many 
longer-term employees, including executives, found him difficult to accept.  McGill’s 
parting remarks hint that he also found the regulated, complex structure of the Bell System 
to be a difficult environment.  McGill’s observation was remarkable but rather accurate.  
He said AT&T was “. . . in some turmoil as it tries to get on its feet.”  He also noted, “Any 
kind of major transition requires extra adaptation, a willingness to change, restructuring, 
new systems, new attitudes and new cultures.  It’s a continuing process.  You don’t get 
through it in a day or a year.”  Those observations were certainly true.97    
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Meanwhile, rather than recognize customer desires for a greater variety of options 
provided by multiple suppliers and seek to accommodate it, Bell carried on the same fight 
to make any competitive options difficult and more expensive for customers.  After the 
1968 FCC decision permitting connection of customer owned equipment, the BOCs had 
held firm to the need for a telephone company provided interface device to prevent harm 
to the network.  Bell customers periodically received inserts in their monthly bill warning 
that equipment from other suppliers, such as telephones or answering machines, should not 
be installed without notifying their BOC.  There would then be a $5 per month charge for 
an interconnection device which was supplied by Bell.  Several of the state regulatory 
commissions had countered by initiating reviews of the need for these BOC-provided 
interconnection devices.  Users and manufacturers contended such devices were redundant 
if the capability was already built into the customer-owned equipment.   
 3.11 Certification of CPE as an Alternative to Requiring an Interface Device 
In 1973, the California Public Utilities Commission was one of the first to endorse 
a certification approach instead of the requirement for an interconnection device.  This 
approach would require the non-BOC equipment to be tested by an independent lab and 
approved by a responsible state or federal regulatory authority.  Pacific Bell countered that 
the impact would downgrade the quality and reliability of phone service.  Wrong numbers 
and poor transmission could be expected.  Costs would increase and cause the price of local 
service to the customer to increase.  It was projected to cost at least $15 million in a five-
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year period for a certification program for PBX systems in California.98  No explanation or 
justification for this claim was provided. 
AT&T argued that the issue was the need to control design and manufacturing 
standards, as well as installation and maintenance processes.  They contended this was the 
only way to achieve quality reliability and performance.  What they claimed to believe in 
was the essential need for end-to-end service responsibility.  Further, they contended there 
were very few complaints to Public Utilities Commissions (PUCs) or to company 
management regarding their programs of inspection and enforcement for foreign 
attachments.  Hence, they believed their employees were doing a good job and one which 
customers appreciated.  However, it is likely that a key unstated concern of AT&T 
prompting their opposition to certification was that it would mean Western Electric would 
be faced with greater competition in CPE.   
Consumer advocates, such as Ralph Nader, were inclined to look favorably on the 
prospect of competition.  However, unlike some of the PUCs with their high level of 
concern for public welfare, consumer advocate groups were generally uncertain about the 
need for certification to provide protection of the network and its users.  Another voice in 
the debate was the Non-Bell operating telephone companies, especially the larger ones with 
more to lose.  They strongly supported the need for certification to prevent network harms.  
Foremost among these larger companies were General Telephone, Continental, and Alltel.  
These three were leaders in the United States Independent Telephone Association 
(USITA).  There were many other smaller companies in USITA.  Typically, the small 
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companies served rural areas and did not have significant concerns about competition since 
their operations were not attractive to new entrants because revenues and profits were 
small.  USITA still represented all independents and presented cases to regulating 
authorities contending that local exchange rates would have to be increased due to loss of 
revenue from the leasing of terminal equipment.    
 There were four pathways through which government could impact the rules 
regarding certification:  the state utility commissions, the FCC, the courts, and Congress.  
Initially, the state commissions could hear grievances and issue changes to the rules and 
regulations.  The FCC could take pre-emptive actions whenever it was deemed necessary 
to achieve nationwide conformity.  Then, through the appeal process, the courts could hear 
arguments and mandate changes be made to comply with their interpretation of the relevant 
laws.  Finally, Congress could create legislation to resolve issues through making changes 
in the laws.   
3.12 Two Pillars to the BOCs Argument  
 Throughout these processes, the Bell Companies continued to build their arguments 
on two pillars.  The first was that if the BOC is regulated, then, in all fairness, their 
competitors should be also.  The second, and they contended the most basic, was that the 
system worked very well as it was and any competition was not in the public interest.  
Groups that did not agree on these points were mostly ones that were created or enhanced 
by changes in the rules leading to more open competition.  The most prominent were 
interconnection associations or organizations of equipment manufacturers other than 
Western Electric.                                   
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 The BOCs continued to assert forcefully that as Customer Provided Equipment 
proliferated, the harms to the network and to service for other customers grew.  Employees 
were informed concerning arguments to be made and strongly urged to communicate these 
points to the public, both formally and informally. Briefing sessions were held to educate 
employees on the issues and position of the BOCs.  Attendance was mandatory at these 
briefings, as indicated by this statement of S. G. Worthington in a policy letter from 1974, 
“A Certification, Interconnection, Competition Region Briefing will be held April 11th in 
Room 1123, 666 Folsom Street from 9:00 until 11:00 a.m.  All management and non-
management employees who have not previously received a briefing on this subject should 
attend.  Attached are copies of advance reading material to be completed prior to the 
meeting.”99   
 At that time Worthington was the head of Public Relations for Pacific Telephone 
Company.  Pacific and the other operating telephone companies felt proclamations and 
warnings from the AT&T corporate headquarters in New York would not mean as much 
to the average citizen in their territory as hearing it from a local manager or neighbor.  In 
1974, the Bell System had a million employees which made this strategy a formidable 
force.  The local operating companies, such as Pacific Telephone, were well positioned 
close to the customer and able to seize on the opportunity to promulgate the messages.  The 
mandatory requirement that all employees must attend is indicative of the importance the 
BOCs placed on this matter.   
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The impacts of enabling CPE competition did cause concerns at many state 
regulatory agencies.  It is an interesting twist that these concerns about impacts on small 
business and residential telecommunications users would arise from efforts toward opening 
competition against the very large and powerful Bell System.  Since the early days of their 
existence, AT&T and the BOCs had continuously used their influence and resources to 
promote the case that one regulated telephone company was the best option to ensure 
universal service at affordable rates for all customers.  Richard John in his book Network 
Nation100 describes how, around 1900, while facing AT&T’s domination of the 
telecommunications market, competition in the telephone business was still considered by 
customers and governmental regulatory agencies to be a plausible alternative to regulation.  
But after 1907, events such as the collapse of the United States Independent Telephone 
Company in New York led state commissions to undertake regulatory control of 
telecommunications.  Further, with the support of Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and 
William Howard Taft, federal authorities also assumed regulatory jurisdiction.   
 But, in the early 1970s, a reversal was underway from the turn-of-the-century 
movement toward regulation.  The FCC was beginning to favor allowing competition.  
However, at the state level, the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners 
(NARUC) was sensitive to public opinion and issued a resolution which urged state 
agencies to, “. . . immediately institute an investigation to determine as soon as practical 
the present magnitude of the creeping economic impact on small users which is arising 
from the liberalized interconnection concept of the FCC . . .”  This was in reference to the 
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1968 Carterfone Decision of the FCC.101  The President of NARUC went even further in 
his closing comments at the regulatory convention, “The time has come, unquestionably, 
to call a screeching halt to further proliferation of government-sanctioned diversion of 
telephone company revenues into entrepreneurial pockets, while we explore in depth what 
is happening to the ‘little guy’ without his knowing it.”102  Contrary to NARUC’s position, 
the door to increased terminal equipment competition continued to open even wider. 
 It was clear that after the FCC permitted competition for communications terminals, 
new players focused on the enterprise103 market and aggressively marketed customer-
owned systems for businesses.104  Although some managers in the BOCs, who faced the 
business customers daily, believed it was important to recognize and respond to specific 
marketplace desires, the Bell System policy makers held the reins tight.  Their mindset was 
still one of “owning the user” and being the only game in town.  Customer-facing managers 
in the BOCs were not willing or able to challenge that ultimate authority.  One reason is 
that by comparison the threat was still not perceived to be great at the higher levels within 
AT&T.  In 1974, the revenue of equipment competitors was $200 million and the total 
equipment rental revenue of the BOCs was $4 billion or one-sixth of AT&T’s total revenue 
3.15 Scare Tactics to Oppose Certification 
Regulators at the state and federal level held discussions centered on the 
advisability of permitting customer-owned premises equipment so long as it was certified 
as meeting the specifications deemed necessary to prevent harms to the telephone network.  
                                                          
101 National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, “Eighty-Fifth Annual Convention 
resolutions,” 1973. 
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103 This terminology is used to indicate large companies with multiple office locations. 
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The BOC’s position, which was communicated to managers with instructions to carry the 
message to the public, centered on the following points: 
1.  Connecting arrangements provided by the telephone company should be 
required in all cases where a customer wished to connect their equipment to the 
network. 
2.  Certification would eventually lead to the uncontrolled interconnection of 
customer equipment.  
3.  The rates charged to residential and small business customers would increase. 
 4.  For the financial benefit of a few customers and suppliers, all customers would 
pay more for less quality of service.  
 These scare tactics used by the BOCs rested on the proposition of the network being 
a “delicately balanced machine in which all parts must be reliable and compatible to enable 
any one of the billions of possible connections to be made.”   They argued this network 
was a vital national resource and a major contributor to the social and economic 
development of the United States.  Further, it was constantly changing and improving 
which required complex centralized management and coordination to ensure its continued 
viability.  This centralized oversight was effectively provided by the incumbent telephone 
companies.  If new entrants were introduced, then it would clearly lead to deterioration of 
the network to the detriment of all users.  An example of what the BOCs presented as 
evidence came from a 1972 study of more than 10,000 reports of a trouble condition on the 
Bell telephone network.  The study stated that almost 5,000 of these were caused by the 
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customer’s own equipment and in almost 1,500 of these cases, that equipment was causing 
actual harm to the network.105   
 AT&T generated the information on harms to the network from the records of the 
BOCs.  It was not developed or reviewed by any independent authority.  The BOCs used 
such “evidence” to solicit and widely circulate opinions by credible authorities.  One such 
statement is this quote from a letter which the National Academy of Sciences sent to the 
FCC, “Uncontrolled interconnection to the common carrier network as it now exists would 
be harmful.”106  Beyond the impacts of creating harm to the network, there were also claims 
made on behalf of the Bell System due to their record of significant accomplishments.  
Francis Welch, the editor of the Public Utilities Fortnightly, an industry publication, 
cautioned the FCC to consider the benefits that accrue to the public by very reason of the 
size and success of the established telephone industry.  Welch asked, “Would regulated 
competition have produced the transistor, Telstar, electronic switching, in short, the best 
telephone system in the world?”107   
3.13 Federal Regulators Remain Unconvinced   
 The FCC continued to consider the option of not requiring any interface device if 
the terminal equipment was “certified” as compatible.108  The BOCs filed arguments which 
contended the FCC was overstepping its authority by asserting primacy over actions taken 
by state regulatory commissions.  At the encouragement of Southern Bell, the North 
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Carolina Utilities Commission appealed to the Fourth Circuit Federal Court in Richmond, 
Virginia to prohibit FCC actions in this matter.109  Similar filings in other jurisdictions were 
precipitated by most of the BOCs in their respective territories.  And, of course, the parent 
company AT&T was always in the fray with their arguments, suggestions or directives for 
the BOCs.  An argument AT&T made to BOC management was that the United States had 
the best communications service in the world at the lowest cost, and hence there should not 
be any concern that the Bell System was too big to be regulated.  Also, should a private 
organization be making such important decisions about such a valuable resource?110  The 
fact was that it had worked well in the past, and yet, with the continually increasing 
importance of communications, perhaps too big could be bad.  Searching for the strongest 
driver behind the breakup of the Bell System does seem to bring us back to this point.   
 The BOC’s position was that any of the certification proposals would simply not 
provide the necessary protection of the network.  In addition, administering a certification 
system would cost more than the current method of having the telephone company provide 
protective interface devices.  The combination of loss of revenue and increased costs would 
adversely impact the ability to keep universal service affordable.  Employees at all levels 
were being urged to communicate with the customers and the public on these issues.  A 
key AT&T executive remarked, “Giving the Bell System a swift kick is not just kicking 
some big, private monopoly.  It’s really kicking the public because that’s the only reason 
we exist – to serve the public.”111  This was an interesting, though not totally valid, 
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statement.  The Bell System was a corporation owned by stockholders who required a 
return on their investment.  As well as a million employees who desired to keep their jobs 
and receive good wages.  Clearly, it was a very high stakes game.   
 3.14 Competition Intensifies   
In 1974 the CPE market was becoming very competitive.  The count of competitors 
in the business market included twenty-five providers of multiplexors to enable 
simultaneous calls over a circuit and fifty providers of modems to convert data from analog 
to improved quality and greater capacity digital signals.  These competitors were in 
addition to over a thousand providers of telephone sets and/or PBXs. 
 The BOCs acknowledged the main reason for the growth of competition was the 
price.  But, they contended the price differential between their offerings and those of new 
entrants was the result of regulatory decisions designed to create “contrived 
competition”112 with different rules for the BOCs than for others.  An example given was 
the use of sealed competitive bidding for a PBX system provided by the Bell System to the 
federal General Services Administration.  It was illegal for the serving BOC to provide 
lower rates than those contained in their published tariffs which were approved by the FCC 
or the appropriate state regulatory agency.  They could have revised the tariff, but since it 
was publicly available that would have negated the purpose of sealed bids for the BOC 
alone.  And, if they did lower the tariff, then they would be obligated to provide the 
equipment at the same rate to all other customers.  Many customers believed there was 
value for their business in fostering competition.  The telecommunications manager of 
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Reynolds Metal switched to a competitor and then later switched back at a lowered price 
to Illinois Bell.  He felt this forced the BOC to improve their lead time for installation, 
maintenance, and service changes.  In his opinion, the BOC offered products and services 
that met his needs, but now they did it faster.113   
A presentation by Pacific Telephone, designed for use in public meetings, cited its 
view of harms to the telephone network which would result without protective interface 
devices provided by their company.  “These devices help to prevent equipment that isn’t 
working properly from causing service problems for those people who are using standard 
equipment.  By service problems I mean things like cross-talk, which is when other 
people’s conversation can be overheard; or getting wrong numbers even though you’ve 
dialed correctly; calls that don’t go through; errors in data transmission; or even incorrect 
billing.”114  The presentation went on to quote a study that Pacific Telephone had conducted 
in an effort to substantiate its claims of harms done to the communications network.  They 
contended that a random sample of 9000 lines using customer-provided equipment 
experienced a trouble report rate 30% higher than comparable lines with only their 
company provided equipment attached.  This was with protective devices installed and they 
were certain that if the protectives devices were eliminated the trouble rates would be much 
higher still.  The key part of their claim was based on the argument that if one part did not 
fit or was incorrectly installed and maintained, then the whole telephone system was at 
risk.  If it happened in only a few cases the impacts may not be serious.  But, considering 
that there were many millions of phones in service, it was likely to happen many times.  
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That would constitute a very big problem for the telephone companies and more 
importantly for the country as a whole.  They went on to contend, without any proof, that 
a customer-owned set without a protective device could inflict personal harm to a repair 
technician or a customer because of high voltage electric shocks.115   
   An example of the perspective of the operations people in the BOCs was given by 
a local manager in the San Francisco district of Pacific Bell.  “When a customer’s service 
goes out, he wants it back fast.  But who should he call first if he’s got his own equipment 
- Bell or the outside technician?  Almost invariably, he calls us and quite often when we 
get there we discover the trouble’s in the terminal or station equipment he’s leased or 
purchased from an outside supplier.  These customer visits are costing me money that I 
can’t fully recover.”116  An impact felt by the operating companies was the reality that 
manufacturers of the terminal equipment could not be depended upon by the end user to 
continue to support what they sold.  When a supplier failed to satisfy a customer, or may 
even go out of business, the customer looked to the operating company to solve the problem 
as its access lines and network required functioning terminals plus they had a regulatory 
obligation to provide telephone service.  For extensions, the sellers were usually 
department stores or mail order houses and their included instructions stated the telephone 
operating company may require the purchase of an appropriate adapter.  This was often 
ignored by the buyer.  The BOCs claimed they opposed certification because it would not 
enable them to maintain the integrity, safety, and reliability of the network and thus be 
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counter to the public interest.  Their contention was that this would not alleviate the 
problem but instead would exasperate it.   
Another component of the BOCs argument against interconnection of devices from 
other suppliers was in the form of damage to the service of other customers.  The Public 
Relations Department at Pacific Bell prepared a presentation, with the review and approval 
of AT&T Public Relations, which was designed for local management to use in various 
meetings with groups of customers.  The text was sent by the Vice President of Pacific Bell 
to selected managers who then sought opportunities to deliver the company’s message.  
Following is a key argument presented in their public speeches: 
Certifying telephone equipment is a far cry from, say, giving electrical 
equipment the Underwriters’ Laboratory seal of approval.  With a toaster or 
a television set, there is only a one-way flow of energy.  If your toaster goes 
on the blink and starts burning your toast and your TV set blows a fuse, it 
isn’t going to bother the people next door.  Their toaster and their television 
will still work all right.  A telephone or a switchboard not only takes energy 
out of the system, it puts energy into it, which is why it must be compatible 
with everything else in the system.  If the telephone network is to work 
properly, the parts must fit together exactly, like pieces of a puzzle.117   
 
Efforts to guard against unauthorized equipment included a “line checking 
program” which used test equipment to determine the number and types of equipment at 
the customer premises.  If such equipment was found, the line connection would be 
disabled.  AT&T justified this program by pointing out the difference between telephones 
and appliances such as TVs and radios which used spectrum or lights and appliances which 
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used electric power.  The clear difference was one of only an incoming connection versus 
a two-way connection.  They argued that faulty telecom equipment could thusly damage 
the entire network rather than only the singular owner of the equipment.  The point as stated 
was that a telephone, “. . .  must be capable of providing rapid, efficient two-way 
communications service, involving some 7 million billion combinations of possible 
telephone connections.”118  Put more simply, a defective set could affect services of many 
others.  This was another fear tactic.  The reality was not comparable to the electric utility 
situation where the power grid had experienced being disabled due to troubles at a large 
customer.   It had not happened in the telephone industry, but it was not possible to prove 
the negative.   That is, to prove it would never happen.    
 To further argue against certification, the BOCs also tried a different tactic, which 
was based not on service quality but in cost to the consumer.  In their policy statement, 
Pacific Bell Telephone stated: “As competitors pick up more and more of the station 
equipment market, the revenue lost to the Bell System will have to be made up elsewhere.  
In other words, if 10% of the System’s customers provide their own equipment – such as 
key telephone systems, PBXs and the like – telephone companies, Bell and Independent 
alike, would have to make up some $219 million, probably by raising the rates to residential 
and small business subscribers.”119  This is another example of a “fear tactic” and one 
which does not acknowledge that just as any other competitive business, they must now 
seek cost reduction efficiencies and/or other alternative revenue-producing products and 
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services.  Under the logic of protective regulation, society would not benefit from 
competition-inspired innovation.  Such proclamations by AT&T and the BOCs planted the 
seeds of their own destruction.  They may have been better served to push harder on their 
own vast R&D resources to combat competition.    
3.16 FCC Approves the Certification Process 
  Efforts by the BOCs to make their case about potential costs and damages were 
not successful.120  Certification of terminal equipment was approved by the FCC in October 
1975, but not implemented for two years.  AT&T filed legal actions in hopes of overturning 
the FCC decision.  Ultimately, after the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed an appeals court 
decision and refused to hear the case, the certification process went into effect in October 
1977.121   
The FCC’s ruling was based on the conclusion that the telephone company 
protective connecting devices were unnecessarily restrictive on the customer’s right to use 
equipment which they owned. The commission prescribed that terminal equipment should 
be connected through standard plugs rather than direct wiring.  Also, all terminal equipment 
would be required to meet FCC specified technical criteria designed to prevent any harm 
to the network.  If the BOC could prove that criteria were not met, the equipment could be 
disconnected and the customer was charged for a service trip.  Hence, if equipment could 
achieve certification there would no longer be a requirement for an interface device 
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provided by the telephone company to be installed between that equipment and the public 
network.  The FCC ruling did require the manufacturer to pay for and pass tests using 
network termination specifications approved by the FCC.  This ruling brought into play 
long and detailed negotiations in standards bodies to establish specifics of the connecting 
device and criteria for testing to determine compliance.  AT&T and the BOCs were major 
players in these bodies and directed their extensive resources toward efforts to delay 
implementation by continuing to claim “network harms” caused by each newly proposed 
device and by arguing for complex and expensive criteria to be established for each new 
product to be able to meet the standards required for certification. 
 The position of the FCC, and supported by the courts, contradicted the view 
expressed by the BOCs and the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissions 
which represented State Public Utility Commissions.  The general thrust of the FCC’s view 
was that the BOCs took advantage of a monopoly position and were slow to implement 
advanced technology which would make the embedded equipment obsolete.  This was 
consistent with the view expressed by Roland Homet, the Office of Telecommunications 
Policy’s chief of studies and analysis when his agency was supporting rules to enable 
greater competition.  Homet stated, “It will bring the bright guy out of the basement with 
new ideas.  Now, if he bothers to develop them, he’s forced to sit on them because 
regulations make introduction difficult, if not impossible.”122 
Media outlets also looked favorably upon the efforts and successes of smaller 
companies going up against the huge telephone monopoly.  This was the case regarding 
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the BOCs efforts to resist competition in CPE.  Government officials were influenced by 
public opinion which media helped to forge.   
By the end of 1975, the FCC and most state regulatory agencies had approved a 
program of certification based upon whether the equipment was compliant with the 
appropriate standards. This allowed the more common types of customer-owned terminal 
equipment to be connected to the local telephone network.  Certification had to be done by 
a professional engineer who was registered as competent in telephone equipment by the 
state agency.  There would be no further cost to the customer beyond the cost of the 
terminal device and an inexpensive plug-in device to enable the phone company to test the 
line.  For the customer, this was a significant saving over the previously required interface 
device which the telephone company provided for about fifty dollars and also charged a 
continuing monthly fee of about five dollars.123  These rulings were not retroactive, 
meaning that customers with existing equipment would have to continue to pay the monthly 
fee.  Therefore impacts on the revenue requirements from other sources for the operating 
companies was felt over time instead of immediately.   
3.17 Economic Impact on the BOCs due to CPE Competition 
 The pricing approach used by the BOCs was based not on costs, but rather on “value 
of service.”  This methodology required significant contributions in excess of costs from 
the basic access lines as well as from “vertical services” attached to the lines, such as call 
forwarding, and most notably from the telephone sets.  These contributions covered the 
costs of the local exchange network which connected lines to each other and to the long 
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distance network.  The economic impact of competition in terminal equipment was best 
assessed at the level of statewide operations because cost and revenue accounting, financial 
management, equipment purchasing, profit and loss and rate setting by the state regulatory 
agencies were centralized there.  Generally, there were no provisions for compensating the 
impacted telephone company for the revenue lost due to early removal and retirement of 
its displaced equipment.  In this regard, rate base regulation worked to the disadvantage of 
the BOCs by denying them the flexibility needed in a competitive environment.  Premature 
replacement of CPE supplied by a BOC with a competitor’s equipment resulted in a shorter 
period over which the BOC “earned” revenue.  The effect was to reduce the allowable rate 
of return for the BOC below what was authorized by regulators.   
 In the residential market, competitors were particularly successful in replacing 
telephone set extensions.  Customers generally desired to keep at least one set furnished by 
the telephone company to assure a reliable connection.  In the business market, key 
telephone systems, PBXs, and extension sets were vulnerable in segments with stable 
installations such as hotels, hospitals, and schools.  In these cases, an attractive aspect of 
making purchases rather than leasing equipment from the telephone company was because 
the capital cost could be written off for tax purposes and would also reduce the life-cycle 
cost for accounting purposes.  In December of 1975, the projected losses of annual 






 Table 1 – Projected losses for non-Bell operating companies124 
 
                As shown above, the expected residential extension losses were 
significant.  But, as apparent from Table 2, the fears of the operating companies were 
greater when it came to anticipated losses of terminal equipment in the business segment.  
In that segment, extensions were not as important as the Key Systems and PBXs and those 
losses were expected to significantly exceed any other area of the terminal revenue.  While 
these two charts display projected impacts on non-Bell companies it was clear the same 
impacts would be felt by the Bell companies and, of course, very damaging to the Western 
Electric manufacturing arm of AT&T.   
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Table 2 – Projected losses for non-Bell operating companies in CPE by market 125 
 
  
 On March 18, 1976, the FCC ended AT&T's virtual monopoly over the equipment 
which it permitted customers to connect to its telephone lines.  The ruling applied to 
telephones sets, switchboards and various other equipment made by private vendors.  The 
FCC dismissed AT&T's widely publicized opinion that independently manufactured 
equipment was incompatible and would damage the phone system.  It ruled instead that 
there was no valid legal or technical reason to exclude others from manufacturing telephone 
equipment.  




 Even though terminal equipment and specialized voice and data transmission 
services were being opened to competitors, the position still held by state and federal 
regulators continued to be that regular voice telephone service was and should remain a 
monopoly by the local telephone operating companies.  This was stated in 1975 by Richard 
Wiley, Chairman of the FCC at a convention of telephone operating companies.  Chairman 
Wiley said, “. . . competition is the desired state of the marketplace in our economic system 
and regulation is an imperfect substitute for intelligent business responses to supply and 
demand pressures.”  However, he went on to say, “. . .  there is absolutely no question in 
my mind that basic MTS (Message Telephone Service) and WATS (Wide Area Telephone 
Service) involve monopoly characteristics and public interest considerations which dictate 
regulation rather than competition.”126  This was a logical viewpoint at that time for the 
same reasons of limited resources, public right-of-way access and universal availability 
which applied to other regulated monopoly enterprises.  
              Vertical integration had long been a major goal of many companies.  It was 
necessary for a highly competitive business to secure every opportunity to reduce costs.  
Owning all the steps in the business process was a highly regarded pathway to success.  In 
1976, the Justice Department began looking again at the Bell System as a violator of 
antitrust laws.  Particular attention would be given to Western Electric, the manufacturing 
arm of the Bell System.  They were the exclusive provider of the telephone network and 
terminal equipment and most types of supplies to the operating companies.  As such, they 
were consistently able to undercut the pricing of other potential providers.  With a captive 
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market, Western Electric was able to provide just what was needed; when it was needed.  
Bell executives proclaimed how effectively the Bell System had performed with this 
arrangement.  Over the period from 1950 to 1975, Bell companies had reduced their 
number of employees from 16 per 1000 telephone lines to 7.5 per 1000.127  Of course, much 
of the reason for this was the advent of new and more efficient technologies, such as 
transmission multiplexing and electronic switching.  Other potential equipment providers 
believed that if given the opportunity they could effectively compete with Western Electric.  
Telephone companies firmly believed the trends toward “dis-integrating” their services 
meant, “. . . the price of telephone service for the average American household and small 
business will go up and the quality of service will go down.”128  They argued that universal 
telephone service at the lowest possible price was a goal set by Congress in the 
Communications Act of 1934.  To achieve this goal telephone companies were allowed to 
be monopolies in the territory they served and were required to operate under strict public 
regulation.  Competitors would duplicate the investments already made by the regulated 
companies and would aim at serving only to most profitable customers.  The incumbent 
telephone companies had set terminal and basic service prices higher on businesses than 
on residences to cover the costs of providing universal service to residential customers.  
Similarly, long distance service was “rate averaged” to allow calls over little used and 
costly to operate routes to be priced the same as calls of heavily used and less expensive to 
operate routes.  The companies argued that allowing competition to “cream skim” would 
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undermine the goal of universal service.  Prices for basic terminals and telephone services 
would have to be increased and the loser would be the general public.   
 In summary, it is noteworthy to recognize the inability of the huge regulated 
telephone monopoly to win against the movement toward deregulation even though it had 
tremendous resources to draw upon to attempt to persuade the public, federal regulators 
and the courts.  The predisposition toward competition as the preferable option for the 
United States business environment was becoming preeminent.  Implications for future 
events is clear in retrospect.  Competition in CPE was only the first step toward opening 
all aspects of telecommunications to competition and forthcoming actions culminating with 




               CHAPTER 4.  DATA TRANSMISSION AND DEREGULATION 
Developments during President Ford’s time in office and the legacy of initiatives 
on telecommunications are discussed in this chapter.  Also, the significant impacts which 
emerged during the period of President Jimmy Carter’s campaign and his early time in 
office are examined.  A major driver of the changes was government actions.  But, the 
impetus for those actions came from several different sources.  Carter’s philosophy 
concerning the proper role of government was key.  He advanced the positive attitude 
toward deregulation which began to emerge under President Ford.   
Advances in technology enabled alternative options to the embedded telephone 
company to appear for equipment and transport.  The combination of technology advances 
and a more positive governmental mindset encouraged the entry of new competitive 
options.  New competitors included not only startups but also powerful established 
companies with large resources to draw upon.  Impacts of these factors during this time 
frame are also investigated.  
 4.1 Business and Government 
The relationship between business and government has always been complex.  
Never more so than during the 1970s when President Jimmy Carter, a Democrat with state 
government experience, some business experience, but no federal government experience, 
was wedged for four years between two periods of Republican administrations.  Coupled 
with the tenor of that period toward regulation in general, there was also a major shift in 
technology which impacted telecommunications.  McCraw captures it this way, “. . . a 
situation of natural monopoly prevailed for many years in long-distance telephoning, based 
on the once valid principle that a single set of transcontinental wires could most 
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economically serve consumer’s needs.  But in the 1960s and 1970s, a technological 
revolution in microwave communication destroyed that premise and ended the natural 
monopoly in long-distance telephoning.”129  This observation by McGraw on technology 
is one example of recognition that technology can have very significant impacts.  He 
acknowledges how technology enabled the emergence of new companies who then sought 
to compete with AT&T and the Bell Operating Companies (BOCs).  Vietor adds to these 
two factors of technology and entrepreneurship what he terms new economic and political 
conditions of the 1970s and what he describes as a regulatory failure.  He writes about the 
convergence of all these drivers and their impacts, “The process accelerated in the mid-
1970s until it seemed to spin out of institutional control.  This transition, from regulated 
monopoly based on electromechanical technology to regulated competition based on 
electronic digital technology, culminated in the breakup of the Bell System on January 1, 
1984.”130  While Vietor and McCraw focus on transport and switching, technological 
advances had similar, and earlier, impacts on Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) as well.  
While debates over the role of government in business did precede Jimmy Carter, 
the evidence demonstrates the pivotal nature of his time as President of the United States 
and the impacts of his actions.  Carter’s promise to citizens was that he would help the poor 
and aged, improve education, provide jobs and not waste money.  To achieve this end, his 
approach with respect to the economy, which was entering a deep period of high inflation 
with no growth, was to replace regulation with price competition and encourage new 
entrants to compete with established companies.  The presumption was that less regulation 
                                                          




would lead to more competition, lower prices, higher volumes and more jobs while also 
reducing the cost of government and lowering taxes. 
It is important to note that the congressman most prominent in the 
telecommunications debates during Carter’s tenure, and a supporter of his philosophy, was 
Democratic Representative Lionel Van Deerlin of California.  Van Deerlin was Chairman 
of the House Communications Subcommittee and led the creation of the proposed 
Communications Act of 1980, which provided the impetus for the antitrust case decision 
that ended the Bell System monopoly.  This bill aimed to reform the regulation guidelines 
set forth in the 1934 Communications Act.  It addressed the impacts of nearly fifty years 
of change in the telecommunications industry, including the advent of computers, 
microwave and fiber optic transmission, and digital technology. Van Deerlin argued the 
importance of opening telephone service to competition and letting the marketplace 
determine rates.  He maintained that passage of the 1980 Communication Act would 
encourage telecommunications innovations, lower customer rates, and advance 
productivity.131  
Carter captured these aspects in the opening paragraph of his message to Congress 
urging action to reform telecommunications by writing about three goals, “Legislation is 
needed to eliminate needless regulatory control, encourage competition and innovation, 
and keep telephone service affordable throughout the country.”132  During the period of 
Carter’s presence on the national stage, players across a broad spectrum of industry, 
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consumer groups, law, and government took active roles in establishing the context and 
arguing their positions.  The ultimate result of this drama did not materialize until after 
Carter’s departure.   
This chapter explores the impacts of data communications which began to develop 
in the mid-1960s and continued to expand, change and grow in importance.  A prime 
example was a data service referred to as “time-sharing.”  This service enabled multiple 
users to simultaneously share a computing resource from remote terminals connected to 
the same communications network as traditional voice services.  Impacts which occurred 
when boundaries between voice communications and data processing started to become 
blurred are explored in this chapter.    
4.2 Potential IBM and BOC Overlaps 
In the computing world, IBM was a leader in the concept of time-sharing. It was 
implemented based on the recognition that a single expensive computer would be more 
efficiently utilized if multiple users could be provided access at the same time.  Individual 
users typically would enter bursts of information followed by long pauses.  With a group 
of users, the pauses of one user would be filled by the activity of the others.  However, 
there were security concerns and error conflicts which occurred.  Also, the costs of 
individual computers declined and their functionality increased.  Eventually, due in part to 
the internet, time-sharing of computing resources declined in value.   
An approach somewhat like data time-sharing was also tried by the BOCs. It was 
to sell voice switching services (known as Centrex) as an alternative to locating a Private 
Branch eXchange (PBX) on the customer premises.  Centrex had the advantage that 
installation and maintenance could be done by telephone company personnel on 
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continuously-staffed offices of the telephone company.  This relieved the customer of the 
costs to provide their own floor space and trained technicians, which were required for the 
PBX.  Each phone station had its own connection to the switching equipment in the BOC 
central office.   Since the BOCs had the embedded facilities, using ‘right of way’ and 
conduits shared across many services, Centrex was an offering that competitors could not 
match.  
But, like time-sharing in the computing world, Centrex also disappeared.  A 
difference though is that Centrex was a clear example of how poorly the BOCs understood 
customer needs and could be uninformed about impacts on their customer’s operations.  
The mentality was that if it was good for Bell, then it must also be good for the customer.   
Centrex required many more lines from the telephone office to the customer site.  For calls 
within the customer premises, it was very inefficient.  The shortcomings of Centrex were 
particularly clear as competitors developed new generations of premises equipment with 
added features that were less costly and often more beneficial.    
 As Centrex declined in value to the BOCs for enhancing their position toward 
competition, another move was also underway.  This was driven by technology and not by 
regulation.  It was the merging of communications and computer technologies.  Business 
Week pointed out this evolution and its impacts by writing, “The office switchboard 
business is beginning to look more like the hotly competitive world of computers than the 
traditional telephone industry.  Dramatically changing technology has virtually made the 
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nation’s 200,000 private branch exchanges (PBXs) obsolete.”133  This prediction came true, 
but it took longer than anticipated by that quote.   
As described in the preceding chapter on voice CPE, William Ellinghaus, President 
of New York Telephone, was among the key executives in the BOCs who realized 
competition in CPE was inevitable.  In 1970, Ellinghaus noted that his company offered 70 
different types of data sets with 20 speeds of operation up to .5 megabits per second.  If 
customers desired to provide their own modems, New York Telephone had a variety of 
data access arrangements to permit their equipment to be interconnected to the switched 
network.134  In this matter, he differed from the official AT&T view which continued to 
argue that based upon their studies 8.5% of data equipment produced signals three times 
stronger than authorized, which increased noise on the network.135  
Regardless of which view was more accurate, it was clear that demands for data 
transmission continued to increase and AT&T and the BOCs had to respond.  Advances in 
computer communications led to increased sophistication of users with changing needs for 
their connectivity.  (The terminology of “computer communications” in the second half of 
the 20th century generally created images of a computer manufacturer, especially IBM, and 
a large business user of computers.)  A book by JoAnne Yates, Structuring the Information 
Age: Life Insurance and Technology in the Twentieth Century, is an excellent study of the 
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relationship between IBM and a large business user, Prudential Insurance, in the early years 
of computers.136 
4.3 Going Beyond a Single Premises  
Impacts resulted from the growth in sophistication of all users and the need for a 
telecommunications structure which extended beyond the user’s premises to diverse 
locations.  The leading edge certainly was large business.  However, small businesses and 
consumers would be following the same pathways.  As the demands of sophisticated users 
continued to expand beyond simple voice communications, opportunities and challenges 
accelerated for BOCs and their growing universe of competitors.   
  John deButts replaced the retiring Haakon Ingolf Romnes as AT&T Chairman in 
1972 and served until 1979.  DeButts brought a more modern perspective to the company.  
An example is his recognition of the growing demand among customers for increased 
capacity, faster operation and more reliable data communications terminal equipment.  
These advances in terminal equipment were critical and necessary in this emerging market.  
But, terminal equipment enhancements alone were not sufficient.  Mr. deButts charged the 
Bell family of companies to aggressively push forward with improved capabilities for data 
communications in transport as well as in terminal equipment.  He remarked that AT&T 
welcomed competition in data terminals as it increased demand for the volume of transport 
services the BOCs could provide.  DeButts touted the Bell System’s position in the terminal 
market and bragged about the variety of different data terminals it had available to 
customers.   
                                                          
136 JoAnne Yates, Structuring the Information Age: Life Insurance and Technology in the Twentieth 
Century, Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005. 
99 
 
As an example of Bell Labs research and development capabilities to create new 
equipment and services, deButts used Picturephone.  He said, “. . . it’s sure to grow rapidly; 
maybe as many as 100,000 sets will in use by 1975.”137 On that prediction, he was very 
wrong.  Kenneth Lipartito, in an article written for Technology and Culture, described the 
history of Picturephone, “One of the proudest achievements of Bell Telephone 
Laboratories in the post-World War II era, the video telephone system, Picturephone, ended 
its brief life as the Labs' biggest flop.” However, Lipartito acknowledges Picturephone 
influenced innovators and users to follow a certain trajectory of information technology.  
Even though it disappeared from use, it is reasonable to examine the capabilities of 
communications we have today and trace their roots to Picturephone.  Thus, it was not a 
commercial success, but it was successful in the sense that it made significant impacts on 
the world in which we now live.138 
4.4 Data Services Present Economic and Regulatory Issues  
At the annual conference of the Computing Machinery Association in August 1971, 
a diverse panel representing various stakeholders debated the economic and regulatory 
aspects of data communications.  The panel included a former FCC Chairman, an AT&T 
Vice President, an officer from a data communications company, a telecommunications 
industry financial analyst, and an economics professor.  The AT&T representative opened 
the discussion with the assertion that the FCC was developing a philosophy of splitting the 
communications market by limiting incumbent telecommunications companies from 
entering new lines of business, such as data processing.  All members of the panel generally 
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agreed that the FCC had not sufficiently addressed crucial decisions on matters such as 
pricing, cross-subsidization, and competition.  The panel member from a prospective 
competitor to AT&T expressed the concern that without intense FCC scrutiny AT&T 
would be able to crush any new provider by using its vast presence and economic power.  
The FCC had said no cross-subsidization would be permitted, but there was no plan in 
place regarding how to identify cases and enforce the policy.   
Next, the AT&T panel member maintained that the competitive products of its Bell 
System companies must be priced based the relevant costs of only those products.  The 
AT&T plan was to abandon the long-standing policy of cost averaging across all products 
and regions.  Brown and Heal discuss this topic in detail.  They also note that “A special 
case is a single multiproduct firm which produces products for regulated markets. . .  and 
produces products for unregulated markets. . . for example, AT&T.”139  When all 
telecommunications products and services in regions served by the Bell System were 
provided only by their regulated monopoly, this cost averaging policy where all products 
and services in all geographic areas were equally priced had been the means used to 
establish universal service.   The goal was to permit all users to have access to all services 
at prices they could afford even when the cost to provide a specific service to a specific 
customer was greater than the price.  Although it also meant that some products and service 
were priced above their cost and this became the target area for new competitors.  Since 
the objective of universal service had been achieved, it was no longer part of the equation.  
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AT&T argued the focus for their company must shift to ways to operate in a fair and 
competitive marketplace. 
Paul Davidson, professor of economics at Rutgers, followed with an appeal for tight 
government control of telecommunications rather than depending solely on competition.  
He suggested government should set and enforce standards for interconnection because 
consumers could not determine what would work properly.  Further, he believed real 
technological progress came about only through government action and enforcement.  
AT&T strongly objected to that view and mentioned cases of great advancements, such as 
the transistor at Bell Labs.   To reinforce his point, Davidson referenced the transportation 
system, the space program, and development of ENIAC (Electronic Numerical Integrator 
and Computer), the first electronic general-purpose computer.  These grand 
accomplishments he contended required what is referred to as “. . . the visible hand of 
government.”  Former FCC chairman, Newton Minow, responded that lawyers had 
overtaken the processes of communications regulation and it took much too long to get a 
resolution of issues.140 
  This panel represented well the different viewpoints of government’s role.  Yet, 
the fact was that competition and free enterprise was the direction being taken and would 
not be derailed.  The BOCs realized this fact and pushed ahead with new approaches to the 
emerging competitive marketplace.   One such response was to create competitive sales 
programs for terminal equipment across the various departments within each BOC.  
Marketing and sales were not significant departments in the BOCs before competition 
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because the only choice for the customer was to buy an instrument from the regulated 
telephone company.   
Of all the competitors and potential competitors, the one most feared by the Bell 
Companies was IBM.  They had the expertize, the presence, and the cash flow to add 
communications systems to their computer and office products lines.  There was a genuine 
concern on the part of regulators that many of the small companies, who were out to make 
quick profits and may provide cheap, lower quality products and services, could adversely 
impact the viability of competition in the eyes of the public.  BOCs were quick to point out 
failures when they occurred.  Failures would not be the case with IBM.  An FCC 
commissioner, noted, “IBM is probably the only company that could compete with AT&T 
on even terms.”141 
4.5 The Power of Open Markets  
Competitors to the BOCs contended that the FCC shift away from monopoly 
regulation was justified because the BOCs had failed to keep the nation's communications 
capabilities in line with the pace of burgeoning requirements of information services and 
abilities of new digital technologies to meet those requirements.  Their position was that 
the United States flourished more readily with the expansion of alternatives and risk taking 
for innovation than it did with uniformity, certainty, and narrowly prescribed options.  Two 
notable cases where AT&T was involved in innovation are teletypes and facsimile 
machines.   Both teletypewriters (often referred to as telex) and facsimile machines had 
long histories of using networks to transmit information worldwide.  The telex network 
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used a switched network of teleprinters, similar to a telephone network, but for the purpose 
of sending text-based messages.  Telex became popular in the 1920s in the United States 
using the telegraph network for applications such as stock market data and transactions.  In 
1931, AT&T introduced a much faster capability using the telephone network rather than 
the telegraph network.  Similarly, facsimile  
machines transmitted images initially over the telegraph network and by the 1930s over 
the telephone network.  Popular applications for facsimile machines were news 
photographs, weather mapping, and law enforcement information.  As stated by Jonathan 
Coopersmith in his book on the history of fax machines, “Ironically, faxing’s success aided 
the ultimate acceptance and diffusion of digitalization by gently introducing users to the 
potential of immediate transmission and acquisition of information and images.”142  With 
the advent of digital technologies, it became clear that computer-to-computer applications 
could eventually replace both telex and facsimile services.  AT&T was beginning to lay 
plans for exiting both declining service areas and focusing resources on future capabilities.  
An example is the creation of the Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) which would 
use a twisted copper pair of wires in embedded cables already in the network to carry 
digitally carry two digital voice channels and one digital signaling channel instead of only 
one traditional analog voice channel.143 
 The official company position was stated in a March 4, 1974 issue of the internal 
AT&T Management Report.  It acknowledged the inevitability of competition in CPE.  A 
good side to it was even pointed out.  “. . . it’s been a spur to us to do a better job on data 
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sets, for example, to get out there and sell, bring our products to the market faster, and 
serve our customers better.  Some in the company could see the potential of data 
communications and the need to stay at the forefront, beginning with equipment on the 
premises.  However, the same article still argued for an interconnection device for data 
equipment rather than certification.144  The small, but growing, contingent who sought to 
“turn around the large battleship” that was the Bell System and “make it into a lean fighting 
machine” had a very long and uphill battle to fight.  Little did they know at the time; it was 
a battle they would never win. 
An early example of a revolutionary technology began to emerge in the 1960s.  
Working as an engineer with the RAND Corporation, the U.S. Armed Forces think tank 
founded after the Second World War, Paul Baran developed a new type of communication 
system that could continue to function if part of it was knocked out by a nuclear blast.  At 
the height of the Cold War, the nuclear threat was very much of a concern.  Baran’s 
proposed system aimed to divide communications into tiny pieces and use distributed 
network “nodes” to pass those pieces around.  If one node was knocked out, the others 
would pick up the slack.  He published a paper on this system which described the concept 
and how it might operate.145   His work was key in leading to the development of the 
ARPANET146 which would evolve into the modern internet.  His communications 
technology for carrying both data and voice over the internet is known as packet switching.   
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In 1974, a landmark paper was published by the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronic Engineers which described the issues and outlined solutions for interconnection 
of packet switching networks.  The concept was like a superhighway for transport and 
delivery of voice and data across different individual networks.147  Still, it took over 30 
years for the application of Voice Over Internet Protocol (VoIP) to become widely 
commercially viable.   
The challenge to the BOCs in the enterprise market segment was clearly dramatic.  
However, it should be noted that the former BOCs still attempt today to serve that market, 
even though their monopoly position was destroyed.  On the web page of today’s AT&T, 
there is a proclamation of the merits of VoIP.  It states: “VoIP integrates voice services and 
data into a single network, expanding the possibilities for communication while creating 
new and exciting paths for growth. High bandwidth and the reach of IP networks can help 
you reduce costs, improve voice clarity, and take your business voice service almost 
anywhere.”148    
               Momentum for competition within the telecommunications industry continued to 
grow and was also spurred on by the successes in the growing competitive marketplace for 
voice premises equipment.  More choices were being offered to customers and competitors 
were demonstrating the ability to lower operating costs for users while also offering more 
features.  Questions were being asked about what other advances could result if more areas 
were competitive.  The attention of Congress began to focus on rewriting the rules for 
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regulation of the telephone industry.  Emphasis was paced on addressing what other aspects 
of the industry should be open to competition.  The two giants, IBM and AT&T, were on 
a collision course with respect to computers and communications.   
4.6 Data Growth Accelerates 
 By the early 1970s, BOCs were aware of the explosive growth in data traffic as 
compared to voice traffic.  In large metropolitan areas, the growing number of online 
computers accessing telephone lines contributed to a deterioration of voice service quality.  
But with the movement from analog to digital transmission and switching systems the 
traditional telephone network became better suited to carrying data communications traffic 
along with voice traffic.  Similar advancements led to CPE capable of handling both voice 
and data traffic.  Direct competition between and data and voice CPE and equipment was 
technically feasible.  The possibilities included computers and data modems that could 
multiplex and concentrate voice messages and processors that could hold and then assign 
the flow of information to remote computers, thus combining the functions of both data 
processing and of storing and forwarding voice messages to distant users.  The PBX market 
moved toward becoming a field for computer switching equipment.  Facilitated by the 
Carterfone rulings, which opened the door to interconnecting other suppliers’ equipment 
with the telephone network, the computer and telecommunications equipment industries 
were on a collision course.  The first commercial system that contained both an electronic 
switching matrix and stored program control was announced by IBM in 1969.149  Both 
industries had the capability and motivation, but the advantage still resided with the 
telephone operating companies due mostly to the long history of public policy regulation 
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which inhibited competition.  However, pressure grew to review and modify regulations in 
anticipation of meeting the newly emerging customer demands through more open 
competition.150  
 As the Information Age advanced and requirements for data communications grew, 
the motivation also grew for IBM to use its strengths to become a powerful competitor to 
AT&T and its operating companies.  AT&T and IBM were major players in the economy 
of the country.  In 1970, AT&T annual revenue was over $17 billion and net income was 
over $2 billion.  While smaller than AT&T, the IBM company was a leader in technology 
innovation and was continuing to grow.  The revenue of IBM in 1970 was over $7 billion 
and net income was nearing $1 billion.151  In July of 1974, IBM announced they were 
forming a subsidiary to buy into a venture to operate Communications Satellite 
Corporation.  It signaled a potential for the giant computer company to compete “head on” 
in the field of communications.  The battleground was expanding and the potentially 
financially lucrative boundary area between the industries of computers and 
communications appeared to be a hotspot.  Computers were becoming integral to the 
BOC’s network while the ability to interconnect distant computers was becoming essential 
to the continuing success of IBM.   
 Despite their common interests, there were huge differences between the two 
companies.  Years of competition had forged IBM into a “lean-and-hungry” mode.  Its 
management was geared to marketing and flexible accounting practices which enabled 
competition not only on product quality but also on pricing and on service, provided 
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through customer-oriented innovation and novelty.  Whereas, top managers in the BOCs 
had risen through operating, engineering and financial departments and were dedicated to 
high quality and rigidly standardized telephone service with prices set by regulatory bodies 
based on investment.  Competition and marketing savvy were not in their cadre of skills or 
interests.   
               In order to continue their growth momentum, both the information processing and 
the traditional telephone industries needed to expand sales in the large business market.  
This was where the offerings of the BOCs and IBM were increasingly overlapping.  IBM 
and other similar companies saw it as essential to avoid having government regulations 
prevent them from entering what they considered logical extensions of their product lines 
and services.  These areas were in the expanding sector of data communications equipment, 
computer network systems, and teleprocessing, which combined information processing 
and communications functions.  This future office was envisioned to provide what was 
described as, “communicating typewriters, data-retrieval displays, and telephones with 
pushbuttons that double as computer input and display devices.”152  From the perspective 
of the BOCs, there was a fear that deregulation efforts may result in their loss of the 
lucrative market segment of large businesses.  Without this highly profitable segment, the 
BOCs feared it may not be possible to subsidize the less profitable residential market and 
maintain their mandate to provide universal service.   
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4.7 AT&T and IBM go Head-to-Head 
Innovations continued to emerge from the convergence of computers and 
communications.  Computer technology was being rapidly deployed in 
telecommunications switching equipment.  New data transmission and processing 
applications such as Electronic Funds Transfer were of increasing importance.  The FCC 
recognized that the data processing industry was highly competitive and innovative and 
demonstrated no need for regulation.   However, it was dependent upon the 
communications companies.  This placed the BOCs in the roles of both a bottleneck 
supplier of services and a competitor in the data processing market.  Therefore, the FCC 
considered strict safeguards to be necessary in order to restrain the market power of the 
BOCs and for the benefit of the data processing market.153  With this perspective, the FCC 
began what became known as the Computer Inquiries (CI) which focused on issues 
surrounding the convergence of computers of communications.  The first was CI-1 in 1966.  
It was following by CI-2 in 1976, and CI-3 in 1985.   
As part of these proceedings, the FCC ruled in March 1976 that a communications 
common carrier could not offer data processing services or equipment unless a separate 
subsidiary was established for this purpose.  This was  
due to a concern that regulated non-competitive services might subsidize competitive data 
processing services.  An impact of this ruling was the rejection of the BOCs “Dataspeed 
40” computer terminal on the basis that it performed data processing.154  Fearing more 
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attempted intrusions by the BOCs onto their turf and anticipating aggressive AT&T 
lobbying, the computer industry, led by IBM, continued to aggressively defend their 
industry in the ongoing debates.   
Both companies were giants.  But, it is interesting to consider that while AT&T had 
a significant lead in annual revenue, the operation of the company required a much larger 
investment in assets and personnel than IBM.155   
Table 3 Comparisons of AT&T to IBM in 1975 ($ Billions) 
    AT&T  IBM 
Fixed Assets   85.1  15.5 
Revenues   35.5  14.4 
Net Income     3.2    2.0 
Employees (000) 1092                 289 
 
With annual net income coming in at more than half of what AT&T earned, there 
was a much higher return on investment for IBM.  Added to this was a greater perceived 
growth potential.  Consequently, the market valuation of IBM was higher than AT&T.  
However, it did play well into the AT&T argument that they were not earning the great 
returns of a competitive company and thus were making the serving of all customers their 
higher priority instead of serving only the most profitable ones.  Also, helping AT&T was 
the fact that they had many more union employees than IBM and government agencies did 
not want to alienate that group because of their political power.   
                                                          
155 Harry Edelson, Communications and Computers: AT&T and IBM, pg. 1, August 24, 1976, 1976 




Distinctions between these two companies are important because AT&T was not 
allowed to offer data processing services and IBM was essentially precluded from the 
regulated business of communications.  In view of the growing convergence of the 
businesses, debates focused on the resolution of their divergent modes of operation.  IBM 
fired an early shot of the war by citing AT&T as one of its competitors in a Justice 
Department antitrust case.  This case was filed against IBM in 1969 following an 
investigation which had begun in 1967.  IBM based the claim that AT&T was their 
competitor due to $700M of revenue which IBM contended was data processing attributed 
to AT&T even though AT&T was not authorized to be using its regulated telephone 
network for data processing.156  
Relationships between these two giants were complex as IBM was both the largest 
single customer and the largest vendor to AT&T.  IBM took a one-third ownership stake 
in Satellite Business Systems (SBS), which provided long distance private transport 
services in competition with AT&T.  When this happened, AT&T lost a major portion of 
IBM’s transport revenue.  Possibly in retaliation, AT&T began to replace IBM computers 
in its operations with computers from IBM competitors.   
4.8 Services Converge 
 By 1976, communications and data processing had converged.  Desk-sized 
Teletypes were receiving data over wires and doing what it took a room-sized computer to 
do two decades earlier.  With data processing and communications becoming intertwined, 
the worlds of IBM and AT&T were converging and the giants were becoming competitors.  
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There was a dichotomy of government involvement in overseeing and managing 
relationships in this new reality.  On one level, the Justice Department had filed suits to 
break up both IBM and AT&T based on the premise that each company was too dominant.  
The dominance came from their size but also from their competitive tactics such as making 
premature product announcements and bundling of multiple offerings.  But on another 
level, service offerings and their associated prices were regulated by various levels of 
government for AT&T and the BOCs.  IBM was not similarly regulated.  Caught in the 
middle was the FCC.   The question to be addressed was whether the FCC should support 
regulating computing or removing regulation of communications.   
The FCC had held that competition was in the public interest for voice CPE, but 
they had stayed away from regulating computers.  With the advent of a Teletype, which 
did data processing and data communications, it became tenuous to differentiate between 
it and a computer connected to the telecommunications network.  An issue to be solved 
was the process of setting rates that BOCs could charge for the emerging data services.  
The existence of common costs in the provision of telecommunications made cost 
assignments for individual services very difficult.  Federal and state regulators were in 
general agreement that pricing of a competitive service should be based on long-run 
marginal cost, defined as the change in volume-sensitive costs resulting from a change in 
output.  The reason regulators favored this approach was that BOCs could otherwise 
impede fledgling rivals if interconnection fees to competitors were higher than their 
marginal cost.157  However, estimation of that cost was extremely complex when a 
competitor’s service used the nationwide switched network.  The BOCs preferred to keep 
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terminal interconnection regulation under state rather than federal control.  While federal 
agencies were well equipped to undertake complex issues, the available staff at state 
agencies which could be assigned to investigate and establish pricing levels was more 
limited.  Thus, states were more inclined to accept the established BOC’s position that was 
articulated by a large and competent contingent of accountants and lawyers with a history 
of pleadings before the state commissions.     
Also, it was problematic for governmental agencies to determine if the monopoly 
guaranteed pricing of a BOC’s regulated business was being used to subsidize its own 
competitive services.  In economics terminology, it came down to a debate between “fully 
distributed” or “marginal” cost accounting.  BOCs desired to use a fully-distributed cost 
model to set interconnection charges.  This meant all costs of building and maintaining the 
network would be considered and BOCs were enabled to charge higher prices for 
competitors to interconnect with their network than what a marginal cost model would have 
established.  The BOCs would then be able to price their data services to end user customers 
lower than  
their competitors.  The BOC’s hope was that cross-subsidization would insulate them 
against competitive erosion.  This was precisely what IBM feared could occur.  But, for 
the BOCs, their approach had an adverse impact.  It sparked growing concerns among 
regulators, who worried that artificial maintenance of monopoly structures by the phone 
companies would foreclose entry of competitors, which may be firms with superior and 
more innovative technology.  Accordingly, it grew increasingly unlikely that data 
communications competition would be forestalled.   Unwilling to relent, AT&T continued 
intense lobbying to push a bill through Congress which included provisions to require 
114 
 
competitors in data communications to prove the local operating company was not able to 
provide a service before they were allowed into the market.  That effort never succeeded.   
4.9 AT&T Achieves a Successful CPE Product 
Backed by the resources of Bell Labs and Western Electric, AT&T continued to 
push the envelope of what could be accomplished and presented a major challenge to IBM.  
AT&T’s most successful data CPE product, which was leased rather than sold to 
customers, was the Dataspeed 40.  It was capable of transmitting and receiving at 4800 
words per minutes.  Reaching that speed was a major accomplishment.  IBM had strongly 
objected that this was clearly a data processing computer and not a communications 
terminal.  According to IBM, AT&T crossed the line that separated hybrid communications 
from hybrid data processing.  Either they were operating in unregulated markets outside of 
their mandate as a common carrier, or the company was extending its regulated activities 
into the previously unregulated data processing market.158   
In response to Dataspeed 40, the FCC established a new definition intended to 
delineate the difference.  Their proclamation was: “Data processing is anything in which 
the ‘semantic content or meaning’ is changed in transmission - or in which whatever comes 
out is a ‘programmed response’ to what goes in.”  Although this did little to clear it up, its 
mindset at the time can be seen in this comment from Richard Wiley, FCC Chairman, “I 
could see a lot of public-interest aspects involved in direct competition between AT&T and 
IBM for the terminal market.”159  In that era of promoting competition over regulation, 
many in the government were intrigued at the idea of head to head competition between 
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the giants of AT&T and IBM. Somewhat ironically, considering the future turn of events, 
AT&T endorsed the prospect.   
AT&T Vice President, William R. Sharwell, was quoted in a Forbes magazine 
interview as saying, “Does anyone doubt that if the full talent existing in the Bell System 
were turned loose, it would not provide worthy competition for IBM?”160  (He said worthy, 
but most likely he thought superior.)  This is yet another example of the mindset at AT&T 
that they had the best and the brightest and could outperform any competitor.  Joe 
McMonagle was a technical manager of data products at AT&T General Headquarters 
from 1975 to 1978.  He offered this description, “I worked directly with Bell Labs on data 
engineering efforts and had many discussions with them about their technology and my 
belief that there was nothing really special about their products and any technical 
organization could produce comparable data sets.  But, Bell Labs and AT&T top 
management tried to create this aura that one else was qualified.  I think this attitude of 
superiority and invincibility played a role in the loss of their monopoly.”161 
4.10 Large Businesses Preferred to Purchase 
 The reality was that other companies could and did produce quality equipment.  In 
addition, many large businesses found it more attractive to purchase terminal equipment 
from competitors instead of renting from the BOC.  They based this decision primarily on 
their calculation that the overall cost to purchase would, over the period of its use, be lower 
than the cumulative cost to lease.  But there were also other factors to consider such as 
payment arrangements, equipment features, and anticipated timing of obsolescence.  The 
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National Steel and Shipbuilding Company, for instance, estimated it would save $3500 a 
month by going to a competitor.  That estimate was exceeded because over the first nine 
months it actually saved $7000 a month.  A larger organization, the Scripps Clinic and 
Research Institute, estimated it would save $23,000 per month by choosing a competitor to 
the BOCs.162   
 Even with the growing challenge of competitors who would sell CPE to businesses, 
the BOCs continued to only lease equipment.  The principle reason for this was that the 
BOCs had a huge embedded investment which was not fully depreciated.  Their problems 
with a “lease only” policy continued to exasperate the BOCs management as more 
competitors entered the business market with continuously improving products.  When the 
pace of change in technology grows more intense, then being a seller is even more 
advantageous than being a company that only leases.  Residential customers tended to be 
less inclined to want their CPE changed to newer models, while business customers clearly 
wanted the latest and the best products to improve their operations.  The BOCs were 
increasingly stuck with investments in undepreciated and outdated equipment that had to 
be removed and written off as a loss.       
Pressure against AT&T, which provided 85 percent of the United States’ phone 
service, was applied on multiple fronts.  The Justice Department was pushing a lawsuit that 
would force AT&T to divest itself of Western Electric, its manufacturer of telephone 
equipment.  Other firms were fighting for the right to duplicate the more profitable 
equipment and services.  Manufacturers of data CPE, as well as voice CPE, wanted the 
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unrestricted authority to sell to customers who would then connect to existing telephone 
lines.  While the FCC continued to block AT&T's entry into computing, IBM was taking 
more interest in telecommunications firms.   
In the business market, the future competitor the BOCs feared the most was IBM.  
As Steve Usselman describes in The Challenge of Remaining Innovative, there were few 
American companies in the twentieth century with greater notoriety than IBM.  It was the 
world’s dominant supplier of electronic computers, which was the glamor product of the 
century.  By 1971, IBM had the highest market capitalization of any American company.  
Competitors such as General Electric and RCA had left the computer market.163  But, the 
fear of IBM was due not only to its size and resources but also because of their entrenched 
position with business customers as well as their marketing and sales skills, and their track 
record of innovation.  Although, as Usselman discusses in detail, IBM also faced the 
challenges of government antitrust cases.164  
 The FCC undertook an investigation to determine whether the BOCs rates were 
reasonable and their accounting practices were fair.  John deButts, AT&T chairman, 
responded that home phone customers could see their bills rising by 70% if the BOCs 
accounting and pricing practices had to be modified to adjust to a potentially new 
environment replete with competitors in the more lucrative areas.  However, firms trying 
to pull business from AT&T claimed increased competition would hold rates down and 
even force a lowering of charges for some types of services.  Independent telephone 
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operating companies and the nation’s largest union, the Communications Workers of America, 
supported the AT&T position.   
4.11  Ford Administration Initiates Deregulation Process 
 In April 1976, John Eger the Acting Director of the White House Office of 
Telecommunications Policy (OTP), issued a position statement that described the 
forthcoming role of the federal government.  He noted that telecommunications technology 
had been developed "which can substantially change the quality and character of American 
society," yet we have been slow to recognize the institutional barriers which block progress 
toward this change and have been "too set in our ways to do anything about them.”  Eger 
argued that the United States stood at the threshold of a new age where the gross national 
product would be measured not so much in terms of goods and services as in terms of the 
production, storage, and the dissemination of knowledge.  He believed the country had 
already reached a point where nearly half of its gross national product was directly related 
to the informational activity.165  Because of this, it was critical that any governmental 
actions would not damage but instead would help to ensure a continued strong position.   
 The solution proposed by the OTP was consistent with the philosophy of the Gerald 
Ford administration.  That was to relax government regulation and enable competition and 
the free enterprise spirit to accelerate and implement new innovations in technologies.166  
Eger went on to say this philosophy was the kind of government thinking that can hasten 
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the transition from technical feasibility to the actual implementation of new services.  An 
example given was the FCC decision to allow customers to buy and install their own 
telephones and telephone-related terminals.  It seems simplistic today, but he described 
how it may eventually be possible to receive stereo sound, deliver captioning, call up airline 
schedules on a screen and possibly even to shop or bank from your home on that same 
screen.  Presumably, none of this could happen if the Bell System retained sole control of 
the industry and operated under the protection of rate-of-return regulation because the 
incentives to innovate and to take risks were not present.   
 Under the administration of President Gerald Ford, support for more widespread 
and open competition in telecommunications continued to gather momentum.167  This was 
reflected in a speech by John Eger168 after he had been appointed as permanent head of the 
Office of Telecommunications Policy.  The Federal government did not typically agree 
with the arguments made by telephone executives.  A press release from the Office of 
Telecommunications Policy made the case that implementation of new technologies which 
could bring the value of the information age to all users was being delayed by needless 
regulatory barriers.  It made the case that the rulings which permitted customers to own 
telephone terminal devices connected to the network were a positive step forward.  It also 
favored faster and higher capacity alternatives to telephone company facilities which could 
enable access to a greater amount of information sources.  Examples of possibilities it 
described (and many others not imagined at that time) are now commonplace to us today.  
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The position it took was that government should be out of the business of regulating the 
telecommunications business because not only did it delay the advancement of new 
technology and services, it also imposed “hidden and unnecessary cost” which was paid 
for by the consumer.169   
Eger stated, “We have allowed old institutions and old ways of doing things to 
dominate innovation and new horizons for progress.  The time has come to put some 
adventuresome spirit into our national policy making and into the board rooms of our 
telecommunications industry.”170  This was an indication of federal support for 
deregulation and increased competition.   But, the Bell System was not giving up easily.   
Eger challenged the assertion of AT&T that rates would increase.  He stated in a 
public forum, “For every study that says the rates are going to go up 70%, we can find one 
that says they are not going to go up.  Most people do seem to agree that present 
competition does significantly impact the Bell System's total revenues, and it is rather 
difficult to extrapolate that kind of impact into anything approaching the 70% scare that hit 
a couple of months ago.”171   
The efforts by AT&T to get legislative relief were dealt a severe blow by the 
conclusions drawn in an analysis of the AT&T bills by the Office of Telecommunications 
Policy.  “. . . the proposed legislation would result in the virtually complete monopolization 
of an industry in which historical,  
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technological, and economic considerations suggest that certainly for some it, free market 
forces are quite capable of serving the best interest of the public.”172 
After President Ford replaced Eger as Director of OTP with Thomas Houser, the 
philosophy changed little.  Houser outlined how the OTP would serve as a resource to 
Congress as it deliberated legislative reforms in telecommunications.  He felt it was 
important to understand with clarity where competition could work and where it could not 
work.  Houser was concerned that competition between highly regulated and non-regulated 
companies was fundamentally an unfair situation.  Government agencies established prices 
for the regulated while the unregulated determined their own pricing structure.  The reward 
went to those who did the best job for the best price.  However, he pointed out, “We have 
learned that competition can create problems and not all competition is workable.  We 
recognize that in rare instances economies of scale for a particular service may be so great 
that there exists the need for a sanctioned, but regulated, natural monopoly.  Still, regulation 
often does poorly what competition does well.  That is to reward innovation and financial 
efficiency.  It generally also adds a time lag by studying and debated whether to authorize 
abandoning established methods and converting to more effective ones.  Congress should 
move promptly to evaluate which segments can most productively be freed from 
government oversight.”173  
While AT&T fought every step of the way to avoid removal of regulatory 
protection, there were arguments made which contended benefits may well accrue to the 
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Bell System.  Those arguments were generally made by competitors or by customers who 
wanted more control, such as large technologically sophisticated businesses.  An example 
is statements by Edgar Buttner, who was the head of an Interconnect Association 
representing suppliers and users.  He believed that as customers added their own terminal 
equipment and developed more ways of using it there would tend to be more use of the 
Bell System communications network.  In response to AT&T’s concern that service would 
deteriorate because customers would not properly maintain it, his counter-argument was 
that since it was essential to the operation of businesses, they certainly would keep it in 
good operating condition.  Further, Buttner argued that the net value to the Bell Operating 
Companies would be positive since the cost of maintenance, provided at a loss by Bell, 
would now be shifted to the users.174   
Final approval by the FCC had been granted in August 1969 for the MCI request to 
provide private line transport.  This meant the federal government favored allowing 
competition in all CPE and in network transport services.   Hence it was logical to initiate 
discussions concerning the restructuring of the entire industry.  All aspects of 
telecommunications were open to being challenged.  For the Bell System, perhaps the 
greatest obstacle of all would be converting from the “only telephone company in town” 
into a company which was customer-focused with sales and marketing savvy.  There 
appeared many lean and agile CPE competitors for the consumer segment.   
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4.12 Momentum Grows for Deregulation 
AT&T had hoped that perhaps if a new president was elected in 1976, he might 
change the tone in Washington.  Also, new members of Congress may also be more 
receptive to the company’s message.  That message was centered on the need for the 
highest quality telecommunications services and equipment to be universally available.  
The argument was that the best way to achieve this was by a single regulated company.  
Further, it was stated that taking care of the public good, as Bell had done for many years, 
was more important than introducing many new competing players seeking only profits.  
Unfortunately for AT&T a leading Democratic candidate, Jimmy Carter, already had his 
doubts.  Early in his campaign, Carter staked out his beliefs about government which he 
said stemmed from his experiences, “I’m an engineer and a scientist and a businessman 
and a farmer more than I am a politician . . .”  He then described how ineffective, expensive 
and cumbersome the federal government had become and how he wanted to streamline it.  
“And I don’t want anybody this year to vote for me for President unless you want me as 
President to completely reorganize the executive branch of the nation’s government.  And, 
if I’m elected President, I’m going to do it.  Primarily because the American people are 
sick of the bureaucratic confusion here in Washington.”175  This statement is an indication 
of his view toward the size and burden of government and portends his attitude toward 
regulation in general, though details for future initiatives in specific industries were only 
in a formative stage.    
                                                          
175 Speech by Jimmy Carter, January 23, 1976, Consumer Federation of America Assembly, Sam Bleicher 
Files, copy in “Agency for Consumer Advocacy”, Box 31, Carter Library.  
124 
 
Kevin Wilson in his book, Deregulating Telecommunications, contends the 
following concerning telecommunications, “Although regulatory reform did not figure 
prominently in his campaign for president, Carter embraced the movement following his 
election.”176  Evidence points to the inaccuracy of Wilson’s statement.  The 
Communications Act of 1934 established rules governing the telecommunications industry 
and had been only minimally modified since enacted.  During the campaign, Carter did 
acknowledge the need to revisit the rules governing telecommunications.  A letter written 
by Richard M. Neustadt, Deputy Special Assistant on the White House Staff shortly after 
Carter took office demonstrates not only support for telecom deregulation but also verifies 
that Carter did address the subject during his campaign.  The letter was a reply to V. G. 
Hudson, President of the Telephone Service Company of Ohio.  Neustadt wrote, “The 
President pledged during the campaign to review the Communications Act in light of the 
developments of the last 40 years, and he has often stated his belief that the burden of 
regulations upon business and the public should be kept to a minimum.”177   
4.13 Other Competitors in the Fight 
In addition to CPE competitors, other strong and vocal opponents to AT&T were 
those companies who sought to provide competitive transport services.  Chief among these 
was the first to gain limited approval for transport, MCI Telecommunications.  Others 
included United States Transmission Systems and Southern Pacific Communications.  
Along with several other companies, they formed the “Ad Hoc Committee for Competitive 
Telecommunications (ACCT).  They presented a particularly impressive (in style and 
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content) statement of their arguments to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce of the House of Representatives.  The Introduction addressed the merits of the 
competitive free enterprise as the basis of the American economic system.  It included a 
statement from an analysis made by AT&T of the results from one of their surveys of public 
opinion.  The statement read, “If the public is to adopt our position fully, it must, in some 
instances, suspend its convictions and accept the antithesis of some long-held beliefs (e. g., 
that free enterprise means lower prices and higher product or service performance . . .).”   
Regulatory agencies sided with competitors as demonstrated by remarks of the FCC 
Chairman, Richard Wiley.  He said: 
Competition, in my opinion, has made AT&T and its partners better and more 
vigorous business entities and better and more vigorous public servants. Critics of 
the Commission's procompetitive policy originally argued that the "one carrier -- 
one system" concept was necessary to preserve the technical integrity of the 
telephone network. After nearly a  
decade of experience with the interconnection of customer-supplied equipment and 
specialized common carriers, the telephone industry has yet to document 
deterioration of the nationwide switched network. Thus, it is not surprising that the 
technical integrity arguments have now been superseded by the theme of adverse 
economic impact. In point of fact, however, Bell and the independents also have 
yet to prove any case of harm here either.178   
In addition, the Director of the Office of Telecommunications Policy also weighed 
in on the debate with this strong statement in opposition: 
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The whole basis for our free enterprise system is that business access should be 
won competitively in the marketplace by providing the goods and services that 
customers want.  It is unbecoming for a company the size and the stature of AT&T 
to use its legal, political and economic power to extend its monopoly by 
governmental fiat into areas where monopoly is not called for.  In my judgment, 
the government cannot let such an effort go unnoticed or unchecked.179 
AT&T argued they did pursue new technology and services.  In the annual report 
to shareholders the Chairman said, “In 1975, we brought new technology to the threshold 
of introduction that, beginning in 1976, will not only increase the versatility of the 
nationwide switched network but improve the efficiency of its operations as well.”180  
Indeed, there were advancements and it is a tough case for either side to prove what 
impacts, positive or negative, would have occurred from greater competition. 
In addressing the role of the FCC as the regulator of telecommunications, Carter 
pointed out the authority was granted under the Communications Act of 1934.  He noted 
the Act was “. . . designed at a time when technology made monopoly the logical structure 
for telecommunications. That system, assisted by the rural telephone loan program, has 
nearly achieved the national goal of universal service—96 percent of all households and 
nearly all businesses have telephone service.”181  Carter maintained conditions had changed 
and pointed to the extraordinary technological advances since 1934. “In addition to the 
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wired network, the telephone companies and new, competing firms are using satellites, 
lasers, microwaves. and miniature computers to provide more and more systems and 
services for business and homes. The new technology makes it possible to hold meetings, 
transmit messages, do research, bank, shop, and receive a widening variety of information 
and entertainment all through electronics.  In the process, the technology has invalidated 
the old assumption that all aspects of telecommunications service are natural 
monopolies.”182   
4.14 A Last Ditch Effort: The Bell Bill 
In 1976, proposed legislation was drafted by AT&T lawyers and introduced in 
Congress.  In a rather desperate attempt, it proposed to continue a single, integrated 
telecommunications system and became commonly known as the "Bell Bill."  This bill was 
cast as a modification to the Communications Act of 1934.  It argued that the existing 
structure had successfully achieved Universal Service and a unified telephone network was 
essential to continue to maintain that goal.  If enacted, it would have eliminated most 
competition in the telecommunication industry.183  The initiative was aimed at achieving 
legislative action with the following provisions: 
- Recognition that existing phone companies should continue to have a 
monopoly. 
- Prevention of new companies entering any phases of phone equipment and 
services so long as they are already offered by the existing operating company. 
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- Authorization for the states to determine what equipment by outside suppliers 
should be permitted to be connected to phone lines. 
Political activist groups, such as The Ad Hoc Committee for Competitive 
Telecommunications (ACCT), undertook rather scathing attacks on AT&T by contending 
that the Bell Bill was a final resort appeal to Congress after having failed to convince 
regulatory agencies, the White House Office of Telecommunications, the courts and the 
public that they should be protected from competition.  The bill, they charged, “. . . is 
neither a ‘reform’ bill nor is it consumer-oriented.  Rather, it threatens to deny American 
consumers innovations and options in choosing communications services . . .”184  Huge 
firms also intervened against AT&T.  Among these were IBM, Litton and General 
Dynamics.  Extensive hearings were held beginning in 1977.185                
 In response to questions about why AT&T objected to letting business firms buy 
their own data or voice CPE from independent suppliers and connect to the BOCs 
networks, John deButts said, “That network is composed of literally billions of parts, each 
compatible with all the others.  To work as a single system, it’s got to be managed as one 
with all the components designed, built, operated and maintained to common standards.”  
He acknowledged that others could produce quality equipment, but argued that the issue 
centered on how it was connected and maintained.  He also described two cases when 
damaged to the network had occurred.  One was from data equipment and the other was a 
PBX.  The FCC Chairman, Richard Wiley, disagreed with deButts and contended there 
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were no proven cases of harm and in fact, AT&T purchased equipment from other suppliers 
and connected it to the network without any connecting device or any certification.  Wiley’s 
position was that it should be the responsibility of the FCC rather than the states to review 
and certify equipment because it was a national network and not a state-only network that 
was involved.   
 
The IBM affiliate SBS prepared a position paper for lobbying purposes that 
attacked the proposed legislation.  The paper stated: 
The proposed legislation would nullify recent actions by the FCC which have 
brought the fresh air of choice to consumers of telecommunication service and 
equipment.  This is leading to significant improvement in costs and technology. All 
the while AT&T’s profits and business growth have increased by nearly record 
amounts.  The AT&T Bill would leave AT&T almost alone in deciding what 
service and equipment consumers would have and at what cost.  While it and its 
allies assert that they are moved to this action by a concern for some consumers, 
the basis of that concern is demonstrably unsound.186  
The paper goes on to make a case that the benefits derived from competition in 
terminals products had forced AT&T to expand the choices it provided and to move 
forward with new technologies.  It contended the same would occur with competition in 
transport, as AT&T and an array of new competitors in the transport sector would meet 
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needs that AT&T previously was not motivated to do.187  The paper charged that AT&T 
was using falsely founded fear tactics about impacts on basic residential service.  As 
evidence, quotes from findings of the FCC were given which stated that competition had 
benefited customers in terms of features, functionality, and cost and had not impacted the 
company’s earnings or rates for basic services.  FCC quotes also concluded that situation 
was unlikely to change.188  
Although SBS opposed continued regulation of telecommunications, IBM was 
willing to agree to telecommunications regulation with the objective of seeking to avoid 
regulation of the equipment and services which IBM provided.  In a letter to newly elected 
President Jimmy Carter’s domestic policy staff regarding the FCC inquiry into computers 
and communications, IBM stated, “Competition has proven to be the spur to innovation 
and the spawning of a variety of new products and services at the lowest possible prices to 
meet the diverse demands from all users.”189  IBM argued that regulation was appropriate 
only for pure transmission services and not for equipment installed on a customer’s 
premises.  While they acknowledged the right for carriers to supply premises equipment, 
they insisted safeguards were essential to ensure that regulated services did not subsidize 
the pricing of equipment.  This was considered by IBM as a critical requirement to enable 
fair competition.  Without it, IBM feared that AT&T would be in a position whereby they 
could undercut IBM pricing and make up any losses with increased prices for their 
regulated offerings. 
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In a letter to the FCC Chairman, AT&T argued that users were pleased with its 
ability to offer a complete package that included transport as well as data processing 
equipment and services.  In this regard, they took issue with the position of IBM and other 
data equipment providers and contended that separation of equipment and transport 
combined with a broad definition of data processing would limit the use of modern 
technology.   The result would be to reduce user choice, restrict innovation, and 
dramatically limit data communication services to small or geographically remote users.190  
Again, this resonated with the AT&T refrain of universal service with uniform and 
reasonably priced availability to all users.    
4.15 Carter Favors Action on Deregulation 
The role of each president in the 1974-84 period is described by Jeremy Tunstall in 
Communications Deregulation: The Unleashing of America's Communications Industry.  
Tunstall characterizes Ford as a trot, Carter as a canter and Reagan as a gallop.191  The 
Carter “canter” started right out of the opening gate of his presidency.  The White House 
Office of Telecommunications Policy prepared a memorandum and forwarded it to Richard 
Neustadt, Deputy Special Assistant for Media and Public Affairs, on March 11, 1977.  The 
memo outlined the suggested position for the Carter administration on telecommunications 
policy.  The White House Office of Telecommunications Policy supported a congressional 
review of the Communications Act of 1934, made the case that regulatory programs of the 
FCC should be discontinued where they no longer served a useful purpose and 
recommended that fostering of market processes should be encouraged.  It concluded with 
                                                          
190 Letter, James R. Billingsley to Charles D. Ferris, October 17, 1977, Domestic Policy Staff, Government 
Reform Neustadt files, Computer Inquiry Folder, Box 22, Carter Library. 
191 Tunstall, 28-9. 
132 
 
this statement, “The President, therefore, wishes the Congress every success in the 
important task of ensuring that our very important communications systems are regulated 
as well as possible, with as little burden as possible to the public and to those subject to 
regulation.”192    
Making appointments is one of a president’s main powers.  Kevin Wilson 
elaborates on this subject regarding telecommunications legislation when he says, “Carter 
softened industry resistance to these bills by appointing pro-competitive commissioners to 
the regulatory agencies.  Slowly, in a piecemeal fashion, the regulatory commissions began 
to introduce competition to the industry.”193  This worked because industry began to realize 
that legislative action could put an end to uncertainty due to incremental deregulation.  The 
most influential of Carter’s appointments with regard to telecommunications was that of 
Charles Ferris as Chairman of the FCC.  The goal of this appointment was stated in a memo 
from Rick Neustadt to Stu Eiszenstat, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs and 
Policy.  Referring to the appointment of Ferris, the memo said, “This decision presents a 
crucial opportunity to improve the Federal communications policy and implement the 
President’s commitment to competition and improved regulation.”194   Even though the 
FCC is an independent agency, President Carter continued to press his goals with Ferris 
after his appointment as Chairman.  In a letter to Ferris on April 11, 1978, expressing the 
need to seek all means to control inflation, Carter continued to push for pro-competitive 
measures by writing, “I believe that regulatory agencies can contribute to the effort by 
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fostering competitive markets and prices, which often provide the most powerful restraint 
on inflationary pressures.  In addition, we should attempt to use market forces more 
constructively than has been the case in the past to achieve our social goals.”195 
The efforts of Charles Ferris did achieve some success in meeting the aims of the 
Carter Administration regarding deregulation of telecommunications.  In a letter dated June 
1, 1979, Eisenstat wrote to Ferris, “I want to congratulate you on the dramatic regulatory 
reform steps the FCC has taken in the last few months.  Your efforts are contributing 
substantially to the President’s program of eliminating needless regulation and promoting 
competition.”196  In his book, Telecommunications in the United States: Trends and 
Policies, Leonard Levin includes a contribution from Douglas Webbink, a commissioner 
on the FCC during the tenure of Ferris.  Webbink states, “The Chairman of the 
Commission, Charles Ferris, and some of the other Commissioners have been strongly 
committed to deregulating many of the services the Commission regulates.  This may be 
seen not only from the Chairman’s votes in Commission meetings and speeches but from 
the emphasis of the people he has chosen as bureau and office chiefs.”197 
FCC processes and congressional rewrite efforts for the Communications Act 
contributed significantly to pushing forward the deregulation and pro-competition agenda 
of Carter.  However, as previously discussed, there was another major contributor toward 
competition in telecommunications that was not related to CPE and was not achieved in 
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the Executive or the Legislative branch of government.  That impact was from the Judicial 
branch and had begun prior to Carter.  It was the request by Microwave Communication 
Incorporated (MCI) to provide high capacity transport between large cities in competition 
with AT&T.  Like the debates on CPE, AT&T called this “cream skimming” and contended 
it would undermine the long-held belief that universal service was in the public interest 
while advocates said it was a movement toward a fairer system of cost-based prices.  It is 
a dilemma, however, that even if it is in the public interest, a system of cost allocation is 
complex and debatable.  This allocation problem exists in competitive as well as regulated 
markets.  But, for a regulated business, it becomes a public policy issue.   
 4.16 Carter Position Consistent with the DOJ Antitrust Action  
The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) had filed an antitrust suit against 
AT&T in the Washington, D. C. district court November 20, 1974.  It was sweeping in its 
allegations and dealt with both CPE and telecommunications transport services.  Joseph 
Kearney in an article in the Hasting Law Journal noted that the government claimed AT&T 
had used its size and national scope to impede competition in telecommunications industry 
segments that by their nature should not have to be served by a single provider.198  The 
state-sanctioned franchises of the Bell System provided, on a monopoly basis, local 
telephone service to more than eighty percent of the nation’s users.  Thus, it had the means 
to do just what the government suit claimed.   
Litigation of this case started before Carter took office and ended after his 
departure.  However, much of the language of the settlement was pulled from the ongoing 
                                                          
198 Joseph D. Kearney, "From the Fall of the Bell System to the Telecommunications Act: Regulations of 
Telecommunications Under Judge Greene," Hastings Law Journal 50 (August 1999): 1404. 
135 
 
congressional and regulatory proceedings during his administration.199  In view of their 
impacts, the goals he outlined are central to capturing the essence of the entire debate.  
Though interrelated, exploring each goal separately achieves the best understanding. 
This belief was not new to Carter as he held it as a basic tenet during his first 
campaign.  At an event hosted in August 1976 by Ralph Nader, who was a prominent 
consumer advocate, Carter was asked if he favored competition in the telephone industry.  
Many aspects of the Bell Bill were deemed by consumer activists and potential competitors 
to the incumbent telephone companies as blatantly anticompetitive.  Carter was also asked 
if he supported the government’s pursuit of antitrust litigation against the Bell System.  
Carter replied, “I do favor competition within the telephone industry.  I think that there are 
a couple of instances with which I am personally familiar as a businessman and as a 
candidate.”200  He went on to describe, as an example, in-building systems for large 
companies as an area where competition is a good thing.  He said, “I have not observed 
myself, nor have I been presented with any proof that there is too much competition within 
the telecommunications industry now.  My own inclination now is to think that there is not 
enough competition.”201  He also indicated support for the antitrust case.   
Carter’s comments at Nader’s forum raised considerable concern within labor 
unions, as competitors to the BOCs typically were non-union shops.  The Communications 
Workers of America (CWA) was an influential union with a large number of members 
employed by the BOCs and AT&T.  Glen Watts, President of the CWA, personally 
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expressed concerns about Carter’s remarks and potential impacts on union jobs.  Watts 
reinforced that the CWA had been a strong supporter of the Democratic Party and this 
position expressed by Carter was very damaging to their continued support.  Stu Eizenstat, 
Carter’s campaign staff aide for the 1976 election, alerted Carter to the sensitivities of labor 
and also made this strongly worded recommendation about the antitrust case, “Finally, no 
comment whatsoever should be made on the pending Justice Department litigation on this 
question, on the grounds that it would be inappropriate to comment on a case that is in 
Litigation.  THIS IS A DIFFICULT ISSUE THAT SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED IF 
WE CAN AVOID IT.”202  Subsequent to the forum, Carter acknowledged labor’s concerns 
and stated that he was still studying the issues.  In a letter of reply to Glen Watts, Carter 
expressed appreciation for the support of the CWA and stated, “Certainly we cannot have 
massive disruption of employment in the industry and personal hardships for industry 
employees. . .”203  
 4.17 Carter’s Uncertainties 
Carter’s varied statements led to uncertainty as to his real position.  The following 
editorial cartoon issued in an industry publication captured this point.204 
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Figure 4 – Carter’s Uncertainty 
 
Some of Carter’s uncertainty may have been founded in his background as an 
engineer and businessman.  From that perspective, he could appreciate the arguments 
against opening up full competition although he did need help to understand the multiple 
perspectives involved with telecommunications deregulation.  Briefing materials furnished 
to Carter by his staff contained a detailed and scholarly written paper that provided an 
analysis of the domestic telecommunications industry.  The author, Laurence Singer, was 
a former lobbyist for the Consumer Federation of America and from 1969 through 1975 
had served as a legal counsel for the FCC.  In his work with the FCC, he had addressed 
telecommunications deregulation issues.  In the briefing papers, Singer addressed the issues 
under debate and described the arguments from multiple perspectives.  The value of the 
integrated system of telecommunications was recognized in a reference made to a recent 
decision by an Administrative Law Judge of the FCC.  That decision acknowledged that 
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the combination of research and development, manufacturing, and operations in the Bell 
System had provided useful public benefits.205 
Laurence Singer had noted in his contribution to the briefing papers during Carter’s 
campaign, “Each FCC decision seems to create more problems than it solves, with no party 
entirely satisfied.”206  He mentioned the conflicts between the FCC and state agencies, 
between business and residential users, and between AT&T and its competitors.  Further, 
he pointed out, “. . . the complexity of telecommunications policy problems is magnified 
by the substantial technological, social and economic consequences of any policy 
decision.”207  Singer correctly predicted the new administration would need to pay close 
attention to these problems and provide a guiding hand.  However, he suggested to Carter 
that the complexities, and presumably the divisions of opinion around this subject, did not 
make it a useful campaign issue.  Singer suggested the position to take was a non-committal 
one.  Carter followed that advice during the campaign but after becoming president he 
eventually took a stand and made a lasting impact on the industry.   
  
                                                          
205 Laurence Singer, Domestic Telecommunications, Briefing Papers prepared for Jimmy Carter, September 
16, 1976, 3, 1976 Campaign, Sam Bleicher's Files, Communications Folder, Box 31, Jimmy Carter Library.  




    CHAPTER 5.   COMMISSIONS, CONSUMERS, AND CARTER 
Chapter 5 reviews the position of the Carter administration regarding deregulation 
in general during his tenure.  The specific issues faced and the positions taken related to 
the telephone industry are highlighted.  The significant impacts the resultant policies made 
are discussed.  Also addressed are the influences on his administration’s policies resulting 
from the beginning of the campaign for a second term in office.   
Jimmy Carter’s 1979 message to Congress on telecommunications touted the 
benefits of deregulation of airlines in the previous year.  He claimed this action saved $2.5B 
for passengers while increasing air travel and airline revenues.  He believed similar 
progress could be achieved in the telecommunications industry through better services 
coupled with cutting costs.  Carter wrote, “We cannot afford to have this progress frustrated 
by unwarranted regulation.  We must ensure that competitors fight through their salesmen 
in the marketplace rather than through their lawyers in government hearings.”208   
 5.1 Voices for and Against Regulation 
Kenneth Lipartito in “Rethinking the Invention Factory,” agreed that monopoly 
status gave AT&T certain advantages when it came to research.  Lipartito stated, “Most 
notable, it could charge the costs of its research to its customers, in contrast to competitive 
firms, which must absorb the costs of unfruitful research.”209  This scenario was good for 
the company, but also considered by some as good for the public.  This assumption of 
public good derived from the ability of Bell Labs to undertake both applied research and 
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basic research.  Payoffs from basic research may be long-term but could also be widely 
applicable beyond only the Bell System.  As Paul Starr described the situation in his book, 
The Creation of the Media, “In a purely competitive market, AT&T would have been too 
concerned with its short-term survival to invest in new knowledge potentially convertible 
into profitable innovations only many years later.  Regulation, in contrast, provided a stable 
environment for recovering long-term investments, and rate-setting agencies typically 
recognized research as a legitimate capital cost.  As a result, AT&T could allocate research 
costs to its operating companies, which could pass them on to consumers.”210  
Although there were benefits to the regulated monopoly of the Bell System and 
powerful forces, such as AT&T and the CWA, fighting to continue the status quo, there 
were also strong voices against it.  The proponents of competition fighting against AT&T’s 
proposed legislation were not only consumer advocates and large potential competitors.  
There were also small businesses seeking opportunities in the manufacturing and supply of 
telephone equipment.  One such company president, Keith Schwayder, had the connections 
to get a meeting with Carter’s staff.  Mr. Schwayder was a wealthy Colorado industrialist 
who had contributed heavily to Democratic campaigns.  One of the companies he owned 
was attempting to grow into a competitor to AT&T and their Western Electric 
manufacturing unit.  He also brought along a lobbyist for the North American Telephone 
Association, a group of independent telephone equipment manufacturers.  Schwayder 
argued against the Bell Bill citing the values of open competition and referring to Carter’s 
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announced position in support of regulatory reform and free market competition.  He 
contended that AT&T arguments of universal service and network harms were groundless.   
 5.2 Let the Bell Bill Fail 
A memo written by Rick Neustadt of Carter’s staff described the issues involved.  
Of interest in this internal memo is the frankness with which Neustadt said that the Bell 
Bill really had no chance of passage anyway and if anything did happen on the legislative 
front it would be in the context of a re-write of the Communications Act of 1934, which 
would take between two and four years to complete.  Accordingly, the Administration’s 
position needed to be one in which it could essentially keep from alienating any of the 
impacted groups, i.e., Democratic supporters such as Schwayder and influential consumer 
advocates, but also the Communications Workers of America (CWA) union, the traditional 
rural and lower income base of the Democratic Party, and the business interests of the 
largest corporation in the world, AT&T.  Neustadt ended his memo with this statement, “I 
think the bill is terrible, but since it is dead for now, I see no point in our getting out in 
front on it and bringing AT&T and CWA down on our heads.”211   
In a memo, Neustadt had provided a succinct analysis and again related that the bill 
should not be passed.  In three parts, he listed the FCC rulings at question, the AT&T goals 
in their proposed legislation, and the position of opponents to the Bell Bill.212 
FCC Decisions permitted the sale of: 
1. Phones, switchboards, answering machines, and other equipment which plugs into 
the network, 
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2. Private lines to large businesses, and 
3. Computerized telephone services, such as Electronic Funds Transfer. 
AT&T sought to maintain their monopoly because: 
1. Non-Bell devices will damage the system, 
2. Private lines will cause wasteful duplication, and 
3. Loss of revenue will require increase rates for residential users, especially in remote 
expensive-to-serve areas.                  
Opponents countered: 
1. FCC registration of devices can be relied upon to protect the network, 
2. Competition leads to minimum prices and maximum innovation, 
3. Competition succeeds only where users prefer their offerings which means they are 
better and not duplicative, 
 
4. It is counter to a free market society for a company to take money from some 
customers and give it to others.   
A strong opponent of the Bell Bill had always been Representative Timothy E. 
Wirth, a Democrat from Colorado.  As a supplement to a summary of testimony before the 
Communications Subcommittee, circulated by Chairman Van Deerlin, Wirth had 
submitted into the Congressional record what he called a “very good summary” from a 
recent article in the magazine Consumer Reports.  The article provided details of the main 
points of the proposed legislation and concluded, “In effect, the bill guarantees existing 
phone companies the monopoly they already enjoy and ensures them a monopoly in future 
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telecommunications technology.  At the same time, the bill weakens or eliminates the very 
government regulation made necessary by a lack of competition.”213 
Considering the many arguments against the Bell Bill and the general opposition in 
Congress, it may be surprising there was any continued momentum.  There are two likely 
reasons it continued as long as it did.  First, is the powerful lobbying resources of AT&T.  
Given its size and economic impact, AT&T was able to get the attention of President Carter 
by actions such as stated in a letter from AT&T Chairman to Carter in which AT&T 
pledged to support efforts to slow inflation by freezing equipment prices and executive 
compensation as well as keeping local phone rates low.  Carter responded by writing, “I 
also appreciate the importance you attach to holding down the rate of increase on telephone 
service charges.  This is the most important step your company can take against 
inflation.”214  This goal seemed to fit into the philosophy that AT&T espoused against 
competition.  The second reason, as described earlier, is the political influence exerted by 
the CWA. 
The combined power of AT&T and the CWA was not enough to carry the day.  By 
the end of 1977, AT&T had recognized the Bell Bill would not succeed and began to seek 
compromises.  On the equipment side, AT&T sought to require at least one telephone 
instrument be leased from the company to ensure availability of service to users.  The 
computer industry did not agree as they felt it could impede their sales of home 
computer/telephones terminals.  Regarding intercity services, AT&T was willing to 
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concede private lines used within a single company could obtain access to their public 
network if “access charges” were levied, which provided a fair contribution to subsidize 
local phone rates.  While this was movement on the part of AT&T, it still left a large gap 
between contending parties.   
In 1978, Henry Geller was appointed the first head of the Commerce Department’s 
newly created National Telecommunications and Information Administration.  He had 
served in several capacities at the FCC, including Special Assistant to the FCC Chairman.  
He also had research experience in Communications Law and Society at the Rand 
Corporation and the Aspen Institute.  Geller played a major role in debates as committees 
in both the House and Senate considered their next steps.215    Geller made requests to the 
Office of Management and Budget in September 1978 for additional staffing required to 
balance strongly held partisan views in the adversarial process of legislative debate on the 
revision of the Communications Act of 1934.  He stated this issue would be of continuing 
concern.216   
5.3 Aftermath of Bell Bill’s Demise 
Geller was right to anticipate the need and to secure appropriate resources.  
Congress agreed in early 1979 to begin anew the process of rewriting telecommunications 
law.  Rick Neustadt suggested to Geller there was the potential for a Presidential Message 
calling on the Congress to act.  It was also expected there would be an objection from the 
Justice Department as the antitrust case against AT&T was dealing with primarily the same 
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set of issues.  The charge was given to Geller to move rapidly with developing and publicly 
announcing the administration position.  Neustadt went on to write, “It is time to decide 
what we want to do in late 1979 and 1980.  (This may be our last opportunity to put issues 
on the national agenda if the bad guys win next year.)”217  
Singer’s briefing paper, prepared in September 1976 for Jimmy Carter’s first 
campaign, had correctly highlighted three of the major thrusts of AT&T’s legislative 
initiatives and explained adverse impacts on competitors that would result.  The points it 
made were still relevant in 1979.  First, prices would be set based on incremental costs, 
which advantages the incumbents who already have the embedded investment.  Second, 
states would be given jurisdiction over terminal equipment, which creates a huge obstacle 
for a new entrant to comply with both the requirements of each local telephone company 
and the varied requirements of each state in which they sell equipment.  The third, and the 
most challenging proposal would be that in order to grow its network a new carrier would 
have to prove the following:  1. There would be no increase in local exchange costs, 2. No 
wasteful duplication of existing lines, and 3. No impairment of the technical integrity and 
capacity for unified operations of the nationwide network.218   
It was long recognized that a powerful weapon against competitors in long distance 
service was control of access to the local network and hence to end user customers.  This 
local network was the domain of the operating companies, primarily AT&T.219  This was 
a successful tactic dating back to 1913 and the agreement that resolved the first antitrust 
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case against AT&T. While this case imposed forced interconnection with other 
independent local service providers, it did not apply to interconnection to long distance 
providers.  AT&T repeatedly used its power to avoid long distance interconnection until 
1978.  On petition by MCI, the court ordered AT&T to interconnect.  The FCC took the 
position that “. . . the introduction of competition stimulated technological change in the 
telecommunications system, helping to satisfy new business communications markets and 
realize the latent but unsatisfied demand for existing services.”220 
The policy issue facing Carter’s administration was the merits of competition 
versus the dangers of dismantling a system that had traditionally worked very well.  It is 
not surprising there would be some uncertainty.  In addition to incumbent 
telecommunications operators (Bell and Independents) and influential labor forces, other 
constituencies who expressed their views in favor of the traditional telecommunications 
structure included retired pensioners, agencies representing rural areas, and minority 
groups.  Most state commissions also had concerns about impacts of competition; although 
there were a few that did see potential benefits, i.e. the Colorado Public Utilities 
Commission. 
5.4 Concerns of Influential Groups on Different Sides of the Debate 
The Pennsylvania Association of Older Persons stated, “. . .  the 
Telecommunications Industry in the United States has established for industry, labor, small 
business and the individual consumer, telecommunications service which even its severest 
critics acknowledge as the finest in the world at the lowest cost to the consumer. During 
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recent years, significant regulatory decisions are threatening to upset balanced universal 
service at low cost by fragmenting the telephone network into thousands of suppliers 
seeking to control portions of the telecommunications service. . .”221 
The American Farm Bureau Federation wrote, “We support the goal of attaining an 
efficient interstate telephone system that will provide telephone service to rural consumers 
at a reasonable cost.  We oppose policies which erode those revenues that traditionally have 
contributed to maintaining service at reasonable rates over the entire telephone 
network.”222 
The NAACP position was, “. . . nationwide cost averaging and rate integration has 
provided an equality of service for low income as well as commercial users in both urban 
and rural areas . . .  we call upon the Congress to prevent the extension of unnecessary 
competition in the areas of terminal equipment and intercity common carrier service.”223 
An especially enlightening explanation given by Laurence Singer addresses the 
convergence of telecommunications and computer technologies and services.  After 
describing the rapid pace of development in telecommunications, the paper made the point 
that “. . .  not only is the telecommunications industry changing at an ever-increasing pace, 
but so, too is the computer industry.  The relationship of these two industries, now already 
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affecting one another, presents further complexities.”224  This accurate observation 
explains why the computer industry was deeply involved and active in promoting the merits 
of telecommunications competition.    
Also, the high level of profits by AT&T had raised continuous concerns among 
consumer activists from early in the debates.  For example, in the third quarter of 1976, 
AT&T posted record profits and became the first public corporation in the history of the 
nation to net over $1B in a single three-month period.  The Table 4 chart appeared on the 
front page of the New York Times.225  The impacts of growing profits were damaging to 
AT&T arguments as competitors seized on these profits to buttress their argument that 
AT&T should be stripped of its near-monopoly position in telecommunications. 
Table 4 – AT&T Quarterly Earnings in Millions of Dollars 
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In addition, consumer activists opposed to AT&T's monopoly status, equally 
sensitive to the level of AT&T’s profits, asserted that the flush of prosperity at the company 
was just one more sign that rates were too high.  The article accompanying the earnings 
table used this quote, “Ma Bell speaks with a forked tongue,” said Marlin Rogol of the 
consumerist Public Interest Research Group.  “At the same time they’re saying competition 
is dangerous, they’re reporting the highest profits in history.” This view contrasts with 
Table 3 on page 110 which showed the amount of AT&T’s investments and indicated a 
much a lower rate of return on investment than the computer industry, which was open to 
competition.  When limited to only a view of absolute earnings, without considering 
investment involved, it does distort the picture.  Still, the volume of antitrust suits directed 
toward AT&T did grow rapidly, and they mostly dealt with AT&T’s purchasing and 
pricing policies.  The DOJ’s main goal in filing the 1974 antitrust case against AT&T was 
vertical unbundling by separating Western Electric (the manufacturing subsidiary) from 
AT&T’s services and equipment provisioning units.  When more competitors appeared, 
including MCI and other long-distance services companies, the DOJ expanded its goals to 
include separation of the BOCs from AT&T’s long distance, manufacturing and R&D 
operations. 
 5.5 Carter’s Goals  
There were important concepts embedded in the three stated goals of Carter’s 1979 
message to Congress. 226  For each goal, it is worthy to explore its origins, conflicts, and 
impacts to understand the underlying concepts.  Doing so also provides an understanding 
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of the times, the state of the technology and the importance to society of efforts aimed at 
telecommunications regulatory reform. 
The first goal listed in Carter’s message was to eliminate needless regulatory 
control.  There were aspects of deregulation that appealed to each of the political parties.  
Democrats felt it would be good for consumers by lowering prices of products and services 
due to simplified rules and less paperwork.  Also, Carter especially wanted to lower cost 
of government at a time when inflation was a major concern.  Republicans supported 
deregulation because they believed a free market environment would enhance innovation 
and competition and reduce the size and omnipresence of government.  The mood of the 
nation was ripe for such changes after the long period of a growing government influence 
on citizen’s lives stemming from the Great Depression, World War II, the Cold War, 
Vietnam, and Watergate.   During the period of Carter’s presence on the national stage, 
players across a broad spectrum of industry, consumer groups, law, and government took 
active roles in establishing the context and arguing their positions.  Even though the 
ultimate result of this drama did not materialize until after Carter’s departure, it is clear the 
initiative began during his four-year tenure in office.   
Even though the national mood was shifting toward smaller government and less 
regulation, AT&T continued to argue that a monopoly was necessary.  AT&T even backed 
up their argument with references to the renowned work of Alfred D. Chandler.227  In his 
1977 work, The Visible Hand, Chandler stated, “In the creation of the nation’s 
communications network, monopoly rather than oligopoly became the pattern. . . .The 
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speed and volume of messages made possible by the new electric technology forced the 
building of a carefully defined administrative organization, operated by salaried managers, 
to coordinate their flow and to maintain and expand transmitting facilities.”228  However, 
AT&T ignored Chandler’s observation that a monopoly was not inevitable.  He likely 
recognized that evolution of technology would make conditions dramatically different 
from the early years of telephony which he was addressing.    
Edward B. Crossland, AT&T senior vice president, tried to paint it as an “either or” 
issue, “All we’re trying to do is get Congress to tell us: ‘Which rules do you want us to 
play this telecommunications game under?  Do you want competition, or do you want the 
rate structure as it is, providing low home phone rates?”229  This position was a major point 
of argument by the telephone industry and was stated not only by AT&T but also by 
independents.  An example is a message contained in bill insert to customers of 
independents. It stated:   
Today we are forced to work in another area to be able to continue providing 
the service you expect and we wish to provide.  Big Government, in the form of the 
Federal Communications Commission, is experimenting with the world’s best 
telephone system in a way we believe endangers the service you enjoy and the 
reasonable prices you pay.  Impartial studies conducted for USITA show that this 
“contrived competition” will cause residential and small business telephone 
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customer to pay up to 60 percent more in the next decade as well as threaten the 
quality of the service.230   
The incumbent phone companies desired to generate fear among customers over 
the potential for loss of quality and affordable phone service.  Their message was heard 
and had an impact on users.  The long enduring goal of universal service to all customers 
at affordable prices with the highest possible quality dates to 1907 when Theodore Vail 
was reappointed as AT&T president.  As Mark Clark notes in his Technology and Culture 
article, which reviews Bell Telephone’s work on magnetic recording during the World War 
I era, “To provide universal service at a superior level of quality became AT&T’s formula 
for corporate prosperity.”231 
The incumbent monopoly telephone companies which were not a part of the Bell 
System belonged to the United States Independent Telephone Association, (USITA).  In a 
lobbying effort in favor of the Bell Bill, USITA had commissioned a study and published 
the findings in a report labeled, “Economic Impacts on Independent Telephone Companies 
and Their Customers from Competition in the Supply of Terminal Equipment and Intercity 
Services.”  It described the difficulty of meeting competition while also functioning as 
public utilities under federal and state regulation.  The study contended that revenues from 
basic local service do not cover costs and are subsidized by the services that the FCC had 
opened to competition.  New entrants go after the most profitable customers and do not 
have the obligation to serve the less profitable ones.  The following chart was included to 
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show the revenue losses which the study projected would occur to the independent 
telephone companies in constant 1974 dollars due to competition.232   
      Table 5 – Projections of Anticipated Revenue Losses of Independents 
                       
The impact would be that independent telephone companies would have to raise 
rates on basic local service to make up for these losses.  The study explained that in rural 
areas costs to provide service is much higher due to distances between customers.  
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Therefore, those customers would be left to the regulated company with the obligation to 
serve all customers.  When forced to make up revenue losses in denser urban areas, the 
company would have no choice but to significantly raise rates in rural areas to cover their 
costs.  It predicted a rate increase of 60 percent over the following ten years would be 
necessary to maintain the financial viability of the independent telephone companies.  It 
ended with this plea, “What is really needed is a comprehensive review by the FCC, 
Congress, and state regulatory agencies of the roles and responsibilities of the telcos as 
public utilities and the market conditions that must prevail for them to be able to meet these 
responsibilities.”233 
The Communications Workers of America (CWA) is the primary union 
representing the workers in telecommunications.  They issued a strongly worded resolution 
in favor of the Bell Bill.  It followed along the same lines of argument as USITA by 
charging:  
Recent decisions of the Federal Communications Commission encouraging 
competition in telephone equipment and services, if carried to their logical 
conclusion, could result in higher rates for local telephone service.” The FCC has 
encouraged "specialized common carriers" to provide competing private line 
services which, when tied in with the switched network, enable subscribers to 
virtually duplicate message toll services of telephone companies. Yet telephone 
companies are being restrained in their efforts to meet this competition.  The FCC 
has also required the interconnection of terminal equipment manufactured by 




unregulated companies to the telephone network, overriding the regulations of state 
authorities and undermining the end-to-end, system-wide responsibilities of 
telephone companies for the quality, maintenance, and functioning of telephone 
equipment.  If FCC encouragement of these kinds of competition results in 
diversion of substantial revenues from telephone companies, rates for remaining 
services, particularly basic residential services, will have to be raised in order that 
total system revenues will cover total system costs. If this were to happen, the result 
would be less business and less employment for telephone companies.234 
The CWA went on to warn of serious consequences for customers and employees.  
It also stressed that the telephone was too good to risk damage based only on theoretical 
but unproven benefits of competition.  The union argued it was best to stay with the current 
model of an integrated system where responsibilities were clear and where revenues from 
business and long distance services enabled low rates for basic residential service.  In 
effect, this was the long-held belief in the merits of universal service, which had guided 
the industry since its earliest days and which was codified in the Communications ACT of 
1934. 
By the time Carter delivered his message to Congress in 1979, there was developing 
a consensus that changes in the model of regulation were needed.  In his message, Carter 
stated, “FCC and court actions over the last decade opened portions of the industry to 
competition.  Despite these far-reaching developments, the statutory framework has 
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remained unchanged, and regulatory changes have come slowly.”235  While the telephone 
companies and their advocates wanted to stall competition, Carter wanted to promote it.  
He felt everyone would benefit from changes in regulation and in his message said, 
“Outmoded regulatory controls and slow procedures are harming new competitors, 
established telephone companies, and the users of telephone and other telecommunications 
services.  Regulatory delays and uncertainties discourage firms from entering new markets 
and offering new services.  In a dynamic industry, these delays can mean that the product 
or service offered is obsolete by the time the regulatory proceeding ends. Innovation is 
hobbled by uncertainty and by the need to respond to artificial regulatory conditions instead 
of real consumer demand.”  He went on to say, “Consumers are the final beneficiaries of 
competition, through lower prices and wider choices.  The competition already allowed in 
the telecommunications industry is producing benefits.  For example, the market for 
telephone sets and other terminal equipment recently was opened to competition.  
Consumers now can shop around for good prices, choose from a wide variety of products, 
and decide whether to buy or lease.  Competition is also providing more choices among 
sophisticated, new services, such as those that combine data processing and 
transmission.”236   
 5.6  Competition Benefits and Reliable/Affordable Service 
Regarding telecommunications, the goals in Carter’s view were to create a structure 
to give customers the benefits of competition where it made sense, while still paying 
attention to the need to keep telephone service reliable and affordable.  Carter charged the 
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FCC Chairman, Charles Ferris, to work on telecommunications issues while recognizing 
that, “Competition is a fact of life in this industry.  It cannot and should not be rolled back, 
and we should not allow it to continue developing haphazardly.  That approach means 
delay and uncertainty, and it poses a long-run danger to the health of our 
telecommunications system.”237   
The FCC did make some changes regarding competition which had the effect of 
benefitting AT&T in the data market.  In a 'tentative decision' released in July of 1979, the 
FCC said it would 'adopt a flexible regulatory scheme.’  This scheme would allow common 
carriers to set up separate subsidiaries to sell de-tariffed enhanced 'non-voice' services.  
This meant AT&T could provide data processing through a subsidiary.  AT&T Vice 
Chairman James E. Olson cautiously noted that “controversy seems to be giving way to 
consensus on telecommunications legislation, helped in large part by President Carter's call 
for action.”238 
Carter also acknowledged, “But, FCC attention is not enough.  Changes in the law 
are also needed.  To this end, I urge Congress to press ahead with a bill that incorporates: 
encouraging competition wherever it is workable and eliminating needless regulation.  
Deregulation makes sense for competitive markets, such as terminal equipment, and for 
small firms that cannot dominate markets.  Many communications and equipment offerings 
should be deregulated now, and legislation is needed to avoid endless litigation over the 
FCC's authority to do so. Of course, some communications markets, such as the local 
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exchange, may remain regulated monopolies indefinitely.”239  (That has not proven to be 
the case since all of telecommunications is now open to competition.)  
Carter noted there had been a major paradigm shift, “The line between 
telecommunications and data processing has become blurred; new equipment and services 
involve both.  Existing controls based on this distinction have produced years of regulatory 
proceedings and are delaying the use of new technologies.”240 He discussed 
subsidies by Long Distance to Local Service, “Universal availability of basic telephone 
service at affordable rates must be maintained. Overall long-distance revenues currently 
contribute to keeping some local and toll rates affordable. This is done through complex 
accounting processes largely determined by the telephone industry.  Because of the 
developments of the last decade, this system is in trouble.  The industry is considering 
changing it in order to match the new competitors' rates, and that could mean significant 
rate increases in some rural areas.”241  The lobby for rural interests was very pleased by his 
comments that, “The legislation should provide for a charge on all long-distance services—
including those of the new competitors—which use local exchanges. This "access charge" 
would cover the actual cost of using local facilities, provide support for local service, and 
finance protection for rural residents against large toll rate increases.”242 
An argument frequently used by the telephone companies was the potential for the 
complicated nationwide network to be harmed by outside companies.  That argument was 
based on having trillions of working parts in the nationwide system which had to be 
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compatible.  Their contention was that the only way to ensure integrity and functionality 
was to have the telephone company supply and control the devices in and connected to the 
network.  Carter recognized their points and acknowledged that “Telecommunications is 
crucial to our society.  The availability of nationwide, high-quality communications is vital 
to the economy, national security, and the quality of our lives.”  But, he also believed that 
competition in place thus far had paid off, “Sophisticated new communications systems are 
providing better services, lower costs, and improved productivity in an economy that 
depends more and more on information transfers.”243  
 5.7 Carter’s Position Increasingly Focuses on Customer Benefits 
Even though he continued to acknowledge the importance of the 
telecommunication industry, as he neared the end of his firm term and prepared to 
campaign for re-election, Carter’s message became much more aggressive in favor of 
consumer interests.  During his first campaign, at the Ralph Nader forum, Carter had 
admitted not knowing much about the consumer impacts of telephone regulatory reform.  
By the time of his 1979 message to Congress, he actively sought consumer involvement.  
In that message, he said, “Public participation in regulatory decision-making should be 
encouraged.  Effective participation by the users of telecommunications services will help 
the FCC and state regulators make their difficult decisions.  Such involvement should be 
encouraged through open proceedings and by providing funding for groups that could not 
otherwise afford to participate and that represent an important interest that would not 
otherwise be heard.”244  It is clear that Carter was walking a fine line whereby he might 





attract the votes of telecommunications users and possible competitors while not overly 
alienating the many employees of the BOCs and other non-Bell monopoly telephone 
companies.  
As mentioned earlier, those touting the benefits of competition included a few of 
the State Commissions, such as the Colorado Public Utilities Commission.  That 
commission rejected a proposed Mountain Bell Telephone Company tariff filing as being 
non-compensatory and in violation of anti-trust laws.  They also ordered Bell to inform all 
customers who had signed leases for equipment that they could terminate their contracts at 
any time without penalty.245   
Even though any prospect of success was diminishing, AT&T continued to hold 
firm to their message by insisting that technological advances had not negated the value of 
a unified network owned, planned and operated by one company.  Thomas P. Hughes 
accepted the impact of a technological structure on organizational form, but he believed 
that the technological system can be reciprocally influenced by various forces.  Hughes 
stated, “…change involves consideration of many fields of human activity, including the 
technical, the scientific, the economic, the political and the organizational.”246  This type 
of logic was growing in its influence.  It reinforced the belief that a policy decision to alter 
the organizational structure of the Telecommunications industry would result in 
technological adaptation to the new (i.e., competitive) business model.  
 
                                                          
245 North American Telephone Association, New Release-Colorado PUC Takes Stand Favoring Bell 
Competitors, April 24, 1976, Domestic Policy Staff, Government Reform Neustadt, Folder 2 Common 
Carrier – Bell Bill, Box 12, Carter Library. 
246 Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 2. 
161 
 
      CHAPTER 6.  DIVESTITURE AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS 
 
This chapter reviews the final steps in the process leading to the break-up of the 
Bell System. The subsequent actions that were required to implement the government 
ruling are described.  In 1982, after eight years of negotiations, AT&T agreed under court 
order to divest the Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) effective on January 8, 1984.  On 
that date, seven new Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) were formed.   
The basic theory was that competition had developed in long distance and 
equipment markets, and one competitor (AT&T) should not control the “bottleneck” of the 
local networks.  From the perspective of AT&T, it has been argued they opportunistically 
agreed to divest the slow-growth local exchanges for the right to keep manufacturing and 
to enter high growth computer and information markets.247  Ironically, the opposite would 
occur.  This was due in part to subsequent governmental decisions, but also because of a 
changing industry environment and evolution of the technology. 
 6.1 Federal Political Roles 
Christopher Sterling identifies the key decade of telecom deregulation to be 1974-
84.  He states that legal and regulatory battles in this period managed to “. . . redefine the 
shape of American telecommunications—with ramifications still being worked out early 
in the 21st century. . .. the unified and long-dominant Bell System would cease to exist, 
creating a wholly different industry structure.”248  It is important to note that the Carter 
presidency (1977-81) is central to this period.  More than just a temporal placeholder in the 
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process, the Carter years quickened the pace of deregulation of the telecommunications 
industry in favor of competition.   
However, even though Jimmy Carter had a major impact on telecommunications, 
Ronald Reagan is still the president who typically gets the most attention for his crusade to 
stem the overall tide of big government, including regulation of telecommunications.  This 
is reflected in an article and editorial cartoon in Regulation Magazine that credits Reagan 
with success in his first year by writing, “. . . the administration's record has been far better 
than that of any other administration, even allowing for the fact that it has had more to 
deregulate than any other.”  Christopher DeMuth, Reagan’s administrator of information 
and regulatory affairs and executive director of the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory 
Relief, wrote the article.  Though he was hardly an unbiased source, the following editorial 
cartoon from the United Feature Syndicate, which DeMuth included in the article, did 
reflect the generally accepted view.249  
                       
Figure 5 –  Reagan and Regulatory Reform 
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The message of this cartoon was that Reagan changed the model from one where 
regulation was holding back the progress of the United States to one where he held back 
regulation and enabled the economy to advance.  While this has been a common view, it 
should be remembered that Carter also made significant progress, albeit not as well 
recognized.  The settlement of the AT&T case was a major example of the deregulation 
movement.  It was finalized at the very beginning of Reagan’s tenure and therefore credit 
for it should rightly be assigned to Carter.  Still, it is ironic that with all the discussion about 
the role of the FCC and about the need for Congress to rewrite the applicable laws, the 
matter was ultimately decided not by the executive nor the legislative branch of 
government.  The bills died at the end of the 96th Congress in December 1980, concurrent 
with the end of Carter’s presidency.  In the Senate, committee leaderships passed from the 
Democrats to the Republicans; in the House, the failure of Representative Van Deerlin to 
be re-elected meant a change in the influential Communications Subcommittee.   
 6.2 Judicial Control and Decision 
Judge Harold Greene, who had assumed control and consolidation of the various 
antitrust suits against AT&T in 1978, had initially set 1980 as the target date to reach a 
judgment.  The resources available to the DOJ were far less than what AT&T could spend.  
In 1979 alone, AT&T spent $100 million on its defense. 
Another tactic of AT&T was to mobilize the power of its one million employees by 
suggesting they participate in a letter writing campaign to their congressional 
representatives.  The company provided employees with arguments to use against the 
antitrust action and in favor of maintaining the Bell System as it was.  Corporate 
headquarters heavily promoted this campaign and even handed out coffee cups with the 
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Bell logo and the slogan, “The System is the Solution.”  Edicts went to subsidiary 
companies instructing them to conduct similar campaigns at all levels.  Shareholders and 
suppliers also received requests to support this cause of the status quo.   
In 1980, there were extensive advertising campaigns in print and television touting 
the value of the Bell System which had built and operated the best telecommunications 
system in the world.  The message was that government efforts to break apart this valuable 
national asset were counter to the public interest.  Since residential customers were largely 
satisfied with their service, the message of the ads sounded reasonable.  Letters flooded 
into Washington.  Ironically, the political pressure of such a media blitz was 
counterproductive to the company’s objectives as it reinforced concerns by governmental 
policy-makers about the power of AT&T.  In addition, it further irritated those who felt the 
company took the arrogant position that they knew what was best for the public.  Temin 
makes this statement, “In fact, from a political point of view, AT&T was too big.  It had 
grown rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s and appeared to have overwhelming power, equal 
almost to that of the federal government. . .. Although no one in power ever said so, the 
United States found it difficult to tolerate any company quite as large and omnipresent as 
the old AT&T.”250  Not to diminish the significance of the deregulation movement and 
competitive open market goals, which were valid drivers for change, the AT&T mentality 
as exemplified by the ad campaign may indeed be an overarching reason why this break-
up attempt succeeded.  It is a factor whose origin AT&T could not blame on any party, 
other than itself.   
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  Sentiment of the federal government and the weight of evidence was against 
AT&T and in January 1982 a “consent decree” was announced which broke apart the Bell 
System.  The challenges were complex and negotiations among many actors were 
undertaken.  Other than AT&T headquarters, the DOJ, and Judge Greene, the other 
involved parties included the FCC, Congress, State Utility Commissions, current and future 
competitors, independent telephone companies, customer advocacy groups, and standards 
bodies.  Often understated in historical accounts was the role of the BOCs, who were 
organized into seven RBOCs as of the effective date of the divestiture on January 1, 1984.  
Following are the before and after views.251   
 
Figure 6 –  BOCs Before Divestiture 
 
                                                          





Figure 7 –  RBOCs After Divestiture 
 6.3 Impacts on RBOC Employees 
Employees of the RBOCs were faced with many uncertainties and challenges.  It 
was totally uncharted territory for those who had felt safe and comfortable within the large 
and stable organization.  Marvin Thomason had held the position of District Manager for 
Installation and maintenance in the Wichita Falls, Texas district of Southwestern Bell 
Telephone since 1979.  This territory covered a large and mostly rural area north and west 
of Ft. Worth up to the Oklahoma border.  Change there had always been slow to happen.  
Thomason said, “I really wasn’t concerned about divestiture other than whether or not the 
large business portion of my operations was going to go to AT&T or stay with me.  We 
were just basically focused on running the day to operations.”252  But, his world did change 
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dramatically after divestiture was announced.  He described how there was a request for 
managers who would be interested in positions created by the need to assume 
responsibilities previously handled by AT&T which now would be left to each 
RBOC.  Thomason recalled, “I responded that I was interested.  I had been in Wichita Falls 
for 4 years and the district was performing well.  I thought a new opportunity with more 
exposure would be good for my career.  I was offered and took a job in the new State 
Regulatory Group at Southwestern Bell Headquarters in St. Louis.  After that, I was 
involved with the issues that divestiture created as they related to our costs which were 
allowed or not allowed by our regulators in setting our customer prices.”253   
While Thomason did not anticipate great changes, he found himself dealing with 
an enormous upheaval requiring creative thinking and very hard work.  His experience is 
typical of what many other employees faced.  They were required to resolve the structure 
of the local service areas, institute access tariffs for long distance carriers, and implement 
a plan for access to their local network.  In the divestiture decree, the RBOCs were also 
charged to create a centralized staff to perform national security functions and to provide 
an alternative to the technology development and implementation support previously 
provided to the operating companies by Bells Labs and funded by the parent, AT&T. 
A major concern of the RBOCs after divestiture continued to be the provision of 
universal service in the aftermath of divestiture.  They contended that everyone who needed 
phone service should be able to get it at reasonable rates.  Their proposed solution was that 
the FCC should mandate collection of contributions from all customers with a particular 




focus on urban and large business users who were viewed as the most likely to bypass the 
RBOCs.  These funds would be used to subsidize the high-cost customers, for whom this 
was referred to as “lifeline service.”  John Hayes, Vice President – Revenues and Public 
Affairs for the Southwestern RBOC, described this concept as a high-cost pool in a speech 
at a Texas/Oklahoma Telephone Convention, “The pool is an efficient and appropriate way 
of supporting exchange service in high-cost areas.  Because we all do business in the wide-
open spaces of Texas and Oklahoma, I’m sure we all share an insider’s appreciation for 
what we mean when we say high-cost areas.”254  Hayes was referring to the fact that in 
rural areas the cost was much higher to provide service and those customers had the need 
but not the ability to pay the high price which would make the service profitable.  As noted 
by Joe Villarreal, who worked in the Texas accounting organization at the time, “It was 
true that new entrants would not go into high-cost rural areas, but would rather serve the 
lower cost urban residential and business customers.  We thought it was only fair that new 
entrants should collect from their customers and pay into a pool to subsidize service to 
high-cost areas.  Otherwise, it would mean our prices would have to go up to stay 
profitable.  Frankly, we really thought it was unlikely those new players would ever be 
required to pay their share.  It concerned us very much.”255   
The same concerns which Villarreal expressed were felt not only in accounting and 
finance organizations but within other groups and across all levels of management.  Other 
functions such as marketing, sales, network planning, operations and certainly regulatory 
worried about impacts on the company, their organizations, and their jobs.  These 
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uncertainties were well founded because while requirements for small collections were set 
by the FCC in 1984, it was not until the 1996 Telecommunications Act that all the 
regulations were finalized.   Included in that act was the establishment of a Universal 
Service Fund.  It required all telecommunications companies, new entrants, and the 
RBOCs, to contribute to a fund which would guarantee lifeline service to all high-cost 
areas.  
RBOCs also continued to attempt to compete in the enterprise CPE market.  But 
they were required to provide CPE only through an “arm’s length” subsidiary, which was 
not permitted to interface with the other units of their RBOC.  They apparently recognized 
the challenge, but continued anyway, as was stated in a Management Report to employees 
of Southwestern Bell, “According to industry analysts, all seven regional companies 
realized last year that their respective customer premises equipment subsidiaries 
represented a long-term investment, rather than a short-term profit center.  Few expected 
CPE to be profitable in 1984.”256  That comment was a significant understatement since 
they never did recover a profitable position.   
The post-divestiture responsibilities of the RBOCs expanded through growth in the 
market as well as other court decisions moving businesses from the legacy AT&T into the 
RBOCs.  They also became active lobbying in Washington for changes in the laws 
governing telecommunications.  The culmination of this effort was the passage of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996257 which completed the opening of competition in most 
aspects of the telephone business.  The 1996 Act had multiple sections which dealt with 
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SBC Communications, AT&T Archives and History Center, San Antonio, Texas. 
257 “Telecommunications Act of 1996”, Pub. LA. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 1996. 
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areas other than only the telephone industry.  These included digital TV via over-the-air 
broadcasts as well as by the growing TV cable industry.  These topics are beyond the scope 
of this study.   
6.4 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 
The Telecommunication Act of 1996 was necessary to clarify issues and make 
adjustments in the impacts of the antitrust ruling.  It was signed into law by President Bill 
Clinton on February 8, 1996.  He brought with him to the signing the same pen which 
President Eisenhower had used to sign the 1957 Interstate Highway Act.  It was Albert 
Gore, Sr., the father of then Vice President Albert Gore, Jr., who had written the 1957 Act.  
Vice President Albert Gore, Jr. was a major impetus behind what he called the Information 
Super Highway, thus the symbolism of the Eisenhower pen.258  When signing the Act, 
President Clinton said, “Today, with the stroke of a pen, our laws will catch up with the 
future.” 259  The vision of those involved in developing the new law was that it would knock 
down any remaining regulatory barriers and open up local telephone service, long-distance 
service, and cable television to competition for the good of the customers.  With an 
optimistic tone, the co-director of Consumers Union, Gene Kimmelman, said, “This bill 
went from being a consumer nightmare to being something that while it still has significant 
risks is dramatically improved and offers at least hope of greater competition and lower 
prices.”260   
                                                          
258 Richard G. Tomlinson, Tele-revolution: Telephone Competition at the Speed of Light: A History of the   
Creation of a Competitive Local Telephone Industry 1984-2000 (Rockport, ME: Penobscot Press, 2000) 
259 Edmund Andrews, “Communications Bill Signed, And the Battles Begin Anew,” New York Times, 
February 8, 1996, late edition. http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0208.html#article, 
accessed September 27, 2016. 
260 Ibid.  
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A key consideration with open competition was the specter of maintaining 
Universal Service.  It continued to be a focal point for government authorities as well as 
for the BOCs and their new competitors.  The policy dialog revolved around four 
questions:261   
1. How much does the universal service obligation of incumbent telephone 
companies add to their operating costs?   
2. How should those costs be financed in a competitive environment?   
3. What technical and pricing arrangements should be made to enable 
interconnection of incumbent telephone companies with competing networks 
in order to maintain complete connectivity of users?  
4. Should “Universal Service” be redefined to include new technologies and 
services and, if so, how should it be done? 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was the first comprehensive revision of the 
Communications Act of 1934.  Rather than replacing, it was integrated into the 1934 Act. 
It culminated twenty years of legislative struggle over how to adapt the federal law to the 
new realities of telecommunications.  According to a committee report accompanying the 
draft bill, a goal was to clearly articulate the policy of Congress that universal service was 
a cornerstone of our nation’s communications system.  The intent was to make explicit the 
authority of the FCC and the States to require common carriers to provide universal 
service.262 
                                                          
261 Mueller, 165-191. 
262 Lawerence Pressler. “Committee Report on the Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation 
Act” (Chairman of Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation) March 28, 1995. 
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The language of the Act makes it clear that universal service was no longer confined 
to only traditional telephone service.  The definition must take into account advances in 
telecommunications and information technologies.  It was defined to include services 
considered essential to education, public health, or public safety.  In addition, they must be 
deployed in public telecommunications networks by telecommunications carriers and be 
consistent with public interest, convenience, and necessity.  The FCC would be required to 
include any conforming service to which a substantial majority of residential customers 
subscribed and it must revise and update the definition periodically.263   
Further, the law specifically provided that “quality services should be available at 
just, reasonable, and affordable rates.”264  This requirement meant the FCC would need to 
decide what is “affordable” and arrange to subsidize any providers whose costs of 
providing the designated service exceeded the affordability target, including geographic 
areas where conditions made service more expensive to provide.  This contrasts with the 
prior rate of return regulation which was based on a fair return on investment and not on 
what was appropriate for particular users.  In order to comply with this new definition, all 
telecommunications providers of interstate services were required to make financial 
contributions to a fund for the services defined as universal.   
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 destroyed the legal basis for protected 
monopolies in telecommunications and assured the right of entry for entrepreneurs.  But, 
it also provided some areas of negotiation and of comfort for the old-line incumbent 
RBOCs, such as the universal service fund and the right to enter unencumbered into 
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264 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. LA. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) 
173 
 
previously restricted areas like interstate transport, intelligent CPE, and television.  Even 
so, it firmly established that as the country moved further into the new Information Age a 
competitive environment was equated with the public interest, was convenient, was a 
necessity and was facilitated by deregulation.  
6.5 Importance and Challenges of Standards in a Fragmented Structure 
Table 6 shows the position of the United States compared to other nations in terms 
of the percent of their investments which were allocated to Information and 
Communications Technologies (ICT) in the later years of the 20th Century.  ICT was 
comprised of three components: information technology equipment (computers and related 
hardware), communications equipment, and software.  Software included the acquisition 
of prepackaged software, customized software, and software developed in-house.  ICT was 
critical to the leadership position of the United States and with the break-up of the Bell 
System plus new competitors the challenges of setting standards and their importance to 










                  Table 6 – Spending on Information and Communications Technologies.265 
 
 
 Another, somewhat contradictory, estimate was that between 1986 and 1992, about 
half of United States corporations’ investments went into information technologies and 
telecommunications equipment.266  The degree of variation between the two sources 
illustrates that measurements are difficult to capture.   What is clear though is the 
importance of these technologies and the strong position of the United States relative to 
other countries.  Because of this, it was critical that any governmental actions would not 
damage but instead would help to ensure a continued strong position.   
                                                          
265 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD (2016), ICT investment (indicator). 
doi: 10.1787/b23ec1da-en (Accessed on 16 November 2016) 
266  Jerry A. Hausman, "Proliferation of Networks in Telecommunications: Technological and Economic 
Considerations," in Networks, Infrastructure, and the New Task for Regulation, ed. Werner Sichel and 
Donald L. Alexander (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 22-23. 
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In addition, for such a complex, interconnected and interdependent system as the 
ICT network, it was essential that all players participate in and adhere to standards.  A 
standard is an agreement that provides a common reference for all concerned parties.  It is 
critical there be no neglect towards the complexities surrounding standards.  This is even 
more true in the realm of the converging telecommunications and information technologies 
than it is in many other fields.  Solving problems necessitates intensive attention to details 
as described in the following statement, “A solution requires that all the elements of basic 
telephony, data processing, all varieties of hardware, and their content formats for input, 
output, transmission, storage, and processing be in perfect harmony.  Once assembled, the 
end-to-end system’s performance must satisfy the sense of urgency of those who use it.  
Accordingly, standards for interoperability are essential, and the participation of suppliers 
and end users in standards-setting movements is a critical success factor.”267 
Consensus standards are recognized by telecommunications companies and by 
governmental agencies as essential to preserving the integrity of nationwide 
telecommunications and enabling the interconnection and interoperability of equipment 
and services.  Examples of telecommunication standards are interface protocols, 
numbering plans, circuit noise limits, and electrical interface specifications.  These 
standards benefit equipment manufacturers, telecommunications operating companies and 
consumers.  The obvious aspect is the ability to make telecommunications connections 
worldwide.  Also, important though is that with an accepted standard a manufacturer can 
expand its market, both nationally and internationally and achieve benefits from economies 
                                                          
267 Harvey L. Poppel and Bernard Goldstein, Information Technology Standardization: The Trillion-Dollar 
Opportunity (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1987), 6. 
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of scale.  Lastly, and very important, a consumer has a broader range of choices and can 
base purchasing decisions on a supplier’s performance, price, and features rather than only 
its compatibility with unique interfaces and services. 
As addressed by Andrew L. Russell in his book, Open Standards and the Digital 
Age, the story of communications standards is, “. . . in effect, the convergence of two 
stories: the history of communication networks and the history of a collaborative form of 
consensus standardization.  The two stories do not share the origins; indeed, they converge 
fully only in the last decades of the twentieth century, when consensus standards were 
recast as open standards.”  Russell describes the convergence as more than a history of the 
Internet, although he concedes that was a key component.  His view appropriately takes 
into account political, technical and cultural diversity within the broader scope of the 
history of networking.  Further, Russell states, it is not only an American story as principles 
of openness and consensus have international aspects and global consequences.  While 
Russell certainly has a valid point and the global community did have great influence, a 
somewhat counter-view rests on the pre-divestiture power and worldwide influence of the 
Bell System.   
Prior to January 1, 1984, most standards for the telecommunication industry, 
domestic and international, were established simply by the ability of AT&T, through 
consultation with their BOC’s, to create system-wide standards. With occasional 
modification, these standards achieved universal adoption by alternative providers in the 
name of compatibility and because they lacked the resources to develop, debate and replace 
the AT&T proposed standards.  The quality of service under this process was generally 
good although some erosion had occurred beginning with the entrance of MCI, Carterfone 
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and multiple other providers of services and CPE.  But compatibility issues accelerated 
enormously with the divestiture of the BOCs from AT&T and the opening of the industry 
to many more new equipment and service providers.   
The new RBOCs recognized this change and attempted to characterize it as both a 
challenge and an opportunity.  As an example, the Southwestern RBOC’s stated position 
was that as a service provider, it sought to offer high-quality services with multiple vendor 
equipment which interconnected seamlessly with the worldwide telecommunications 
network.  As a user of telecommunications components, it sought to purchase products 
with the best features and performance at the most reasonable cost. The most important 
benefits of standards it identified were to: minimize capital costs, increase flexibility, 
strengthen the quality of service, and maximize legal protection.  The Southwestern RBOC 
accepted that its role was to contribute toward standards which were useful to the company 
and the industry at large.268   
The telephone system is a large network of many components and for it to function 
requires interface standards in a similar manner to other large networks such as railroads 
or power utilities.  Hence, for a customer to place their owned equipment on their premises 
required a standard interface to the telecom system.  This began with voice telephone sets 
and went on through data modems for computer access and complicated high capacity 
multichannel data communications.  Transport facilities went from a single path on a 
copper pair of wires to high capacity fiber.  It also was required for network switching 
nodes to be able to send traffic to others systems, including those of competitors.  Transport 
                                                          




went from copper wires to analog carriers, then digital carriers and then packet switching.  
The packet switching mode directed traffic using individual packets of data with each one 
containing inside the packet not only the information to be delivered but also the “to and 
from” addresses.  In the communications network, a dedicated link between two points was 
replaced by a virtual link.  Communications were divided into these packets which could 
be sent via different routes and then reassembled at the destination.  There was the 
requirement to establish standards so that multiple telecommunications companies could 
interface their systems, multiple providers could manufacture and install the equipment and 
multiple end users could connect and operate their voice and data CPE.  
Telecommunications standards are the underlying “laws” that govern the Global 
Information Highway.  Telecommunications networks in every country in the world utilize 
formal standards to physically interwork.  Without public agreements and the 
telecommunications standards that codify such agreements, wide-area voice and data 
communications would not be possible.  The American National Standards Institute 
(ANSI) and the Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA) negotiate proposals 
within the United States.  These are then addressed at the international level by the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU).269 
 The International Telecommunications Union is a treaty organization of the United 
Nations which has individual countries as members.  It is the oldest telecommunications 
standards organization, dating back to 1865. It recently adopted the name ITU as the name 
of its standards work, replacing the name International Telegraph and Telephone 
                                                          
269 International Telecommunication Union. (1999). Annual report. Geneva. 
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Consultative Committee (in French the acronym was CCITT).  The standards work in the 
ITU is divided into two sections, ITU-Telecommunications (ITU-T) and ITU-Radio 
communications (ITU-R). Each section is organized into Study Groups.  Study Groups are 
divided into Working Parties, and then further divided into Question Sessions.  The work 
in a Question Session is led by a Rapporteur (French word meaning facilitator).  These 
working meetings are termed Rapporteur meetings. 
 The TIA is the formal organization responsible for the standards of the 
telecommunications equipment within the United States.  Completing the picture of formal 
telecommunications standards committees in the United States is the Alliance for 
Telecommunications Industry Solutions (ATIS).  It is the lower layer of the formal 
organizations responsible for the telecommunications network standards. 
 In summary, TIA develops the national standards in the United States for 
the equipment that connects to the telecommunications network and ATIS T1 develops the 
US national telecommunications standards for the network to which the equipment 
attaches. Work from both these organizations is passed, via the US State Department (as 
the representative of the USA) to the ITU where worldwide telecommunications standards 
are defined (by bringing together national standards work from many countries).  There are 
also other groups in the complex process of telecommunications standards.   
It should be noted that technological innovation has been in large part facilitated by 
standards work which enabled multiple vendors to design equipment without artificial and 
expensive interface devices.  As described earlier, AT&T and Bell Labs previously had 
developed standards with little or no outside contributions.  The future would bring an 
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enormous change to how the telephone system would be designed and operated.  Joe 
McMonagle had network planning and operations responsibilities and lived through this 
transition while working intensively with various departments of each of the newly created 
RBOCs, multiple suppliers, and competitors as well as many large customers.  His charge 
was a key part of the effort to keep the United States communications services working 
well.  He described a key challenge they faced within standards bodies, “As new 
technology developed utilizing semiconductors, integrated circuits and stored program 
control memory, more and larger companies saw the business opportunities and demanded 
to participate in the standards arena.  In addition, with the breakup of the Bell System, 
seven new companies (the RBOCs) began to actively participate in setting standards.  
Initially they worked together, but eventually, they started going down different paths 
further complicating the standards process.”270  As noted by Phyllis Anderson, a member 
of the standards group in one of the RBOCs, “The process of reaching agreements with 
multiple members of the industry was extremely challenging.  Each company had their 
own agenda and sought to optimize their position.”271  While it is true that the challenges 
were huge in the early days of opening the telephone system to competition, those 
challenges have never diminished.  In fact, Anderson stated they continued to grow as new 
services and new entrants appeared.    She described how the following cartoon was 
circulated within her organization in 2009 and generated smiles of acknowledgment as 
rather accurate by those employees, such as herself, who had been working the standards 
issues for many years. 
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271 Phyllis Anderson, Member of Technical Staff, AT&T, Interview by author, February 24, 2017. 
181 
 
                   
   Figure 8 – Cartoon Illustration of the Standards Process 









             CHAPTER 7.     CONCLUSIONS 
 
“No monopoly of global telecommunications currently exists or is likely to exist because 
of the constant technical change produced by the free interchange of technical information, 
the relative fluidity now achieved by global capital, and the failure … to protect Bell’s 
monopoly….”272 
 
This quote is an accurate assessment of what happened by the late 1990s and 
remains true today.  In response to facing growing competition in their own territories, the 
former Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) began to expand into competition 
with each other.  They also began to consolidate through acquisition.273  Even the 
remaining businesses of the original AT&T were eventually acquired by one the RBOCs.274 
Part of the reason the AT&T breakup is a recurring area of interest in business 
history is that communications impacts society in so many ways.  As the nature of 
communications has changed, the way most of us live and work has also changed.  Many 
rural areas of the United States did not have a phone in the house until the 1960s.  Today, 
we carry a smartphone almost all the time and would feel totally lost without it.  Access to 
the wealth of information, entertainment, business applications and personal interaction 
provided by the internet has become so central to the lives of most citizens in the United 
States that we cannot imagine the world without it.  Competition in this arena is a topic of 
great relevance given the February 26, 2015, FCC action, in which openness was defined 
                                                          
272 Peter J. Hugill, Global Communications Since 1844 – Geopolitics and Technology, The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore, 1999, p.239. 
273 The first such move was when the Southwestern RBOC acquired the RBOC serving the Great Lakes 
states (Ameritech). 
274 In October, 2005 the acquisition of AT&T by SBC Communications was finalized. That RBOC was 
formally Southwestern Bell.  Primarily, AT&T’s remaining businesses at the time were long distance voice 
and data, internet service, international operations, and the new service of mobile telephony.  Because of 
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not as price control, but as assurance that the last mile connection will not be used to block 
access.  Although the FCC decision is about "network neutrality" and most scholars address 
transport issues, the implications for Customer Provided Equipment (CPE) and associated 
interconnection standards are very significant.  Most of what has been written about the 
history of competition and regulation deals with network competition rather than premises 
equipment.  Further, the importance of CPE standards in the whole process is 
understated.  Potential harm to the performance of the telephone system was at the forefront 
of the arguments against CPE competition and led to the requirement for certification of 
CPE provided by other than the incumbent telephone company.  Therefore, this dissertation 
addressed not only competition in voice or data transport of information, but also explored 
in depth the role competition in CPE played in the debates which ultimately led to 
divestiture.   
 7.1 Former RBOCs Have Minor Role in CPE Today 
Provision of the essential data communications premises equipment became highly 
competitive and provided by a large number of companies.  By the mid-1990s, the Bell 
Operating Companies (BOCs role in data CPE had become minimal.  The major role that 
data equipment evolution, driven by technology, has played was paid significant attention 
in this dissertation.  For voice CPE, there were certainly technological advances which 
played a role in the demise of the BOCs dominating position; however, in that case, 
regulatory factors were the prime driver.  In the case of data CPE, the reverse appears to 
be true.  Although governmental action obviously had its impacts, it was the rapid advance 
of technology and the merging of computers and communications which had the greater 
influence on the diminishing role of the BOCs in data CPE.   
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 7.2 Intense Pressures of Fragmentation and Competition  
In the case of telephone companies, as in other industries, there are motives for 
increased competition.  The expectation of greater creativity and innovation is primary 
among the objectives.  Other points particularly germane to telephone operations were well 
stated in a report funded and prepared specifically for AT&T.  The report noted, 
“Competition is basically a cruel market process which rewards the efficient and metes out 
severe punishment to those who fail.  Under a regime of full competition, each firm is under 
severe pressure to offer the product most likely to appeal to consumers.”275  Among the 
authors of this report was a man who made enormous impacts on regulation in the United 
States.  That man was Alfred Kahn.  This same report held out the prospect that certain 
types of services may be best provided by a regulated monopoly.  While not stated in the 
report, services in rural areas may be such a category since universal service would dictate 
the need to connect remote and inherently expensive locations.  It went on to discuss how 
there were cases where competition could thrive without negating the merits of economies 
of scale which a monopoly enabled.  CPE is one such area.  As stated, with some sadness, 
by a former employee of a BOC, “CPE is now a commodity and can be purchased 
anywhere, even Walmart.”276  
Adjusting to this new environment was an enormous challenge to the Bell System, 
which grew up and thrived as a regulated monopoly.  An example of the impact was an 
                                                          
275 William J. Baumol, Otto Eckstein, and Alfred E. Kahn, Competition and Monopoly in 
Telecommunications (n.p.), 1970, page 4. This report was prepared by an advisory group at the request of 
AT&T to define economic issues associated with the changing regulatory scene. It was for internal use of 
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276 Joe McMonagle, Former Director of Planning and Operations at Southwestern Bell Corporation, 
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operations planning book, jointly authored by AT&T General Departments and Bell 
Laboratories.  It was under preparation prior to the January 1982 settlement of the AT&T 
antitrust case.  After the settlement, the publication had to be entirely modified to fit the 
new world of telecommunications.  The subject of the report was instructions regarding 
planning, building and operating the next generation of communications networks to 
accommodate the growing need for integration of voice and data over the same 
transmission, switching and terminal facilities.  After five months of dissecting and 
remolding, it was issued in June 1982 as a recommendation to the restructured AT&T and 
the soon to be divested Bell Operating Companies.277  Although some of it proved useful, 
for the most part, each newly independent company chose its own path. 
              The government’s view ultimately prevailed because the BOCs and AT&T could 
provide no convincing evidence to counter unfolding events.  Nor could they win on 
theory.  Their attempts to buttress their position, through the ill-conceived Bell Bill and its 
accompanying scare tactics, were worse than ineffective.  They prompted a significant 
backlash.   
 7.3 Accept and Go Forward 
  It would be counterfactual to speculate about what may have been different if 
deregulation had not proceeded as it did.  What we do know is that our world today enjoys 
an abundance of information and communications capabilities.  Beyond the relaxation of 
regulation and encouragement of competition, the federal government also took steps to 
press forward on development and implementation of advanced telecommunications 
                                                          




technologies.  Auctions of government-controlled radio spectrum for use in privately-
managed cellular networks led to mobile telephones which have replaced much of the 
traditional landline phone service and enabled “anywhere/anytime” communications.  In 
addition, impacts of the internet are perhaps even more profound.  In the words of 
President-Elect Bill Clinton, the advanced communications infrastructure, “. . . could do 
for the productivity of individuals at their places of work and learning what the interstate 
highway of the 1950s did for the productivity of the nation’s travel and distribution 
system.”278  In 1993 President Clinton authorized an investment of $2 Billion for the 
creation of a high-speed information and communications network, connecting 
universities, private and public research laboratories, hospitals, and eventually homes, 
which would serve as a catalyst for growth in information services.  Congress later reduced 
the investment to $1 Billion.279  The President’s support and funding approved by Congress 
has served keep the United States in a strong technological position.  The post-divestiture 
environment has successfully functioned toward achieving this goal.  One measure of this 
is shown in the following table which identifies the position of the United States as having 
the third largest number of internet users.  However, it is important to recognize that some 
countries with smaller populations, such as Japan, the United Kingdom and the Nordic 
countries, do have a higher percentage of the population with internet access than does the 
United States.  There is still room for improvement by the United States in achieving 
universal accessibility to the internet. 
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       Table 7 – Internet Users by Country in 2016280 
            Number of Users   % of Population 
1. China  721, 434,547  52.2 
2. India  462,124,989  34.8 
3. U.S.  286,942,362  88.5 
In 1995, the Progress and Freedom Foundation issued a report that advocated the 
elimination of the FCC, thus ending federal regulation of all telecommunications.  Entry 
and pricing in all markets would be free of federal control.281  The rationale was that new 
technologies, such as wireless voice and data, cable TV provided fast internet, computer 
based connectivity were creating a competitive marketplace where regulation would no 
longer be needed.  The economics of the various alternatives were fully comparable to 
traditional wired telephony.  Also, by shortly after divestiture, the penetration rates of wired 
telephony had already reached very high levels, even for the lower income families.  This 





                                                          
280 www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users-by-country, International Telecommunication Union (ITU), 
2016. 
281 George A. Keyworth et al., The Telecom Revolution: An American Opportunity (Washington: Progress 
& Freedom Foundation, 1995) Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2120176  
188 
 
Table 8 –  Household Income and Telephone Penetration After Divestiture282 
Household Income   % of homes with telephone 
Under $5000     71.1 
$5,000 – 7,499     82.7 
$7,500 – 9,999     87.6 
$10,000 – 12,499    89.5 
$12,500 – 14,999    91.3 
$15,000 – 17,499    92.9 
$17,500 – 19,999    94.6 
$20,000+     96.3 
Although the proposal to end regulation had some merit, there was no chance it could 
be enacted by Congress and the executive administration in power at that time.  Their 
philosophy was that government had an obligation to continue some degree of regulation 
in order to provide protection for every citizen from corporate greed.  For example, the 
incumbents sunk costs might otherwise allow them to reduce rates substantially to forestall 
entry of competitors.  Additionally, the incumbents could take actions to complicate 
interconnection and numbering methodologies.  If a customer would have to change their 
phone number, then they may be less likely to leave the incumbent.283   
                                                          
 282 Data from U.S. Census Bureau, 1986. 
283 Robert W. Crandall, Have Regulators Dialed the Wrong Number? Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997. 
189 
 
Whether the breakup of AT&T was the best route for society to take can be 
endlessly debated.  What is for certain is that through legal and political processes the pro-
competitive philosophy, which Carter advanced, resulted in the largest divestiture in 
history and overwhelmed and outdated all other previous telecommunications regulation 
and competition initiatives.   
More than twenty years have passed since what is likely the last major initiative in 
deregulation of the telecommunications industry.   The 1996 Telecommunications Act 
changed parts of the AT&T Divestiture Agreement by allowing the BOCs unrestricted 
permission to enter in Long Distance services, added more detailed provisions for 
interconnection with competitors and allowed Cable TV and BOCs to enter each other’s 
markets.  However, it did not eliminate the ability of state commissions to impose their 
individual regulations.   
While comparisons of telecommunications to other industries with monopolistic 
overtones, such as railroads, electric utilities, or airlines, are useful they are unclear and 
incomplete.  Peter Temin, writing the official AT&T history, argued that a change in 
governmental ideology favoring competition was more influential than technological 
change or the specific legal issues.284  It must also be noted that the power and influence 
of potential competitors were key to driving negotiations, governmental philosophies, 
regulatory changes and clearly the standards processes.  “Spectrum auctions removed 
barriers to entry for wireless services and introduced more competition.  Ultimately, the 
former Bell System became two national operating companies rather than one long distance 
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and seven regional companies.  Long distance used to be a major industry, now it is just 
part of the service.”285   
7.4 Technology Made It Possible and Competition Has Worked 
While various factors had their impacts; it is clear today that without the 
advancements in technology the ultimate change could not have happened.  These winds 
of change began with competition in CPE at the BOC level and have led to the ability for 
mobile phones, provided by a competing multitude of services companies, to call a person 
rather than a place and to access the world of the internet.  The storm of technology that 
precipitated the split of the country’s largest company into pieces set the stage for a 
multitude of new entrants, which policy-makers facilitated and customers embraced.  The 
result was to directly impact the lives of millions and touch almost all citizens in some way.   
The conclusion is that the Bell System could be successfully broken apart.  AT&T’s 
arguments predicting severe damage to essential services were wrong.  This is recognized 
in remarks by Irwin Dorros.  At the time of the antitrust case, he was the AT&T Assistant 
Vice President-Network Planning.  In that role, he was responsible for planning the 
evolution of the then Bell System nationwide network.  During this assignment, he was the 
technical leader of AT&T's defense in the DOJ antitrust action.  He participated in 
negotiations and framing of the settlement terms.  During an interview in 2011, Dr. Dorros 
said, "I testified in court three times that it would be a disaster.  It didn't turn out to be a 
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disaster at all.  I didn't realize the power of competition at the time.”286  What most people 




                                                          




        TIMELINE 
1848 John Stuart Mill developed the principle of natural monopoly when he noted that 
gas and water service in London could be supplied at lower cost if the duplication 
of facilities by competitive firms were avoided. 
 
1877 A United States Supreme Court decision enabled states to regulate prices levied by 
businesses affected with a public interest.  
 
1878 First telephone exchange opens in Connecticut. 
 
1894 Second Bell patent expires and opens the way for competitors. 
 
1907 Theodore Vail, AT&T’s first President, called for regulation of the 
telecommunications industry because it was a natural monopoly operated in the 
public interest. 
 
1910 The Interstate Commerce Commission began regulation of the interstate aspects of 
the telephone industry. 
 
1934 The Communications Act was passed by Congress and created a seven-member 
Federal Communications Commission charged to assume the interstate aspects of 
communications. 
 
1947 First antitrust suit filed against AT&T. 
 
1952 Federal court ruled that Dialite, a customer-owned device to attach to a telephone 
dial, was not permitted. 
 
1956 FCC prohibited use of the Hush-a-Phone but the Federal Appeals Court overturned 




1956  First antitrust suit was settled by a consent decree which limited Bell to only the 
telephone business.   
 
1967 The FCC issued the Carterfone decision permitting other manufacturers’ equipment 
to be connected to the network so long as it “did no harm.” 
 
1974  A second antitrust suit was filed against AT&T, seeking a break-up of the Bell 
Companies. 
 
1976   The FCC and Appeals Court approve a registration program which includes 
PBXs, key telephone systems, main stations, data and ancillary equipment (i.e. fax 
machines). 
 
1976 The Consumer Communications Reform Act, supported by the telephone 
companies, is introduced in Congress. 
 
1977 President Jimmy Carter appoints Alfred Kahn to work on fighting high inflation.  
They advance deregulation and price competition which support breaking up of 
market control by large regulated monopolies. 
 
1977 The Senate holds oversight hearings which include witnesses from telephone 
companies, the FCC, competitive suppliers, business customers and consumer 
advocacy groups. 
 
1979  The Telecommunications Act of 1979 is introduced in Congress to replace the 
Communications Act of 1934 as the vehicle for managing national 
telecommunications policy. 
 
1980  The FCC rules that AT&T must offer terminal equipment only through an 
unregulated separate subsidiary.  The transition must be completed by March 1982.  
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1981 Trial proceedings begin in the Justice Department’s 1974 antitrust suit against 
AT&T. 
1982 Settlement announced of the 1974 antitrust suit against AT&T, resulting in the 
divestiture of the Bell Operating Companies.   
 
1984 Divestiture becomes effective. 
 
1996 The United States Congress passed a Telecommunications Act which replaced the 
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